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An Examination of Schiller's concept of harmony.; with 
special reference to the use of the word "Harmonie" In 
the philosophical writings^
Many recent studies have examined Schiller’s use of 
language within his philosophical essays. S.S,Kerry has 
suggested that certain words appear here as "concept- 
rnyths” - that is, they stand for a complex system of ideas 
and hear several associations at once. In this thesis it 
is contended that the word "Harmonie" is one such "concept- 
myth".
Although the word had been part of the German language 
since the time of Frauenlob, it was not used widely until 
the 18th century, when the ideas of Leibniz and Shaftesbury 
began to be reflected in popular philosophical writings. 
Schiller extended the use of the word by seeing in the ideas 
which he felt to be implied by it in its musical sense an 
analogue for his own concept of the ideal human personality.
This theeis does not undertake to examine every 
example of Schiller’s use of the word "Harmonie", but it is 
shown that, in the philosophical essays, he uses the word to 
cover both various agreements between the different sides 
of the personality and various relationships between the 
personality and the outside world. There are three types 
of agreement within the personality (intuitive, moral and 
counterfeit) and corresponding to these are three harmonious, 
or seemingly harmonious, relationships between the 
personality and the outside world, each one of which has 
its own political and historical implications. Intuitive 
harmony (sinnlich) and moral harmony fmoralisch) are truly 
harmonious states, whereas counterfeit harmony ffalsch) is 
a compromised condition which may have dangerous conse­
quences. The task of Art is to bring about true harmony 
in the individual and thus, by implication, in society.
To strive towards true harmony is seen by Schiller as the 
task of each individual and the word "Harmonie" with all 
its implications thus becomes a code-word containing a 
guiding principle for all walks of life.
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Appendix E.
Standardisation of references contained in the text of the 
thesis.
Apologia. ^
Appendix B has been thought necessary because the 
edition of Schiller^ s works used throughout the text is 
not a well-known one.I have tried as far as possible, 
therefore,to give all references again in better known 
editions.Unfortunately,however,it was found impossible 
to put all these references in the text itself,so that 
from p.83 onwards the reader is advised to use the 
Appendix.
Spelling of quotations from Schiller.
An apology must also be given for the inconsistency 
in the spelling adppted in the quotations from Schiller. 
It had been hoped to standardise these and to adopt the 
present-day forms throughout,but unfortunately the typist 
was unable to undertake this.I have therefore altered the 
most glaring inconsistencies,but should like,at a later 
date,to complete the task.
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A. INTRODUCTION
I. General Introduction
In 1928 Hans Lutz^ pointed out that, although research 
had been concerned with the details of Schiller’s biography 
and with the problems of his dramatic and poetic v/ork, the 
speculative essays had not been fully appreciated. Scholars 
had indeed tried to elucidate Schiller’s aesthetic theories, 
but their conclusions had been unsatisfactory for two main 
reasons: the essays had either been studied by literary 
scholars who had no detailed knowledge of the l8th century 
philosophical background, or they had been examined by 
philosophers who had no idea of Schiller’s literary develop­
ment and no feeling for the peculiarities of his language.
Among the former Lutz included the studies of Schiller's
2 3aesthetic theories by Berger and Harnack , both of whom 
he considered to remain "philosophisch an der Oberflache".
(1) H. Lutz ’ Schillers Anschauungj\von Kultur und Natur’. 
Germanische Studien. Berlin. 1928.
The works referred to by Lutz are as follows:
(2) K. Berger. Schiller. 2 vols. Berlin 1906-19Q9«
" Die Entwicklung von Schillers Asthetik.
Weimar. 1894'
(3) O.Hamack. Die klassische Asthetik der Deutschen.
Leipzig. I892.
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Among the latter he included works by Tomaschek, Uberweg 
and Kiihnemann^, who are all censured for neglecting certain 
details of literary scholarship. Close examination of the 
essays was, at the time of Lutz’ article, extremely rare. 
Bertha Mugdan’s^ study of the development of Schiller’s 
philosophical thought is indeed mentioned by Lutz, but it 
is primarily concerned in assessing Schiller’s relationship 
to Kant and also to Reinhold and Fichte. Lutz hoped that 
by tracing the development of Schiller’s use of the words 
"Natur" and "Kultur" throughout the essays he would pioneer 
a nev/ approach to the study of this side of Schiller’s 
work.
Lutz called his work "eine begriffsgeschichtliche 
Untersuchung" and by his method he was able to isolate 19 
different usages of the word "Natur" in Schiller’s writings. 
His analysis also led him to the conclusion that Schiller 
constantly changed the names of his concepts and made no 
attempt to work them into a coherent system. "Es ist" he
(1) K.Tomaschek. Schiller in seinem Verbaltnis zur Wissen- 
schaft. Vienna.TsSR]
(2) F.Uberweg. Schiller als Historiker und Philosoph.
Leipzig. 1884.
(3) E.Kûhnemann. Schiller. Munich. 1914
" Kants und Schillers Begründung der Asthetik.
Munich. 1884.
" Schillers philosophische Schriften und
Gedichte. Auswahl. Leipzig. 1902.
(4) B.Mugdan. ’Die theoretischen Grundlagen der Schillerschen 
Philosophie’. Kantstudien. Erganzungsheft. Berlin. I910.
writes "als ob er die alten Begriffe vergessen hStte und 
daher gezwungen ware, nach neuen zu suchen. Dabei steht 
sein Ideal ziemlich klar vor ihm, er besitzt aber nicht 
die Pahigkeit, es in ein philosophisches Begriffssystem 
einzukleiden. Das zeigt, dass er eben mehr Dichter als 
Denker ist".^
Although Lutz indicated new paths for Schiller research, 
he himself did not perhaps fully appreciate the complexity 
of Schiller’s purpose. He assumed that Schiller wished to 
expound a philosophical system. Hermann Meyer, however, 
has tried to show that, in his speculative essays, Schiller 
did not v/ish to use the rational language adopted by Kant —  
a language which was directed tov/ards the intellect or 
’common sense’ of the reader, but which did not in Schiller’s 
view appeal to the imagination. As he believed that the 
ideas of reason could never influence the individual as a 
whole unless they were presented in a way which did appeal 
to the imagination, Schiller adopted, according to Meyer, 
a rhetorical language. Through such a medium Schiller hoped 
not to construct a philosophical system but to influence 
people to act in accordance with his ideas. Meyer suggests 
that the rhetorical style of the essays has been overlooked
(1) op. cit., p ,278.
and calls, in a footnote, for a detailed stylistic analysis
A
Of them from this point of view# The date of his article 
(1959) shows that very little had been done in this 
direction since Lutz* first challenge.
Kühneraann had already indicated the wide field that 
may be covered by any Schillerian concept. In his opinion 
the names Schiller gives to his concepts are often ill- 
fitting: they conceal, rather than clarify, the under­
lying thoughts. Kuhnemann did nevertheless suggest ,that 
Schiller’s importance lay in his psychological insight and 
in his ability to combine practical experience with 
philosophy. "Die vbllige Verschmelzung der systematischen 
Begriffe und der Erfahrungen ist das Grossartige seiner 
reifen philosophischen Schriften" he says at one point.^ 
Recently scholars have sought to investigate more thoroughly 
Schiller’s psychological insight and, for some of them, the 
breadth of Schiller’s terms, his ability to pack several 
layers of meaning under one word, has been his peculiar 
strength and fascination. Professor Wilkinson, for instance, 
has said that "if Schiller’s terms are inexact, it is no
(1) H.Meyer. ’Schillers philosophische Rhetorik. Eine 
versteckte Sntlehnung.* Euphorion. 53* 1959*
(2) E.Kühneraann. Kants und Schillers Begründung der Asthetik. 
Munich. 1884. p.97.
random inexactitude, if inconsistent, not an haphazard 
inconsistency"# The difference between Kant and Schiller, 
according to Professor Wilkinson, is that whereas Kant 
was trying to make a clear distinction between the several 
faculties of mind, Schiller was trying to illustrate "the 
dynamic interplay between the two fundamental aspects of 
human nature : sense and spirit, nature and freedom, finite 
and infinite, or however you like to call them".^ Schiller’s 
trick of constantly changing the names of his concepts is 
not seen by Professor Wilkinson as a weakness on Schiller’s 
part, but as a method of deflecting attention "from the 
content of the concepts to the dynamic relations between 
them"# By thus revealing (often with the aid of admirable 
diagrams) the nature of Schiller’s use of language within 
one of his most important essays Professor Wilkinson has 
contributed to a deeper understanding of his thought.S.S. 
Kerry has suggested that, in his essays, Schiller is 
developing a mythology of concepts, whereby his concepts 
assume a semi-human identity. They are thus emotionally 
charged and capable of bearing several associations at once.
(1) E.M.Wilkinson. ’Some reflections after translating 
Schiller’s letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man’. 
Schiller Bicentenary Lectures. London. I960, p. 57.
(2) ibid., p. 59.
(3) ibid., p. 68.
and these associations must all be borne in mind if the 
essays are to be fully understood. "The bleak abstraction 
"Freiheit" is charged" he v/rites "with a quite abnormal 
potential and irradiates large associated areas". Thus a 
more favourable interpretation of Kuhnemann*s criticism that 
Schiller’s terras fit too loosely is revealed.
The peculiar nature of Schillerian terminology has also 
been explored recently by Olive Sayce. She has found that 
Schiller did not, as a rule, coin any new terms to express 
his philosophical ideas, but adopted instead words with 
already well-established connotations. The difficulty is, 
she continues, that Schiller by no means abandoned these 
already established connotations, and within his work words 
may be found to bear both their traditional and their 
specifically Schillerian senses. Indeed, they may sometimes 
bear both simultaneously. Mrs. Sayce discusses Schiller’s 
varying use of the word "Natur" and distinguishes pre-Kantian, 
Kantian and post-Kantian stages. Seven different meanings 
of the word "moralisch" are also isolated. Mrs. Sayce also 
examines the words "naiv" and "sentimentalisch" and shows 
how failure to appreciate the different senses in which 
Schiller may use these words can lead to mis-interpretation. 
She concludes with these words: "Ziel einer sprachlichen
(1) S.S.Kerry. Schiller’s Writings on Aesthetics. Manchester 
University Press. 19él. p.6.
Untersuchung muss es sein, die verschiedenen Bedeutungen 
eines Wortes aufzudecken, nicht um Schiller der Inkonsequenz 
zu heschuldigen, sondem als Vorbedingung für ein tieferes 
Verstândnis".
In this thesis an examination of Schiller’s use of the 
Y/ord "Harmonie" will be undertaken with this goal in mind. 
From this examination it is hoped to show that the word 
"Harmonie" bears for Schiller a variety of meanings, both 
traditional and Schillerian, all of which may nevertheless 
be inter-related, and that it assumes, too, the proportions 
of a concept-myth that offers us a guide for both our 
personal and our public lives.
In order to appreciate the wide range of meaning that 
Schiller gives to this word, it is necessary first of all to 
consider its standard definitions and its previous history 
and usage. It may be found listed in Schulz-Easier as 
follows:
"Harmonie. F. ’Einklang’. Um 1600 aus lat. (griech) 
harmonia eingebürgert, zunachst als musikalischer Terra in
(1) 0.Sayce. ’Das Problem der Vieldeutigkeit in Schillers
asthetischer Terminologie’. Jahrbuch der deutschen 
Schillergesellschaft. 6.Jahrgang. 1962. p.176.
8techn. (1) dann auch in ûbertragener Bedeutung. (2).’* The 
earliest reference given in this dictionary is taken from 
the Thumeysser Onomastic on of 1583 and shows the strict 
technical use of the word;
"Thon vnd Klang Oder Soni der Harmonise". The form 
"arraonie" was, however, knov/n in the later Middle High 
German period and is listed in Müller as follows:
"armonie.swf.harmonie.wie die doene schoene loene 
schenken uz der armonien".
The example given is taken from Frauenlob*s Unser frouwen 
leich. The same example is also quoted in Grimm as the 
earliest recorded usage of the word in German. The technical 
usage of the word "Harmonie" in German can thus be said to 
date from about the time of the Meistersanger.
In Grimm furthermore is the suggestion that the form 
"Harmonie" only begins to spread after the revival of 
interest in the classics during the Renaissance and that 
it does not acquire widespread currency until the second 
half of the 18th century "wo es namentlich SCHILLER mit 
vorliebe braucht". In Grimm, too, the senses of the word 
are divided into the technical and the figurative as follows 
" 1) (von tonen und farben) die verbindung von 
einzelnen gleichzeitig angeschlagenen tbnen zu einem 
v/olklingenden ganzen, die woltuende anordnung der farben
und gruppen eines gemSldes.
2) das harmonisch klingend musikstuck selbst#
3) in weiterer bedeutung zusammenstimrming, und zwar:
a) in âsthetischem, philosophischem, mathematischera
sinne •••••••••••••
b) in der gemeinen sprache des lebens zusammenstimmung,
eintracht".
A fourth meaning of the word as a technical term of anatomy 
is also given, but as this sense does not occur in Schiller’s 
work (although it might well have been known to him) it will 
not be quoted here. Under 1) are included the Pythagorean 
concept of a harmony of the spheres and certain other 
metaphorical usages. To illustrate these metaphorical usages 
the dictionary quotes Schiller several times: for instance, 
the line
"Ihr Leben ist die schbnste Harmonie" 
which is taken from a very early poem Empfindungen der
A
Dankbarkeit is cited. The earliest figurative usage given 
in Grimm is taken from the Straszburger Kleiderordnung of 
1628:
"(der unterschied der stânde) ohn welchen auch die 
politische harmony ....inn gutem wohlstand sich nimmer mehr
(1) N.A. vol. 1. p.12.1.38. i”. A. «oi. 2. 10.
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befinden wird. "
In Schulz-Basler there is an example of a still earlier 
figurative use from the year 1610. It is taken from Hippolyt 
Guarinoni’s work Die Greue1 der Verwüstung menschlichen 
Geschleehts;
"das menschiiChe Gemuht müsse ein Harmoniam, gleichsamb 
ein recht und lieblich zus ammens t immende Musi cam inn sich 
haben".
Here the development of the figurative sense fran the 
technical can be clearly seen, and the relative newness of 
the word itself is shown by its Latin declension. The 
figurative use of the word to mean "Ubereinstimmung des 
Willens, der Neigungen" is said in Adelung (1796) to be 
frequent, but, unfortunately, few examples of usage are 
given by this dictionary and it is thus not possible to 
ascertain from it exactly how far the word had extended its 
meaning by this time. (Words of foreign origin are not 
recorded in Campe, but it is perhaps worth noting that the 
use of "Ubereinstimmung" to mean agreement of the inclinations 
is considered "uneigentlich"). The development of the usage 
of the word "Harmonie" during the 18th century is perhaps 
best indicated by August Langen, who writes that during this 
century musical metaphors came to be used v/ith increasing 
popularity to express emotional or psychological states, and
11
among the words that now extend their meaning he cites 
"Harmonie", "Stimraung" and "tbnen". Of "Harmonie" itself 
he writes "Von Fremdwbrtem ist Harmonie am wichtigsten. 
fis findet sich schonseitdem 17* Jahrhundert in ûbertragener 
Bedeutung, wird aber im 18. Jahrhundert v/ohl mit besondereÿ' 
Akzent gebraucht". ^ As an example of the extended use of 
a musical metaphor he quotes the following sentence from 
F.Jacobi’s novel Allwill;
"fis stieg ihre Freundschaft in immer wachsenden 
Harmonien durch Misslaute— starke und kiihne Auflbsungen, 
zura reinsten Engels-gesang empor." ^
According to Langen, the use of "Harmonie" to mean "das 
seelische Gleichgewicht des Einzelmenschen" is rarer, but 
he stresses the importance for the 18th century of the 
general concept of harmony. "Darüber hinaus ist Harmonie 
aus sehr alten Quellen fliessend ein wichtiger philosophischer 
und asthetischer Begriff des 18. Jahrhunderts. Namentlich 
die Philosophie Shaftesburys wirkt hier: Harmonie als 
Grundgesetz des Weltalls, des Einz elmenschen und -auf 
Ssthetischem Gebiet- des mikrokosmischen Kunstwerks". ^  The
(1) A.Langen. ’Der Wortschatz des 18.Jahrhunderts’ Maurer- 
Stroh. Deutsche Wortgeschichte. II. Berlin 1959. p.182.
(2) Quoted by Langen# op.cit. p.182. The reference given is 
to a fragment of the novel which appeared in the magazine 
Merkur. Merkur. 1776.11.17. , \
(3) Langen. op.cit. p. 183. .Tolus/
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word "Harmonie" may thus be said to be first used in German 
in the late Middle Ages as a technical term of music and to 
extend its meaning gradually during the Renaissance and 
post-Renaissance periods. Its figurative use in the sense 
of ’harmony of the personality* did not, however, beccme 
frequent until the 18th century.
As Langen indicates, the concept of harmony itself 
is very much older. Shaftesbury’s ideas can undoubtedly be 
traced back to Greek sources, notably to Pythagoras and 
Plato. Indeed, the extension of the word "Harmonie" during 
the post-Renaissance period can probably be attributed to a 
revival of interest in these two authors.
The Greek word "harmonia" comes from a root meaning 
"to join". Guthrie tells us that it meant first of all 
"the joining or fitting of things together, even the material
A
peg with which they are joined". It then came to mean 
the stringing of an instrument because, Guthrie suggests, 
this process was seen as a method of j oining the arms of 
a lyre. The word was then gradually transferred to the 
sounds made by the strings. Greek music was somewhat 
different from ours, and the New Oxford History of Music
(1) W.K.G.Guthrie. A History of Greek Philosophy. Vol.1 
Cambridge. 1962. p.220.
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suggests that the meaning of "harmonia" in the musical 
sense in Greek times was "a musical idiom together with the 
sound it postulates". These tones (tonoi) were based on 
certain successions of notes held to be pleasing to the ear. 
Sometime during the 5th century B.C. Pythagoras is reputed to 
have discovered the mathematical relationship between the 
frequency of such notes. (Hence is derived the term 
’harmonic progression’ in physics.) In this way the word 
"harmonia" came to be associated in the Greek mind with the 
idea of an underlying order.
Pythagoras and his followers conceived the world, and 
indeed the Universe, as a single whole v/hich displayed "an
A
order in the relations of its component parts". This order 
can also be seen in individual living creatures which we 
call organisms "to indicate that they have all their parts 
arranged and subordinated as instruments (organa) towards 
the end of keeping the whole being alive".? Hence each 
individual human being reflects in microcosm the principles 
of the Universe. Because, too, principles of mathematical 
order had been found to underlie the "tonoi" of music, 
number came to be regarded as the clue to the nature of all
Guthrie, op.cit. p.207< 
ibid. p._ .
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things and the harmony of music was seen as an analogy of 
both the individual and the Universe. To the Pythagorean 
school is also attributed the theory of the ’harmony of the 
spheres’ a theory which, Guthrie says, is "perhaps the 
supreme example of the Pythagorean attempt to explain the 
whole vast cosmic plan by reference to the basic discovery 
of the founder: the all-pervading influence of, and 
intimate connexion between, the laws of mathematics and 
music". ^ According to this theory each planet emits its 
own particular note as it journeys through space and, 
because the distances between the planets were thought to 
be mathematically proportional, these notes form a cosmic 
harmony. The notion of the harmony of the spheres was a 
favourite one of both Renaissance and post-Renaissance 
writers. Shakespeare ^ refers to it several times ; Goethe 
mentions it in the Prolog im Himmel^; and, as will be seen, 
it occurs quite frequently in Schiller’s v/ork. Whether or 
not these later writers shared the same concept of musical 
harmony as the Greeks is not an important question for the 
purposes of this thesis: for all of them the ordered movement
(1 ) Guthrie, dpl^-cit. p. 295.
(2) cf. Merchant of Venice. Act V. sc.1. 11.60-65. 
(3; cf. Faust. 11. 243-244.
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of the cosmos finds its natural expression in musical terms.
The Pythagorean ideas were discussed and sometimes 
enlarged by Plato. He attaches great importance to harmony 
and rhythm^which are to be used in the education of the 
citizens of the Republic. "Rhythm and harmony" he says "sink 
deep into the recesses of the soul and take the strongest
A
hold there". The man who is thus trained to appreciate the 
ordered harmonies of music will grow to appreciate and desire 
harmony and order in all walks of life. Such an individual 
is the ’just man’ who combines within himself the three 
principles of reason, desire and passion (that is, of mind, 
body and spirit) which Plato compares to the higher, lower 
and middle notes of the scale. The aim of the ’just man’ 
is to maintain this harmonious condition in all his actions, 
"whether it be the making of money and satisfying bodily 
wants, or business transactions, or the affairs of state". 
Thus the idea of a balanced combination of differing or even 
opposed qualities is added to the implications of the word 
"harmonia". The concepts of the harmonious personality and 
of the aesthetic education, which form the principal inter­
related themes of Schiller’s speculative essays, can thus 
be seen to be in a direct line of descent from Plato.
(1) The Republic of Plato. Translated by P.M. Comford.
Oxford. 1941, p.88.
(2) ibid. p. 139.
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The works of Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of 
Shaftesbury (1671-1713) provide one of the mediums by 
which the Greek concepts of harmony outlined above were 
conveyed to the 18th century. For the English philosopher 
the Universe reveals itself as a harmonious whole, and the 
task of each individual is to re-create within himself that 
harmony which he sees reflected in the cosmic order. The 
harmony of the Universe may be discovered by the use of 
reason: Shaftesbury’s own starting point is his observation 
of the natural world, in which he sees each individual 
species as ordained to contribute to the good of the whole 
creation (the fly to the spider, the male to the female, 
etc). The harmonious individual, for Shaftesbury, is one 
who can combine his "private" or "egotistic" desires or 
"affections" with his "public" or "altruistic" ones. There 
is a clear distinction in Shaftesbury’s work between 
impulses which urge self-preservation and impulses which 
urge preservation of the species. These latter, in 
Shaftesbury’s view, fall together in the human species with 
impulses v/hich urge service to the community. His aim is 
to show that the two sets of impulses really coincide, that 
one’s true self-good lies in the preservation and development 
of an ordered society. In combining public and private
17
"affections" the individual gives form to his life as an 
artist gives form to his work, and, as in artistic creation 
taste guides the artist in deciding what is relevant to the 
harmony of the whole, so too taste can be a guiding factor 
in deciding v/hat is relevant to the harmony of practical
A
life. Grudzinski considers that here the source of all 
later 18th century attempts to formulate schemes for the 
aesthetic education of Man may be seen. Grudzinski also 
believes that Shaftesbury was the first to use the word 
"harmony" with reference to the inner life of the personality, 
and Shaftesbury certainly does speak of the "harmony of the 
affections"^ and "the harmony of a mind".^ However, he can 
scarcely be said to use the word wi,th very great frequency, 
but when he does it is interesting to note that there is 
very often a suppressed musical metaphor present. One 
example may perhaps be quoted:
"Tis a breach of the Harmony of publick Conversation 
to take things in such a Key, as is above the common Reach".^
(1) H. Grudz inski. ’ Shaftesburys Einfluss auf Chr. M.Wieland. 
Mit einer Einleitung uber den Einfluss Shaftesburys auf 
die deutsche Literatur bis 1760’. Breslauer Beitrâge zur 
Literaturgeschichte. Neue Polge. 34* Stuttgart 1913.
(2)" Shaftesbury’s Charackteristicks. 4th.ed., 1727. vol. 2. 
p.434.
(3) ibid. vol. 1. p. 207.
(4) ibid. vol. 1. p. 76.
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Grudzinski considers that Shaftesbury’s great influence on 
18th century thought springs from his desire to make
philosophy a practical guide for everyone. (The sentence
quoted above shows the very practical way in which he applied 
the principles of harmony to everyday life.) In England, 
Grudzinski believes, his ideas can be traced in Richardson’s 
novels which, as is well-lmown, were later widely read in 
Germany. Shaftesbury’s own v/ritings were translated into 
German in 1745 by Spalding, and those of his disciples 
Hutcheson^ and Ferguson by Lessing (1756) and Garve (1772) 
respectively. Garve’s translation of Ferguson’s Principles 
of Moral Philosophy is one of the few works known for certain 
to have been read by Schiller in his youth. It made a
lasting impression on him and it is probably to this work
that the similarity of some of his ideas with those of 
Shaftesbury can be traced. Ferguson himself hardly uses 
the word "harmony" at all, but in the main he follows 
Shaftesbury very closely, stressing that "if benevolence is 
understood to be an attribute of human nature, the laws of 
self-preservation and of society coincide in all their 
tendencies and applications".^ The adoption of the dialogue
(1) Hutcheson’s System of Moral Philosophy. 1755.
(2) Ferguson’s Principles of Moral Philosophy. 3rd ed. 1785.
p. 111.
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form by many of the popular philosophers in Germany can 
also, Grudzinski believes, be attributed to Shaftesbury’s 
influence. Among the more important of these philosophers, 
as Schiller may have been acquainted with their works, are 
Sulzer (1720-1799) and Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786). 
Mendelssohn’s Phâdon in particular contains many interesting 
uses of the word "Harmonie". Here, once again, the figurative 
senses can be seen developing from the musical ones, as, for 
instance, in the following sentence:
"1st nun die Musik eine Wissenschaft, das Schwache 
mit dem Starken, das Rauhe mit dem Sanften, und das Unange- 
nehme mit dem Angenehmen in eine Harmonie zu bring en, so 
kann gewiss keine Musik herrlicher und vortrefflicher sein, 
als die Weltweisheit, die uns lehrt, nicht nur unsere Gedanken 
und Handlungen unter sich, sondem auch die Handlungen des 
Endlichen mit den Absichten des Unendlichen, und die Gedanken 
des Erdbewohners mit den Gedanken des Allwissenden in eine 
grosse und wundervolle Harmonie zu stimmen".^
As a further source for the spread of the frequency of 
the word "harmony" during the 18th century the philosophy 
of Leibniz must not be overlooked. As an answer to the
(1) M.Mendelssohn. Phadon. National-Bibliothek der deutschen 
Classiker. vol.63. P« 60. also cf.Gesammelte Bchriften. 
Nach den Originaldrucken und Hanaschr if ten .xierausgege ben 
von G.B.Mendelssohn.Leipzig, 1843-1848.vol.II .p . \0^
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question: How do the monads act on one another, if they 
are indivisible and incapable of being changed by an 
external force? Leibniz conceived the theory of the pre- 
established harmony, by which an action in one monad finds 
a corresponding action in another. This ultimately leads 
him back to a theory of the pre-established harmony of the 
Universe, so that for him, too, the Universe reveals itself 
as a harmonious whole. The agreements between Leibniz and 
Shaftesbury have often been pointed out. Grudzinski quotes 
Leibniz as saying of Shaftesbury^s work: "II ne manque que 
mon harmonie préétablie, mon banissement de la mort et ma 
re^duction de la matière ou de la multitude aux unités et 
aux substances simples"? It is interesting to note that, 
in explaining his theory^Leibniz uses the example of two 
choirs who, although unseen to each other, sing in harmony 
because the harmony is pre-established by the score they 
are using. Here again the musical connotation of the word 
is used to illustrate its philosophical application. The 
ideas of Leibniz were popularised, as is well-known, by 
Wolff (1679-1754) and were probably transmitted to Schiller 
in this form through his teachers at the Military Academy. 
Iffert considers it highly unlikely that Schiller knew the
(1) cf. E.Cassirer. ’Schiller and Shaftesbury*. Publications 
of the English Goethe Society. 1935.
(2) Quoted by Grudzinski. op.cit. p.1 7.
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true philosophy of Leibniz and cites Schiller himself as 
admitting that, in his youth, he was not acquainted
-j
thoroughly with any philosophical system. Wolff had 
restricted the idea of the pre-established harmony to that 
between the body and soul. The concept of a pre-ordained 
harmonious Universe could, however, have been transmitted 
to Schiller through the poetry of Uz (1720-1796) and Haller 
(1708-1777) both of whom he greatly admired. Again, these 
poets do not use the word "Harmonie" itself very frequently 
(Haller hardly at all) but several instances could be cited 
'Of lines describing harmony. Haller, for instance, writes; 
"Die Welt ist selbst gemacht zu ihrer Burger Gluck.
Bin allgemeines Wohl beseelet die Natur,
2
Und allés trâgt des hbchsten Gutes Spur! "
Of such poets Grudzinski writes: "Die metaphysischen 
Grundlagen liefert fast stets Leibniz, wahrend Shaftesbury 
für den asthetischen Grundton und den hymnenartigen Schwung 
der Gedanken verantwortlich zu machen ist".^ Both 
philosophers may be said to have sounded an optimistic note 
for the whole I8th century and their ideas may be considered
(1) cf. Iffert* Der .lunge Schiller. Berlin. 1933. pPf4l ff.
(2) A.Haller. Uber den Ur sprung des Ubels. 11. 62-64. This
poem also distinguishes clearly between self-interest and 
public good. 11. 113-160.
(3) op. cit. p. 18.
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as *Gemeingut* of the writers and thinkers of the period.
Many of the ideas outlined above will be found again 
in the works of Schiller. It is contended here, however, 
that in the course of his philosophical speculations 
Schiller extended the implications of the word "Harmonie" 
in a way that no previous writer had done. Firstly, by a 
detailed analysis of human action, he showed how the harmony 
between the various impulses in Man might be achieved and 
how the aesthetic education might be possible. At the same 
time he realised that the creation of harmony through taste 
is by no means as simple as Shaftesbury imagined it to be. 
Secondly he saw how the ideas underlying the word in its 
musical sense could provide a guide for every walk of life 
from the simplicity of a woman weaving in her cottage to 
the complexity of the m o d e m  state. Thus the word "Harmonie" 
will be found to have, for Schiller, profound musical, 
aesthetic, philosophical, psychological, political and social 
connotations and to be sometimes capable of bearing all these 
simultaneously.
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II. Introduction to Schiller*s concept of harmony.
Before a detailed examination of Schiller*s use of 
the word "Harmonie" in the philosophical essays is under­
taken, it might be first of all useful to consider his 
attitude towards harmony in the musical sense and to 
ascertain how he uses the word elsewhere in his work. R. 
E m y  has shown that, between the years 1775-1800, the 
relationship of music and language was the subject of much 
enquiry. This enquiry was stimulated by Herder* s essay on 
Qssian und die Lieder alter Vblker. where the theory that 
poetry arose from folk-song is developed. Erny shows, much 
more clearly than does Langen, how^within this period^the 
word "Stimmung" broadens its meaning so that, by the end of 
the century, it has come to mean "die Zusammenstimmung (im 
musikalischen Sinne) der Geister und Seelen zu einer Gott 
wohlgefalligen Gesellschaft und eine seelische ZustSnd- 
lichkeit des Menschen, hervorgerufen durch die gefûhls- 
massige Offenheit gegenuber sinnlichen Eindrücken, wie sie 
die Musik bewirkt". Among the essays on the subject 
quoted by E m y  is one by Fritz von Dalberg entitled Blicke 
eines Tonküristiers in die Musik der Geister (1787). Here
(1 ) R.Emy. *Lyrische Sprachrausikalitât als asthetisches 
Problem der Vorromantik*. Jahrbuch der deutschen 
Schillergesellschj^aft. 1 956. p. 141.
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music is seen to reveal the laws on which all human 
relationships are founded. Erny quotes the following 
sentence: "In alien Verhaltnissen des Menschen, zum 
Universum, zu Gott, zur Gesellschaft, zu sich selbsten 
Oder seiner inneren Natur handelt er nach Gesetzen der
A
Tonkunst". Dalberg is also quoted by Erny as saying: "Auch
die innere Beschaffenheit und Regierung der Seele ist wahre
2
Musik und grûndet sich auf harmonische Gesetze". These 
remarks are interesting in so far as they indicate a general 
attitude of the time and show how the Greek ideas outlined 
in Chapter I are echoed by 18th century writers.
Schiller*s two most important statements on music are 
to be found in his notes on Kbmers Aufsatz liber Musik (1795) 
and in his review Uber Matthissons Gedichte (I794). In the 
notes on Kbrner* s essay he sees the specific appeal of music 
as its appeal to the sense of sound. The power of music 
lies in its ability to evoke certain patterns of sound which 
correspond to the patterns of our emotions, and for this 
reason music can exert such a powerful influence upon us.
Much the same view is presented in the review of Matthisson’s 
poetry. Here Schiller says that the aim of music is to
Quoted by Erny. op.cit. p. I40, 
ibid.
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present the form of our emotions or "die inneren Bewegungen 
des Gemutjifs durch analogische aussere zu begleiten und zu 
versinnlichen". ^ The harmony of music, or of any work of 
art, reflects a harmony of the inner self.
"Jene liebliche Harmonie der Gestalten, der Tbne und
des Lichts.............jene Stetigkeit mit der sich die
L ini en im Raum Oder die Tone in der Zeit aneinander f (igen, 
ist ein natürliches Symbol der innern Ubereinstimmung des 
Gemüts mit sich selbst und des sittlichen Zusaramenhangs der 
Handlungen und Gefûhle, und in der schbnen Haltung eines 
pittoresken Oder musikalischen Stückes malt sich die noch 
schonere einer sittlich gestimmten Seele". Schiller* s own 
viev/ of music v/ould thus seem to echo the general sentiments 
of his time on the subject. A better idea of what he really 
understood by "Harmonie" in its musical sense may perhaps be 
obtained by examining one or two usages of the word. When 
Schiller uses the word in its strict musical sense, he has in 
mind either a combination of different notes or the progress­
ive form of the musical work as a whole. Where a combination 
of notes is mentioned, it is always the resulting new whole 
that is stressed. In this new whole^ each part is essential
(1
(2
SW. vol. 12. p. 454. KA.vol.22.jtJ.272.5. A.«»ol, ^2^8.
Ibid. p. 455. KA.vol.22.p.273.^
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to the others. For example, the eager young man in the 
poem Das verschleierte Bild zu Sais says:
**Nimm einen Ton aus einer Harmonie
Und allés, was dir hleibt, ist Nichts, solang
Das schbne All der Tbne fehlt**.......
Amalia in Die Rauber and Ferdinand in Kabale und Liebe 
cite the example of a harmony between tv/o notes in speaking 
of their loves. Amalia stresses the blending of the notes:
"................................ wie
Harfentbne in einander spielen
2
Zu der himmelvollen Harmonie".
Ferdinand emphasises once again the indivisibility of 
their union:
"Wer kann den Bund zweier Herzen Ibsen Oder die Tone 
eines Akkords auseinander reissen ?" ^
Thus a process of synthesis, by which two parts form a new 
complete whole or organic unity is illustrated for Schiller 
by this similar process in music. In music, too, there is 
a further process by which the various single harmonies are 
combined into a complete piece. Here each fresh synthesis
i) S.A. V.L I, . 2 0 8 .  II. It- If. 
:) S A .  0.1. g. .. 8 2 .  Il 1 0 - l a ,  
j) S.A. .^1, 3, p  3 0 < j .  ll.a-1,.
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is immediately followed by another; throughout the piece 
there is movement throughout time and yet, when the 
instruments cease to play, ije feel v/e have been listening 
to a coherent work and not to an isolated series of chords.
This process is sometimes likened by Schiller to a river, 
which is constantly flowing forwards, but which, to an 
observer, retains the same form.
"Mein Ohr umtont ein Harmonieenfluss" 
he says in the poem Die Erv/artung, and in Die Künstler he 
forms the compounds "Harmonienbach" (1.299) and "Harmonienmeer*' 
(1.307). The idea of incessant movement is also conveyed, 
in the poem Laura am Klavier, by the verb "wirameln". 
"Seelenvolle Harmonieen wirameln,
Ein wollûstig Ungestüm,
2
Aus den Saiten....... ."
Thus "Harmonie" in its musical sense suggests to Schiller 
both a synthesis, whereby a new whole is formed, and a 
synthetic process, whereby various single harmonies blend 
into a greater whole. Even in its musical sense the word 
has thus a dynamic, not a static, quality.
Even in his very early writings Schiller uses musical
(1) 8W. V0I.I. p.237. 1. 30. KA.T0l.l.p.l86.i-A.tfcl,l.«.22,
(2)  SW. V01 .1 .  p. 12. 11. 15 -17 .  m . v o i . 1 . p .52 A . . .L K p .a a i* . .
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metaphors to express certain physiological and psychological 
concepts. In the dissertation which he successfully 
presented at the Military Academy under the title Uber den 
Zusammenhang der tierischen Natur des Menschen mit seiner 
geistigen he several times employs the word "Harmonie" with 
reference to physiological mechanisms. The word sometimes 
applies to one particular organ, as in the account of the 
state of ecstasy, where Schiller writes;
"die Bewegung des Gehims ist nicht Harmonie mehr, 
sie ist Konvulsion". ^
Sometimes the whole physical organism is involved, as in the 
sentence;
"Aus der Verworrenheit dieser aller [Sensationen] 
bildet sich nun die Totalempfindung der t^ierischen 
Harraonien’*. ^
From these examples it is clear that Schiller saw the health 
of the physical organism as depending on certain principles 
of co-operation and balance betv/een the various parts. This 
state of health, where all parts of the organism are in tune 
with each other, may perhaps be designated one of physiological 
harmony. The musical reference of the word "Harmonie" is
(2; ibiû. p. 29. i,-A.vol.2ü.p.58. .^A.u.1.11. p.^/. //. /-a. /
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perhaps concealed here, but in the examples quoted the 
word undoubtedly refers to a process whereby various parts 
co-operate, or should co-operate, to form an organic whole, 
(in the Symposium, it might be noted, Plato also speaks of 
the * harmony of the body* and draws a parallel between the 
lav/s of music which bring about a reconciliation of opposing 
sounds and the laws of medicine which reconcile the opposing 
elements in the body).
The thesis presented in Uber den Zusammenhang der 
tierischen Natur des Menschen mit seiner geistigen is that 
a vigorous personality (Geist) demands a healthy and active
body and --- more importantly, for Schiller*s day and age ---
that disturbances of personality can manifest themselves 
in physical symptoms. To illustrate the inter-dependence 
of body and soul, of physical organism and personality, 
musical metaphors are used. The metaphor of two stringed 
instruments placed side by side is introduced: when a 
certain note is struck on one, the same note v/ill be heard 
on the other. '*So weckt, vergleichungsv/eise zu reden, die 
frbhliche Saite des Korpers die frohliche in der Seele, so
4
der traurige Ton des ersten den traurigen in der zweiten". 
Again Schiller tells us that:
die allgemeine Empfindung t^ierischer HarmonieIt • • • •
(1) SW. vol.10. p.37. . ÏÏA.vol.Eu.ii.eA. S,A.aol.ll, iS-'lS,
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die Quelle geistiger Lust und die t^ierische Unlust die 
Quelle geistiger Unlust se^n sollte." ^
This concept of a pre-established harmony betv/een body and 
soul may have been familiar to Schiller through Wolff* s 
popular philosophy, but he soon develops his own variations 
on it. In Die Rauber, when Franz is planning to shorten 
his father’s life, he says: **Philosophen und Mediziner 
lehren mich, v*rie t ref fend die Stimmungen des Geists mit den 
Bewegungen der Maschine zusammen lauten. Gichtrische 
Empfindungen werden jederzeit von einer Dissonanz der méchant 
ischen Schwingungen begleitet. ** Thus, Franz argues, he has 
only to strike a violent note on the instrument of his 
father*s mind to bring about on the instrument of his 
physical body a note so violent that (Franz hopes) death 
will result. For Franz the allegory of the two instruments 
has yet another meaning. If the physical body is destroyed, 
how can the soul survive ? "Empfindung*’ he says to Pastor 
Mbser "ist Schwingung einiger Saiten und das zerschlagene 
Klavier tbnet nicht mehr".^ If Schiller’s thesis is taken 
to its logical conclusion, then it would indeed provide
( 1 ) aW..vQllOq). 37. RA . vol. 20. p . 6S .f.A,
(2) Act 2. SC.1. SW. vol. 2. p. 33* NA.vol.0.p.S8,^V\.*^»%.^m^.
(3) Act 5. sc. 1. SW. vol.2. p. 174. NA.vol.2).p. 121. I*
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Franz with an argument for equating physical with spiritual 
death. The connection between physical and psychological 
processes is again stressed in a poem of this period, 
Melancholie an Laura, where it is once again pointed by a 
musical metaphor. Here Schiller writes:
"Ach die kühnste Harmonie 
Wirft das Saitenspiel zu Trummer,
Und der lohe Aetherstrahl Genie
1
Nahrt sich nur vom Lebenslampenschimmer".
There is an implicit comparison here betv/een the harmony
s
drawn forth from an instrument and the production of
A
genius. Just as too violent a vibration may shatter the 
strings of an instrument, too much intellectual brilliance 
may shatter the physical body. Thus in some cases the 
personality may bring about the destruction of the body.
Schiller seems to have been quite aware of the deterministic
2
implications of his thesis. Von Wiese considers that they 
remained the central problem of his youth, and the French 
scholar R. Masson thinks that he was unable to counter them 
effectively until he began to study Kant. The musical
(1) SW. vol.1. p.21. 11. 91-94. It is interesting to note 
that Shaftesbury has practically the same metaphor cf. 
Shaftesbury’s Charackteristicks, ed. cit. vol.2. p.95.
(2) B.V. Wiese. Schiller. Stuttgart 1959* (See especially 
Chapters 6 and 7}.
Melancholie an Laura .1\A. vol. 1 .p . 115 . ^  A  vol. 3  p, 3^
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allegory that seems to underlie Schiller’s thought here is 
no great comfort to him, for there can be no harmony without 
the component parts —  the two notes, the two instruments 
or the personality and the physical body.
Masson is certainly right when he says that the
influence of Schiller’s early medical training on his views
on psychology is not .to be under-estimated. He has shown^
how Schiller^ in treating Grammont ^ tried to maintain the
equilibrium of the physical organism in order that the
depressed student’s spirits might revive. (Indeed, so skilful
was Schiller as a psychiatrist that one is tempted to ask
what discoveries he might have made, had he stayed in his
appointed profession). The idea of a psychological as well
as a physiological harmony —  or, as Dr. Graham has suggested,
2
of a psychic as well as a physical organism —  certainly 
arises from these early studies.
At the same time, however, Schiller is using musical 
imagery in connection with another set of ideas —  ideas 
which come to him from the general tradition of Leibniz and
(1); R.Masson. ’La psycho-physiologie du jeune Schiller’. 
Etudes Germaniques. 1959«
(2) See I. Appelbaum-Graham. ’The Structure of the 
Personality in Schiller’s Tragic Poetry’. Schiller 
Bicentenary Lectures. London. 1960. pp. I04. ff.
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Shaftesbury* The most important of these is the idea of a 
great creative force flov/ing throughout the Universe and 
manifesting itself in all things. This force is love, as 
is clearly shown by these lines from the poem Fantasie an 
Laura;
"Sonnenstaubchen paart mit Sonnenstaubchen 
Sich in trauter Harmonie ,
Spharen in einander lenkt die Liebe,
Weltsysteme dauern nur durch; sie".
Any combination of different parts into a new whole is a 
manifestation of this force, and the resulting synthesis, 
as in music, is called harmony. Indeed, the connection 
between love and harmony at this stage of Schiller’s 
development is so intimate that he cannot imagine one without 
the other. For instance, in the poem Der Triumph der Liebe 
he portrays a loveless world, where:
"Noch mit L i e d e m  ihren Bus en 
Huben nicht die weichen Musen 
Nie mit Saitenharmonie", ^ 
but, shortly after Venus appears, love and harmony are linked 
together. (1.89)* A further connection between love and
( 1 )  o . l l .  0 3 2 .  I I .  Ï 3 - I U .
6 A. v.ii. a^y.
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harmony might perhaps be seen in the later poem Die vier 
Weltalter, where an eternal bond is said to exist between 
Woman (the bearer of love) and the Singer (the bearer of 
harmony)
In the human world the creative force of love is 
seen first' and foremost in the relationship between the 
sexes (later so beautifully-expressed in the poem Die 
Geschlechter) and secondly in the bonds of sympathy between 
friends. To the harmony that springs from love and friend­
ship might be given the name "Seelenharmonie", for in Don . 
Carlos Carlos says:
% e n n ’s wahr ist, dass die schaffende Natur 
Den Roderich im Karlos wiederholte,
Und unserer Seelen zartes Saitenspiel
2
Am Morgen unseres Lebens gleich bezog" 
and the Princess Eboli, when confessing her feelings towards 
Carlos, talks of "der Seelen entziickender Zusammenklang". ^  
Schiller himself does use the word "Seelenharmonie", 
although mostly of the bonds between husband and wife. In
•) A^. u«i. 1. p. If.
a) If., p II
3) s'A. 0 .1,1,. ^ 9 /. M i ' i t i - m j .
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the poem An K o m e r , written for the occasion of the letter’s 
wedding, he speaks of the ideal wife:
"Die in schbner Sympathie 
Dein Gefühl erreichet 
Und in Seelenharmonie 
Deiner Minna gleichet". ^
In the humourous poem Die beruhmte Frau the husband 
describes in these words how he would have liked his marriage 
to have been:
"Schon sah ich schbne Kinder urn mich scherzen 
in ihrem Kreis die schbnste sie, 
die glücklichste von alien sie, 
und mein, durch Seelenharmonie, 
durch ewig festen Bund der Herzen".
"Seelenharmonie" is determined by the ability to share the 
feelings of another. Even Alba in Don Carlos recognises 
a harmony of opinions, and not merely one of years, as a 
basis for love, and he tells the King that Carlos and the 
Queen were
"...................................... verschwistert
durch Harmonie der Meinung und der Jahre". ^
.) p. va. u. vy-
0.1.1. p. I/. 
3)  ^A. o.i. 4  p. 1^ :?. I I-a4 4y —
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In all the examples quoted above there is a suggestion 
of reciprocity: the feelings of one person are allov/ed to 
work on those of another, and vice-versa. This inter-play 
between the partners gives "Seelenharmonie" a dynamic 
character; there is freedom for change and development; 
it is not a mere static agreement of interests. In his 
Theosophie des Julius Schiller lets Julius say:
"Liebe findet nicht statt unter gleichtbnenden Seelen,
i
aber unter harmonischen"^
a sentence which tellingly illustrates both Schiller’s 
concept of musical harmony and his insistence on the 
dynamic nature of love and friendship. From the ordinary 
experiences of love and friendship Schiller thus arrives 
at a concept of harmony, in which the process of harmoniz­
ation involves reciprocity, and in which the resulting 
synthesis itself has an active and creative force. For 
Schiller one such "Seelenharmonie" should generate another, 
so that eventually the state of world-harmony and brother­
hood so enthusiastically proclaimed in such poems as An 
die Freude and Die Freundschaft is reached. Indeed, in Die 
Freundschaft the evolution of the human race is compared 
to a "Ringeltanz":
(1) SW. vol.10. p. 332. 1A . vol.20 . p . 121. ll
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"Arm in Arme, hSher stets und h'ôher,
Vom Mogolen bis zum griechischen Seher,
A
Der sich an den letzten Seraph reiht,
1
Wallen v/ir, einmut^*gen Ringeltanzes"
As more and more friendships are formed, new and more • 
complex patterns emerge. Just as the idea of the 
harmonious personality, of the integrated psychic organism, 
may be said to have arisen from Schiller’s early medical 
studies, so too his desire for the evolution of a better 
form of Society may be said to spring from his youthful 
enthusiasm for friendship.
To the concept of a world-brotherhood may be linked 
that of the harmony of the Universe as a whole. When 
speaking of the universal harmony, Schiller sometimes uses 
the Pythagorean metaphor of the harmony of the « spheres. 
Nowhere is this more forcefully expressed than in the poem 
Der Tanz. From the standpoint of the observer, the ballroom 
floor is here a whirl of confused activity and yet, as he 
watches, he is able to discern an intelligible pattern. As 
the dance proceeds, one particular pattern may be super­
seded perhaps an 18th century quadrille, in which there
are several figures, should be imagined— but the general
( 1 )  av. v o l . 1 .  p .  40 . 1 1 .  4 9 - 5 2 . p.ay.
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pattern is nevertheless preserved. At first this puzzles 
the observer, and he asks:
"Sprich, wie geschiehts, dass rastlos bewegt die
B i1dung en schwanken,
Und die Regel doch bleibt, wenn die Gestalten auch
fliehn ?" ■'
The secret, he discovers, lies in the rhythm which gives a 
semblance of cohesion and permanence to the whole. The 
dance is then taken as an allegory of the Universe. The 
observer now asks:
"Und der Wohllaut der grossen Natur umrauscht dir
vergebens ?
Dich ergreift nicht der Strom dieser harmonischen
Welt ?" ^
(An alternative version of the poem shows:
"Und dir rauschen umsonst die Harmonieen des Welt-
alls ?
Dich ergreift nicht der Strom dieses erhabnen
Gesangs ^
In the Universe, too, there is incessant change and activity
1) NA. vol.1 . • p. 228. 11. 19-20.
2) ibid. 11. 27-28.
These tv/o quotations are from the first version of the
poem which appeared in the MusenaImanach. 1796.
(3) SW. vol.1. p.433# 11# 27-28. (This, the more usual
version, follows a revision made by Schiller for the 
publication of his complete works. 1800-18O3.) I'L;#
W.ll ai^o tc  ;n S A . Udl. I. pp. liLO^  | Cl I,
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and it is difficult to perceive, at first sight, any 
underlying order or purpose. Yet the Universe, too, is 
regulated by a strong central rhythm, which can be observed 
not only in the movements of the planets, but also in the 
rhythms of all living creatures. The principles of this 
universal harmony may be grasped by anyone who understands 
the principles of music ("das Maass") and the harmonious 
life is only to be achieved when these principles are 
understood and obeyed. The link between music, metaphysics 
and practical life established by Pythagoras appears here 
in fully-developed form. Elsewhere in Schiller’s poetry 
references to the harmony of the spheres are mostly 
conventional. For instance in the poem Die Teilung der 
Erde the poet answers the question put by Zeus:
"Wo warst du denn, als man die Welt get^eilet ?"  ^
by saying:
"Mein Auge hing an deinem Angesichte
2
An deines Himmels Harmonie mein Ohr".
In Sehnsucht the wanderer hears sweet harmonies as he 
approaches the ideal land:
) s/\. .A i. Ç.203. :Ll
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"Harmonieen hbr ich klingen 
Tbne susser Himmelsruh"  ^
and in Bürgerlied (also known as Das Eleusische Fest) Ceres 
teaches Man to honour the rhythm of the seasons and the 
cycles of the moon:
"welche still gemessen schreiten
2
Im melodische#% Gesang".
Perhaps,too, the remark made by Karl at the end of Die 
Rauber:
"Meint ihr wohl gar, eine Todsünde werde das Aequiv-
f
aient gegen Todsûnden sefn? Meint ihr die Harmonie der 
Welt werde durch diesen gottlosen Misslaut gewinnen ?" 3 
could be given a Pythagorean interpretation. The harmonious 
sound of the earth as a planet can be disturbed by the sin 
of its inhabitants. By drawing an equation between sin and 
discord, Schiller here gives the Pythagorean concept of the 
harmony of the spheres a profound moral implication. The 
examples quoted above of "Harmonie" used in the sense of 
a harmony of the Universe have been taken at random from 
the various stages of Schiller’s work. Conventional though 
seme of them are, they show that the idea of a harmonious
i) p Y  ti. 1<^-
$ A - 1 -  p  / y /  II
?) »*i-3. p. y.
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Universe runs throughout his work. It can perhaps be 
called one theme in the Schillerian symphony.
In Schiller’s early work there are, as has been shown, 
two separate concepts of harmony: one of the dependence 
of psychological on physiological harmony, the other of the 
idea of a creative, harmonizing force flowing throughout
i
the Universe. The gap between the two, von Wiese considers, 
remained unbridged by Schiller in his youth. In his youth 
the two ideas certainly do run parallel. One can perhaps 
see their gradual reconciliation in the concept of the 
harmonious individual, who not only has all his inner forces 
integrated into an organic whole on the analogy of the 
physical body, but can also maintain a harmonious relation­
ship with the outside world and exert in it an active, 
creative force. The emergence of the idea of the 
harmonious personality in this sense can again be traced 
through musical metaphors.
In Kabale und Liebe Lady Milford compares Luise to a 
piano that has been touched for the first time. "Auf dem 
unberuhrten Klavier der erste einweihende Gilberton".^
The suggestion is that Ferdinand, as the lover, sets the
Wiese, loc. cit.
Act 4* sc. 7* SW. vol.2. p. 469. N a .vol.5.p .74
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whole of Luise’s personality in motion, as the player causes 
the strings to vibrate. An extended use of this metaphor of 
the personality as a musical instrument may be traced in 
Don Carlos. Carlos and Posa are two instruments tuned by 
Nature in the same key, so that the feelings of one should, 
ideally, harmonize with the feelings of the other. In Act 4 
Posa draws an analogy between the Queen and an instrument 
owned by a person who does not know how to play it. The 
implication here is that harmony lies hidden in every 
individual, just as it lies hidden in the strings of an 
instrument, but that not everyone can draw it out.
"Gehbrt die süsse Harmonie, die in
1
Dem Saitenspiele schlumraert, seinem Kaufer ?" 
asks Posa, and an echo of his question may be heard when 
Carlos, speaking to the King of Posa after Posa’s death, 
says:
"Diess feine Saitenspiel zerbrach in Ihrer 
Metallnen Hand". ^
The human personality is seen as a very delicate instrument 
that demands great skill from its player. A slight,but
(1) Act. 4. sc. 21. 5A. ici
(2) A «  5. ac.A.
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significant, variation of the same theme is seen in Posa’s 
question to the King during the interview:
".......................Da Sie den Menschen
Zu Ihrem Saitenspiel herunterstürzten,
Wer tjjfeilt mit Ihnen Harmonie ?" ^
The King has here been compared to God, who creates men 
in his own image. The King, Posa says, tries to do likewise 
and must forfeit his own humanity. He plays on his subjects 
as if they v/ere musical instruments, but there is no-one 
to hear the resulting harmony. In these examples the human 
personality is seen as a musical instrument, and relation­
ships between personalities are expressed in terms of one 
man playing upon another. Posa is able to strike chords 
in the King that have never been struck before. (To the 
above question the King replies:
" Bei Gott,
Er greift in meine Seele"  ^
and the verb implies the action of the hands in plucking 
a lyre or harp). The King plays upon his subjects and 
arranges their parts in the symphony of the Spanish 
Empire. In Fiesco, too, the hero declines to show his true 
intentions until he has sounded out all his compatriots.
(1) Act 3. sc. 10. SW. vol.3. p. 304.ka.vol.Z.p.146,
5A. ..1.4 ,
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Then, as if he were indeed about to conduct a symphony, he 
says that all the instruments are now tuned for the macabre 
concert.^ The creation of political harmony is thus 
compared by Fiesco to an orchestral work, where the unity 
of the whole depends on the conductor’s knowing the 
capabilities and exact timbre of each instrument. All these 
metaphors show an interest in the inner workings of the 
human personality and, at the same time, an awareness of the 
dynamic influence of one personality upon another, an 
influence that can be used for political ends. The idea of 
the individual who strives to bring about harmony both 
within, in his own personality, and without, in the world 
at large, may be said to be the second great theme running 
throughout Schiller’s v/ork.
A word might be said at this point about some of 
Schiller’s stage-directions. Professor Garland and 
Professor Mainland have both pointed out the significance 
of Schiller’s stage-directions in the interpretation of his 
plays. Professor Mainland ^  has shov/n how a stage-direct ion
(1) Act 2. sc. 16. SW. vol.2; p. 269. In her thesis 
’Schiller’s View of Tragedy in the Light of his General 
Aesthetics’ (D.Phil. London. 1951) Dr. Graham uses this 
statement in support of her argument that Fiesco "plays" 
throughout.
(2) W.F.Mainland. Schiller and the Changing Past. London.
1957.
Fiasco’s remark will be found in KA.vol.2.p.227.
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in Wallensteins Tod may be read to throw suspicion for the 
deception of Buttler onto Octavio. Professor Garland has 
said that, in the early plays, the characters often express
emotion by physical action by biting the lip, rushing
from the room, etc  and that these stage-directions
I
illustrate Schiller’s thesis of the harmony between physical 
body and personality. Schiller’s stage-directions may also 
further indicate, according to Professor Garland, ’’movements 
or actions which are symbolical”. If these remarks are 
borne in mind and if it is remembered what has been said 
above about the musical instrument as a metaphor of the 
personality, it may be thought significant that Schiller 
sometimes introduces musical instruments into his plays.
In Kabale und Liebe, for instance, Ferdinand asks Luise to 
elope with him, and when she refuses to do so, v/e read that 
Ferdinand ”hat in der Zerstreuung und Wut^ eine Violine 
ergriffen, und auf derselben zu spielen versucht- Jetzt 
zerreisst er die Saiten, zerschmettert das Instrument auf 
dem Boden, und bricht in ein lautes Gelachter aus”.^ This
(1) H.B.Garland. ’Some Observations on Schiller’s Stage- 
Directions’. German Studies presented to W.H.Bruford.
London. 1962. p.156.
(2) Act 3. sc.4 . SW. vol.2. p.445. ùA.vol.5.pp.b7-5d.
Sf\, p .54 / , - -
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may perhaps seem a most obvious thing for a disappointed 
young man to do, as he is, after all, in the home of a 
musician. However, if this action is connected with one of 
Ferdinand’s later speeches, it takes on a different meaning. 
After the poisoned lemonade has been drunk, Ferdinand 
begins to take a last look at Luise. In so doing, he asks: 
”Wie kann so viel Wohlklang kommen aus zerrissenen Saiten?” 
and proceeds to castigate God for failing to make Luise’s 
soul in keeping with the beauty of her body. Luise is thus 
compared to a musical instrument, and if these lines are 
allowed to show that Ferdinand has always subconsciously 
regarded her in this way, then his destruction of the violin 
foreshadows his murder of her. He tries to play the violin, 
fails, and breaks it; he tries to love and understand Luise, 
fails, and poisons her. Again, in Wallensteins Tod, 
Wallenstein, who has by now made his fateful decision, asks 
Thekla to sing and play for him on the zither. She becomes 
very confused and, although she makes an attempt, ”im 
Augenblick, da sie anfangen soil, zu singen, schaudert sie
p
zusammen, wirft das Instrument weg und geht schnell ab.”
5  A. *,1. p If oo- a/. 
S'A. vol. 5.
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Thekla is unable to sing because she is experiencing an
inner conflict between her love for Max and her loyalty
to her father. This inner discord is underlined by her
inability to produce harmony in the strict musical sense.
The throwing aside of the instrument may also be taken as
a symbolic gesture; from now on harmony has gone out of her
life. In Wilhelm Tell a musical sound is used slightly
differently to underline the domestic and political harmony
of the Swiss. Here the audience hears, as the curtain rises,
"das harmonische Qelaute der Heerdenglocken, welches sich
-|
auch bei erSffneter Szene noch eine Zeitlang fortsetzt".
The following variations on this tune sung by the fisherman,
herdsman and hunter show the harmony of the Swiss way of
life with its ordered activity and closeness to nature.
This harmonious state is soon shattered by the thunderstorm,
which co-incides with the arrival of Baumgarten and the
beginnning of the political conflict. The cowbells are
not heard again until the end of the play, when justice
2
and liberty have triumphed.
In conclusion, the suggestion might be ventured that 
Schiller’s concept of harmony arises ’aus dem Geiste der
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Musik*. In the process in music whereby two or more notes 
are combined into a new whole he sees an analogue of 
various other processes of combination: of the parts of 
the physical body, of the forces within the personality, 
of human beings in love and friendship. The progressive 
form of the musical work as a whole further expresses for 
Schiller the dynamic nature of such combinations; harmony 
of the physical body generates psychological health, the 
harmonious personality forms harmonious relationships with 
the outside world, and from love and friendship may come an 
eventual world-brotherhood. The harmonious integration of 
the forces within the personality and the harmonious 
personality in action form the subject-matter of the 
philosophical essays where, it is suggested, the musical 
metaphor is still retained, although in a less obvious form.
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B. AN BXAAÎINATION OF THE WORD ’’HARMONIE” IN SCHILLER’S 
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS.
I. Schiller’s view of the personality as revealed in the 
philosophical writings.
When Schiller wrote his first philosophical 
dissertations and Jettera he had no real acquaintance with 
systematic philosophy. His later, and more famous, essays 
were, however, only written after a long and detailed study 
of Kant during the years 1791-1794- The influence of Kant 
can be seen in all these later essays, especially in the 
terminology employed. Schiller himself admitted to K S m e r  
that in the Briefe über die âsthetische Erziehung des 
Menschen he had to postulate several Kantian ideas without 
their formal proofs because he wanted to write quickly and 
succintly. ^  Such an admission supports Meyer’s contention^ 
that Schiller’s purpose is here to capture the imagination 
of his readers rather than to construct a completely 
coherent system of his own. The terminology adopted by 
Schiller in expounding his view of the personality in these
(l) Afterwards referred to as ÜAEM.
(2; Letter to Kbrner 10. Nov. 1794# NA. vol.27. p.80.
(3) loc. cit.
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essays often seems inadequate to the modern reader, firstly 
because the Kantian background is overlooked and secondly 
because the science of psychology has since evolved terms 
v/ith more exact spheres of reference. In the 18th century 
the study of psychology was still very much a branch of
A
philosophy and, according to Blackall, even the philosophical 
vocabulary of the time v/as relatively non-specialised and 
inexact. Even of Kant it has been said that "his
epistemological vocabulary is........ far too simple to do
the job he requires of it.” The author of this statement, 
Weldon, then shows that the term "Erscheinung” may, in Kant’s 
writings, have four separate spheres of reference. It is 
thus not only against Schiller that the charge of linguistic 
difficulty may be levelled.’ In his chapter on Kant and 
Schiller René Wellek has warned us that ”We must constantly 
try to translate what they say into our idiom”.^ Any 
examination of Schiller’s concept of the harmonious 
personality must therefore try to find satisfactory 
equivalents for his terms.
(1) E.A.Blackall. The Emergence of German as a Literary 
Language. Cambridge 1959* (esp. Chapter 2).
(2) T.W.Weldon. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Oxford.
1958. p. 127.
(3) René Y/ellek. A History of Modern Criticism; The Later 
18th Century. London. 1955* P» 229.
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There is ample evidence to show that Schiller really 
had grasped the essentials of Kant’s critical philosophy.
i
Victor Hell, for instance, has commented on some of the
annotations that Schiller made in the margin of a copy of
the Critique of Judgement. For the reasons indicated,
however, Schiller’s analysis of the human personality is
not nearly as complicated as Kant’s. In their efforts to
2
explain Kant’s psychology many interpreters have had to 
resort to pages of c.oniplicated diagrams. Schiller’s analysis 
of the personality itself does not warrant this : it may be 
said that he works with four chief divisions or categories, 
to which he gives the names ’’Sinnlichkeit” , ’’V e m u n f t ” , 
’’Einbildungskraft” and ’’Wille”. Between these categories 
various relationships are possible.
The term ’’Sinnlichkeit” and its related adjective 
’’sinnlich” cover, for Schiller, a very wide range. Schiller 
himself tellingly illustrated their range when he said
(1), Victor Hell. ’Esthétique et philosophie de l ’art: 
Eléments d ’une,théorie classique d*après la correspondance 
de Schiller’. Etudes Germaniques. 1959*.
(2) See the American pioneer psychologist E.F.Buchner’s 
article ’A Study of Kant’s Psychology’. The Psychological 
Review. Monograph Supplement. New York. TÔ97.
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1 2
’’Allés, was in der Zeit ist, ist sinnlich”. Vorlander 
saw ’’Sinnlichkeit” as the Schillerian equivalent of Kant’s 
term ’’Gefühl” from which category, according to Kant, 
spring all those urges v/hich drive us to immediate action 
without conscious reflection. Such urges are re-actions to 
stimuli received through the senses from the world of time 
and space. In Schiller’s work such re-actions may be of 
two kinds: i) natural needs, and ii) impulsive desires.
Natural needs, which Schiller sometimes also calls ’instincts’, 
are perhaps best defined by Schiller in Uber Anmut und \Vurde^ 
when he writes: ”Da einer Natumotywendigkeit nichts
abzudingen ist, so muss auch der Mensch, seiner Preiheit 
ungeachtet, empfinden, was die Natur ihn empfinden lassen 
will, und je nachdem die Empfindung Schmerz Oder Lust ist, 
so muss bei ihm ebenso unabanderlich Verabscheuung Oder 
Begierde erfolgen. In diesem Punkte steht er dem TjAere 
vollkommen gleich, und der starkmütigste Stoiker fühlt den 
Hunger ebenso empfindlich und verabscheut ihn ebenso lebhaft 
als der Y/urm zu seinen Pussen. ” ^ Natural needs may be 
re-actions either to external stimuli (e.g. a horse runs
(1) See notes on Kbmers Aufsatz über Musik. NA. vol.22.
, p. 2 % .
(2) K.Vorlander. Kant, Schiller, Goethe. Leipzig. 1923.
(3) Afterwards referred to as ÜAW.
(4) SW. vol.11. p.441. JMA.voï.^^.ü.p.Ai9ô.
<A. aW. II. /. ^ 3 - i Ol.
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away if it is frightened by an unfamiliar sound) or to 
internal ones (e.g. a baby cries if it is hungry). Such 
needs are Nature’s method of preserving both the life of 
the individual and of the species. The animal, according 
to Schiller, has no choice but to obey its natural needs, 
and in its case self-preservation and the preservation of 
the species nearly always co-incide. In Man, on the other 
hand, for reasons that will be discussed later, the 
interests of self do not always co-incide with the interests 
of the species. In the course of his everyday life in the 
world each individual is faced with countless complex 
situations. His immediate response is to find a course of 
action that will ensure his immediate advantage. In other 
words, he puts his own cause before that of the community. 
These responses may perhaps be termed ’impulsive desires’. 
They may in some cases co-incide with natural needs, but 
the distinction is important if Schiller’s own distinction 
between ”reine Natur” and ”rohe Natur” is to be appreciated.
Schiller nowhere finds it necessary to give a precise 
definition of ’’Vernunft” although he sometimes refers to 
this category as ”das selbststandige Vermbgen”. ,”V e m u n f t ” 
can perhaps best be regarded as the Schillerian equivalent 
of Kant’s term ”Bev/usstsein” , the capacity in Man for 
conscious reflection on all that he does. The animal does
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not have to think where the general good of its species 
lies: Man has to formulate his ovm laws through the use of 
’’Vernunft”. The laws of ’’V e m u n f t ” thus legislate for the 
good of the whole, and it is the duty of the individual 
to obey them.
For Kant, the general term ’’Bewusstsein” includes;
i) conscious reflection on v/hat is t r u e  the sphere of
thought and knowledge; ii) conscious reflection on what 
is good —  the sphere of ethics; and iii) conscious
reflection on what is beautiful --- the sphere of the
imagination and of Art. The beautiful, although a symbol 
of universal precepts, can only be apprehended through the 
senses. Imagination thus occupies a mid-way position 
between the lower regions of undifferentiated sense- 
impressions (’’Gefühl”) and the higher regions of ’’Bewusstsein”. 
This is also the position occupied by ”EinbiIdungskraft” in 
Schiller’s essays. ”Einbi1dungskraft” is the capacity in 
Man to appreciate the beautiful and is also called by Schiller 
”der asthetische Sinn” , ”das Gefühl für das Schbne” or, 
simply, ”Geschmack”.
The Will, for Schiller, is the distinguishing feature 
of Man. As he says in Uber das Erhabene : ”Alle andere
Dinge müssen; der Mensch ist das Wesen, v/elches will”.
(1) SW. vol. 12. p.346. I A.vol.21.p.38. S A
’ II. 6 -  y.
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The will may be defined as the power of conscious choice 
between one<. course of action and another. Through the 
exercise of his will an individual decides whether to 
follow his impulsive desires or to obey the precepts of 
duty. The will thus determines the relationship between 
the two categories referred to above as ’’Sinnlichkeit” and 
’’Vernunft”. Schiller’s view of the personality may perhaps 
be expressed in a very simple diagram as follov/s;
Wille
Sinnlichkeit Vemunft
(Einbildungskraft )
Within each human personality there are, at any given 
moment, i) urges towards courses of action in accordance 
with natural needs or impulsive desires and ii) urges 
towards courses of action in accordance with the precepts 
of. duty. The course of action to be followed is determined 
by the Will, the power of conscious choice, but, as will 
be shown later, in those individuals we call ’ cultivated’^ 
the imagination, or sense of beauty, may also play a 
decisive role. Where the courses of action prescribed by 
desire on the one hand and by duty on the other are at 
variance, there will be conflict and discord within the 
personality. Should the two courses of action co-incide,
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there will be harmony.
Schiller envisages three basic relationships between 
"Sinnlichkeit” and "Vemunft” , between impulsive desire 
and conscious duty. These are described in UAW as follows: 
"Der Mensch unterdrûckt entweder die Porderungen 
seiner sinnlichen Natur, urn sich den h b h e m  Porderungen 
seiner vemunftigen gemass zu verhalten; Oder er kehrt es 
urn und ordnet den vernünftigen The il seines Wesens dem 
sinnlichen unter und folgt also bloss dem Stosse, womit ihn 
die Naturnotwendigkeit gleich den a n d e m  Erscheinungen 
forttreibt; Oder die Triebe des letztem setzen sich mit 
den Gesetzen des ersten in Harmonie, und der Mensch ist 
einig mit sich selbst” .^
The first sense of the word "Harmonie” to be distinguished 
in Schiller’s philosophical essays is thus one of a vague 
general agreement betv/een desire and duty. The word is 
used to characterise that state where the course of action 
urged by desire coincides with that urged by duty. In this 
state the individual knows no conflict and acts as a unified
'K
whole, ("einig mit sich selbst”). The maintenance of this
(1) SVi. vol.11. p.426. M.V01.2Ü.P.28Ü.
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harmonious state is presented in the same essay as the task 
of each individual life:
”Es ist dem Menschen zwar aufgegeben, eine innige Uber-
einstimraung zwischen seinen beiden Naturen zu stiften, immer
Ex. 2. ,
ein harmonirendes Ganze zu sejn und mit seiner vollstimmig-
en ganzen Menschheit zu handeln.” ^
Only those actions v/hich spring from the agreement of the 
two natures, of desire and duty, may be said to be actions 
worthy of true humanity. The use of the word ”vollstimmig" 
in the above sentence is interesting, because it indicates 
an underlying musical metaphor. True humanity is a state 
where both tones blend into harmony, not a state where only 
one tone is to be heard or where the tones sound together 
in discord. In the true "Zusammenstimmung zwischen dem Sitt- 
lichen und Sinnlichen" both tones are to be sounded with 
equal force, and this, as Schiller tells us, is "das Ideal 
vollkommener Menschheit".^ Although such a harmonious state 
is said in UAW to remain an ideal which can never be attained 
in the actual v/orld, each individual should nevertheless 
strive towards it. In this striving he may be assisted by
1) SW. vol. 11. p.440. NÂ.vol.£Ü.i).E89(JA.-*/.//.i,-a33./.J4-».a24-4l.
,2) SW. vol.11. p.453. I1A.vol.Ee.p.298JLJA.u4»/.L. a73,//2C>-24
3) ibid. KA.vol.20.p.298.^/t;J. I
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the cultivation of his sense of the beautiful or in other 
Y/ords, by an education "zum Geschmack und zur Schbnheit".
The aim of the aesthetic education, Schiller writes in 
UAEM, is
"das Ganze unserer sinnlichen und geistigen Krafte in
Ex. 3' „ 2
mbglichster Harmonie auszubilden".
.The idea that harmony between duty and desire, in so far as 
it may be brought about at all, may be brought about by the 
aesthetic sense in Man is to be found again in one of Schiller’s 
earlier essays Die Schaubühne als eine moralische Anstalt 
betrachtet (1784)» Here Schiller writes;
"Unsre Natur, gleich unfâhig, langer im Zustande des 
Tj^iers fortzudauem, als die feinem Arbeiten des Verstandes 
fortzusetzen, verlangte einen mittieren Zustand, der beide 
Ex.4* v/idersprechende Enden vereinigte, die harte Spannung zu
sanfter Harmonie herabstimmte, und den wechselweisen Ubergang 
eines Zustandes in den andern erleichterte. Diesen Nutzen 
leistet uberhaupt nur der asthetische Sinn Oder das Gefühl 
für das Sch'ône".^
The adjective "sanft" here indicates that the harmonious 
state is characterised by an ease and grace of action, and
(1) S A . u«l I». Ÿ9- //. L u/s Bf\ ;xi)
(2) . I
5A. ool U p  gy. I/, y- /y.
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the possibility of a reciprocal inter-play between the two 
sides of human nature is shown by the expression "den 
wechselweisen Ubergang eines Zustandes in den andem". In 
that such inter-play is possible, the state of harmony may 
be said to be a dynamic state. Of it Professor Garland has 
said "It is not a passive, but an ’ energetic’ balance; not 
static, but kinetic; delicately poised it conceals a latent 
dynamism".  ^ It is also interesting to note in the above 
example a suppressed musical metaphor implied by the words 
"Spannung" and "herabstimmte". The sounds produced by the 
instrument of the personality when there is tension between 
the two natures may be compared to the sounds produced by 
a musical instrument when the strings have been tensed too 
much. Such sounds are not in keeping v/ith the true tone 
of the instrument and harmony can only be drawn from it 
when the right pitch is obtained. In terms of the 
personality, harmony can only be obtained when the various 
parts stand in an easy and reciprocal relationship to each 
other. The next task of this examination will be to 
determine the exact nature of this relationship and to 
ascertain whether Schiller envisaged only one harmonious 
relationship between the parts of the personality or several
(1) H.B. Garland. Schiller Revisited. London. 1959. p. 25.
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Before the relationship betv/een the parts of the
personality is further discussed, however, the relationship
of the personality to the outside world must be considered
in a little more detail. Life involves changes in space
and time. The human being is a continuously changing
creature in a continuously changing environment. Through
his senses he registers changes in his environment and if
these changes are allowed to exert an unrestricted influence
upon him he is said to be in a state of passivity. The
adjective Schiller generally uses to describe such a state
is "leidend". Alternatively the individual may seek to
impose his ideas on the world around him, and here Schiller
calls him active ("tatig") or creative, ("schaffend"). A
clear exposition of these concepts may be found in one of
the Kalliasbriefe where Schiller writes: "Bei Betrachtung
der Erscheinung verhalten wir uns leidend, indem wir ihre
Eindrûcke empfangen; thatig, indem wir diese Eindrücke
unseren Vemunftformen unterwerfen". ^ To a certain extent
these processes are inter-linked: changes in the external
world affect each individual, and each individual can cause
variation in the outside world. The inter-dependence of the
natural world v/hich v/e know through our senses and the
c
rational world of our own ideas is stated most succinctly
H e r t s -'Brief e. Kritieche Gesamtausgaoe.Berausgege ben von 
^ . Jonas . T  vols L3"tuttgart, 1892-1896 . vol.Z.p .241.( xietter of 
8 .February . 179S. ).
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by Schiller in Uber den moralischen Nutzen asthetischer 
Sitten where he writes: "Die Ordnungder Natur ist also von 
der Sittlichkeit unsrer Gesinnungen abhângig gemacht, und 
wir kbnnen gegen die moralische Welt nicht verstossen, ohne 
zugleich in der physischen eine Verwirrung anzurichten".
The term ’reciprocity* must therefore be applied not only to 
the dynamic arrangement of the parts within the personality, 
but also to the relationship between this personality and 
the changing outside world. This reciprocal relationship 
may perhaps be said to correspond to the progressive nature 
of a musical work. As life proceeds, the relationship 
between the personality and the outside world will manifest 
different patterns, just as different patterns of harmony 
come into being as a piece of music is played.
The reciprocal relationship between the personality 
and the outside world is perhaps examined most fully in 
UAEM. Here Schiller distinguishes between an essential 
pattern, which determines the form of each individual, and 
the different realisations of this pattern in time and 
space. If the poem Der Tanz is recalled, then the essential 
pattern ("Person") may be compared to the rhythm which 
controls and organizes the various figures of the dance.
(1) SW. vol.12. p. 343. liA.voi.El.p.Sb.
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while these figures themselves represent the manifestations 
of the essential pattern ("Zustand"). Por Schiller, the 
psychological life of each individual is concerned firstly 
with the manifestation in the outside v/orld of as many 
different aspects of the essential pattern as possible, for 
different situations demand different re-actions, and 
secondly with the sub-ordination of the changes in the 
outside world to an order imposed from within by this
essential pattern. That is; " er soil allés zur V/elt
maChen, was bloss Form ist, und alle seine Anlagen zur
Erscheinung bringen......... er soil allés in sich vertilgen,
was bloss Welt ist, und Ubereinstimmung in alle seine 
Veranderungen br ingen: mit a n d e m  Worten : er soil allés 
Innre veraussem und allés Aussere f ormen". ^ Here again 
it is the task of each individual to bring harmony into all 
his manifestations in the outside world. The harmony to be 
understood by "Ubereinstimmung" in the above sentence, 
however, is the harmony between all these manifestations 
and the pattern of his ideally-integrated personality which 
he carries within. The processes described in the above 
quotation are formulated by Schiller more specifically in
(1) SW. vol. 12. pp. 53-54- IU.vol,E0.p.344.( Ua Ejà 11,.
-A. a. Ç. //. 7- / 5.
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the concept of the "Stofftrieb", v/hereby the aspects of 
the essential pattern seek to become actual, and of the 
"Formtrieb", whereby the variations in the outside world 
are given order and significance. In explaining the latter 
concept Schiller writes:
"Der zweite jener Triebe, den man den Formtrieb
I
nennen kann, geht aus von dem absolut en Dase;^n des Menschen 
Ex. 5* Oder von seiner vernünftigen Natur, und ist bestrebt, ihn 
in Freiheit zu setzen. Harmonie in die Verschiedenheit 
seines Erscheinens zu bringen und bei allem Wechsel des 
Zustandes seine Person zu behaupten". ^
The word "Harmonie" is used here in the same sense as the
# #
word "Ubereinstimmung" in the expression "Ubereinstimmung 
in alle seine VerSnderungen bringen" (see above). A second 
sense of the word in Schiller’s philosophical essays may 
now be recorded: that of concordance between the personality 
and its expression in the outside world. The concept of 
harmony is now seen to include both the harmony of the 
integrated personality and the harmony between this 
integrated personality and the outside world, but it must 
always be remembered that both harmonies are inter-linked. 
Indeed, the latter could be described as the harmonious
NA.vol.£0.pp.545-246.(UAEM i£ ;.
(1 ) SY/. vol. 12. p. 56.
s A .  U.I. / a .  / / 1 '  / 4 .
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personality in action. Where a harmonious reciprocal 
relationship between the personality and the outer world 
is attained, all actions will be in keeping with the 
essential pattern and order will be imposed upon life.
As Schiller himself says: "Wo beide Eigenschaften sich 
vereinigen, da wird der Mensch mit der hbchsten fülle von 
Dase:Jn die hbchste Selbststandigkeit und Preiheit verbinden, 
und, anstatt sich an die Y^ elt zu verlieren, diese vielmehr 
mit der ganzen Unendlichkeit ihrer Erscheinungen in sich 
Ziehen und der Einheit seiner Vemunft unterwerf en".
Just as the reciprocal inter-play between the parts 
of the personality remains an ideal, so, too, the harmonious 
reciprocal relationsip between inner and outer worlds is 
said by Schiller to be "die Idee seiner Menschheit, mithin 
ein Unendliches, dem er sich im Laufe der Zeit immer me hr 
n ah em kann, aber ohne es jemals zu erreichen". In the 
striving towards the harmony of the personality the 
cultivation of taste was seen to play an important role; 
in the striving towards the harmony between the personality 
and the outside world the ’play-urge’ in Man ("Spieltrieb") 
must come into action. The ’play-urge’ Schiller tells us.
- SA. o6l. 12. p. It 3. II. ( u . A E n  l 3 )
d) SA. o < j l - //. I)
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springs from the reciprocal action of the "Stofftrieb" 
and the "Formtrieb". It is perhaps nothing more than the 
desire for harmony which Schiller believed to exist in 
each individual. The *play-urge* strives to bring about 
the harmonious relationship outlined above by robbing the 
experiences of the outer world of their * dynamic* quality 
and by presenting the order demanded by the rational self 
in such a way that it does not appear tyrannical;^ that is, 
it is an attitude of mind which refuses to be driven to 
immediate action by the stimuli received from the outside 
world and which refuses to take the moral laws of duty so 
seriously that they become a chore.
After this discussion on the reciprocal action of 
inner and outer worlds the musical structure of Schiller’s 
language and thought becomes much more vivid. Not only 
is the human being conceived as a harmony of various parts, 
but his whole life, too, is to be one harmonious movement. 
(There is a hint of this thought in Fiesco when Leonore 
pleads with Fiesco to flee from the political life of 
Genoa: "Unser Leben rinnt dann melodisch wie die flbtende 
Quelle zum Schopfer"). In this movement there is an 
essential theme and endless variations on it. The musical
1 vol. »2.
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tenor of Schiller’s thought is illustrated by his own style, 
and his constantly changing terminology, his ’jeu de 
substitution’ as Hell has called it,  ^ can perhaps be seen 
as a set of variations on his central theme. As Professor 
Wilkinson has said, it is almost as if Schiller were 
trying "to make even a philosophical treatise tend in the 
direction of the art to which he said all the arts should 
in some sense approximate" (i.e. music).
It can thus be said that in the essays Schiller wrote 
after his study of Kant, although there is very little 
reference to music itself, the word "Harmonie" still retains 
its musical connotations. It is now used either of a 
process by which the various forces within the personality 
are brought to work together, or of the inter-action between 
personality and outside world. The first of these 
processes, it is suggested, corresponds to the one in music 
whereby separate notes are combined to form a chord; the 
second to the moving form of a musical work as a whole.
(1) op. cit. p. 348.
(2) op. cit. p. 67*
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II. Patterns of harmony within the personality as revealed 
in the philosophical writings
In the preceding chapter it was seen that the first
sense in which the word "Harmonie" is used in Schiller’s
philosophical essays is that of a vague general agreement
between desire and duty, ah agreement in which the
various forces within the personality stand in an easy
and reciprocal relationship to each other. It will now
be suggested that Schiller envisaged at least three
different kinds of harmonious, or seemingly harmonious,
relationships.
A clue to these different relationships is afforded
by the following passage from Uber naive und sentimental-
1
ische Dichtung ;
"So lange der Mensch noch reine, es versteht sich, 
nicht rohe Natur ist, wirkt er als ungetj/eilte sinnliche 
Einheit und als ein harmonirendes Ganze. Sinne und 
Vernunft, empfangendes und selbsttj^âtiges Vermbgen, haben 
sich in ihrem Geschafte noch nicht getrennt, vielweniger 
stehen sie im Widerspruch miteinander. Seine Empfindungen 
Sind nicht das formlose Spiel des Zufalls, seine Gedanken 
nicht das gehaltlose Spiel der Vorstellungskraft; aus dem
(1) Afterwards referred to as UNSD.
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Gesetz der Not^slwendigkeit gehen jene, aus der Wlrklichkeit 
gehen diese hervor. 1st der Mensch in den Stand der Kultur 
getreten, und hat die Kunst ihre Hand an ihn gelegt, so ist 
Ex.6 jene sinnliche Harmonie in ihm aufgehoben, und er kann nur 
noch als moralische Einheit,d.h.als nach Einheit strebend, 
sich aussern. Die Ubereinstimmung zwischen seinem Empfinden 
und Denken, die in dem ersten Zustande wirklich Statt 
fand, existirt jetzt bloss idealisch; sie ist nicht mehr in 
ihm, sondern ausser ihm, als ein Gedanke, der erst 
realisirt werden soli, nicht mehr als Tatsache seines 
Lebens." ^
In this passage Schiller is laying the foundation for his
distinction between the two kinds of poetry. In the
state of natural simplicity, he goes on to say,
"wo der Mensch noch, mit allen seinen Krâften
2
Ex.7 zugleich, als harmonische Einheit wirkt"
the imitation of Nature will be the poet’s task. In the 
state of civilisation ("Kultur")
"wo jenes harmonische Zusammenwirken seiner ganzen 
Ex. 8 Natur bloss eine Idee ist"^
the task of the poet is to present an ideal. It will be
(1) SW. vol. 12. p. 232 (Schiller’s italics)
'2) ibid. p. 232
3) ibid. p. 233
These three references y/ili be found in EA.vol.2U.pp.426 
427. u.l, 12.
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clear from the first passage quoted above that the ’first 
state’ mentioned in the clause "die in dem ersten Zustande 
wirklich Statt fand" refers back to the state of "reine 
Natur" introduced in the opening sentence. The use of the 
qualifying demonstrative "jene" shows that the expression 
"sinnliche Harmonie" is to be associated with the same 
state. "Sinnliche Harmonie" can therefore be equated with 
"Ubereinstimmung zwischen seinem Empfinden und Denken, die 
in dem ersten Zustande wirklich Statt fand" and also, 
through the link with "reine Natur", with "unget^eilte 
sinnliche Einheit" and "ein harmonirendes Ganze". The 
expressions "harmonische Einheit" and "jenes harmonische 
Zusammenwirken" contained in Exs. 7 and 8 above may also 
be read as variants of "sinnliche Harmonie". A description 
of a state of "sinnliche Harmonie" may thus be obtained.
In such a state the personality is at one with itself, 
and this unity springs from the reciprocal inter-action 
of the forces within. There is no conflict here between 
"Sinne" and "Empfinden" on the one hand and "Vemunft" 
and "Denken" on the other. Instead, each ’category’ plays 
its part in relating all the activities of the individual 
into an organic whole. All impressions of the outside 
world registered by the senses ("En^findungen") are ordered 
into the essential pattern of the personality: all thoughts 
are connected in some way with the outside world ("Wirk- 
lichkeit"). Here, then, is that reciprocal inter­
play between "Stofftrieb" and "Formtrieb" - v/hich
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Schiller had described in his earlier essay UAEM. The
state of "sinnliche Harmonie” is thus a state of true
harmony in that all the forces within the personality
work together co-operatively so that there is not only an
inner harmony but also a harmonious relationship between
the individual self and the outside world. Professor
Mainland^ has noted that this ”sinnliche Harmonie” is a
characteristic of what Schiller terms ”das Naive” but has
attempted no further definition of it. Professor Bruford
would seem to be referring to the same state when he
writes^The ’natural’ harmony that we ascribe to the
childhood of mankind and to favoured ages in the past like
that of Greece in its heyday, he [Schiller] sees now in
the behaviour of actual children and simply country people,
2
but he finds it too by analogy in landscape”. One kind of 
harmonious relationship between the forces within the 
personality has thus been established. To it Schiller 
applies the terra ”sinnlich” , and the precise meaning of 
this word in this context will have to be investigated.
(The translation of Schiller*s philosophical essays in 
Bohn’s Standard Library^ avoids the issue by rendering
(1) op. cit. p. 154-
(2) W.H.Bruford. Culture and Society in Classical Y/eimar. 
Cambridge 1962.’"pi 200^
(3) Schiller. Essays aesthetical and philosophical. 
Translated anonymously in Bohn s Standard Library. 
London. 1899» Bohn p. 285*
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“slnnlich" here by the deliciously vague "sensuous").
If it is accepted that "sinnliche Harmonie" is linked
in Schiller's thought with the concept of the 'naive',
then it must also be associated with the concept of 'gei^ls',
for, as Schiller says in HNSD, "iTaiv muss jedes wahre
Genie seyn, Oder es ist keines”. As examples of ’genius’
Schiller mentions, among others, Sophocles and Shakespeare,
Archimedes and Hippocrates, Julius Oeasar and Peter the
Great. It is therefore not only to children and simple
country people that the state of "sinnliche Harmonie” may
be ascribed; great artists, great scientists, and even
great statesmen may also qualify. In Schiller’s theory
of the nature of ’genius’, as it is stated in UNSD and in
the poem Per Genius which was written at about the same
time, the genius is one who is guided by his instincts.
In both the essay and the poem the metaphor of a guardian
angel is used. In UNSD Schiller writes ; ”.......... bloss
von d er Natur Oder dem Inst in k  t ,  seinem  schützenden  Engel,
geleitet, geht es [das Genie] ruhig und sicher durch alle
2
8chiingen des falschen Geschmacks”. In the poem Der 
Genius he says:
1) SW. vol. 12. p. 213. a^..vol.2u.p 424($^ ^ ^
2; ibid. LA.vol.20.^.4id4 J /.
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"Hast du, Glücklicher, nie den schützenden Engel
verloren,
Nie des frommen Instinkts liebende W a m u n g  verwirkt,
0 dann gehe du hin in deiner kbstlichen Unschuld I  ^ '* 
Just as an animal, has an ’ instinct* which tells it to do 
not only what is right for it individually in any given 
situation, but also what is at the same time the right 
action for the general good of its species, so, too, the 
actions of genius, guided as they are by the guardian 
angel of ’instinct*, are embodiments of universally valid
precepts. In UNSD, for instance, Schiller writes : ”......
aber seine Binfâlle sind Eingebungen eines Gottes (Allés, 
was die gesunde Natur tÿfut, ist gbttlich), seine Gefühle 
sind Gesetze fur alle Zeiten und für alle Geschlechter 
der Menschen”. The same thought is repeated in Der Genius 
in these words :
**........ Was du tjfust, was dir gefallt, ist Gesetz,
Und an alle Geschlechter ergeht ein gôttliches
Machtwort.” ^
(and an echo of the same idea may perhaps be heard in 
GrSfin Terzky* s advice to 'Wallenstein:
(1) SW. vol.1. p. 438. 11. 37-38 and 1. 43. ^
[I] lT: 48-49?* AA.V01.2U.P.424.
The first version of Per a-enius may be found in üA.pp.übg- 
£5£ under the title of natur- und Schule. ''
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"Denn Recht hat jeder eigene Charakter,
Der ûbereinstimmt mit sich selbst”. )
The ’instinct* that guides the genius, however, is of a
higher kind from mere * animal instinct* which, as was
shown in the preceding chapter, Schiller sometimes terms 
* natural need*. It is a * moral instinct* by which an 
individual automatically knows what is in accordance with 
the universal law. To avoid confusion this * moral instinct* 
will here be termed * intuition*. If the above reasoning 
is accepted, it may be concluded that where an individual 
acts from an intuitive knowledge of the universal law, he 
may be said to be in a state of “sinnliche Harmonie”.
In the passage from UNSD quoted at the beginning of 
this chapter (Ex. 6) it is clear that for most people the 
state of “sinnliche Harmonie” has been lost. Once this 
happens, the individual is said by Schiller to be a 
“moralische Binheit.d.h. nach Einheit strebend”. If it 
is remembered that in this context “Einheit” means the 
unity of the harmonious personality, then the individual 
must be now striving towards a postulated “moralische 
Harmonie”. , Schiller in fact uses this term a little later 
on in UNSD in the discussion of the elegiac mode of 
reflective poetry:
(1) Wallensteins Tod. Act 1. sc. ?• SW. vol.4* P* 231.
M.V01.8.P.2Ü1. SA. ool. ç.CLld, II. 6 0 0  —  6 0 2 .
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"Die Trauer über verlorene Freuden, ûber das ans 
der Welt verschwundene goldene Alter, über das entflohene 
Ex. 9. Glück der Jug end, der Liebe, u. s.w. kann nur a Is dann der 
Stoff zu einer elegischen Dichtung werden, wenn jene 
Zustande sinnlichen Friedens zugleich als Gegenstande 
moralischer Harmonie sich vorstellen lassen". ^
In Schiller* s usage the word "moralisch** is another word 
with a wide range of meaning. (Here again the Bohn trans­
lation takes the easy way out and renders it without any 
explanatory note by *'moral"). Mrs Sayce has suggested
that, in addition to the meanings i) "ethisch— sittlich 
gut*' ii) "geistig" "seelisch" " innerlich", and iii) 
"vemünftig" which she believes the word to have in UAW, 
in UNSD the connotations iv) "zur Idee gehbrig" , v) "als 
Adj.zu *Sitten* in allegemeiner Bedeutung" and vi) "als
Adj. zu Gesellschaft in der Verb indung * moralische V/elt* "
3may also be isolated. In the context of the passage
quoted above (Ex. 9) Schiller says that the elegiac poet
may lament either over the distance between the real and
the ideal worlds or over the loss of the Golden Age, the
loss of the state of natural simplicity. However, the
loss of the Golden Age is a fit subject only if its 
 -----------------------------------------------------
(1 ) SW. vol. 12. pp^51 ff. (my italics). .vol .2l/ . .450.
(2) ed. cit. p. 297.
(3) op. cit. p. 166. Mrs Sayce also finds that in UAEM 
"moralisch" may also have the meaning "logisch" or
"intellektuell".
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portrayal can be understood as a symbol of "moralische 
Harmonie". "Moralische Harmonie" is thus linked, if 
somewhat loosely, with an ideal state.
There are two other places in UNSD where Schiller 
uses the word "Harmonie" with a qualifying adjective with 
reference to an ideal state. When he discusses the idyllic 
mode of poetry, the subject of which is the presentation 
of the Golden Age or of the Ideal as actually realised here 
and now, Schiller says:
"Er [der Dichter] fuhre uns nicht rûckwarts in unsere 
Kindheit, um uns mit den kostbarsten Erwerbungen des 
Verstandes eine Ruhe erkaufen zu lassen, die nicht ISnger 
dauern kann, als der Schlaf unserer Geisteskrafte; sondern 
Ex.10. fuhre uns vorwarts zu unserer Mündigkeit, um uns die hbhere 
Harmonie zu empfinden zu geben, die den Kâmpfer belohnt, 
die den Uberwinder begluckt".
The ideal state is here presented as the Coming-of-Age of 
Mankind ("Mündigkeit"), the achievement of that perfect 
social order which Schiller had earlier sketched out in 
UAEM and which Kant had championed in his essay Was ist 
AufklSrung ? The comparative adjective "hbher" invites 
the reader to contrast the harmony mentioned here with the 
harmony of an earlier stage, to which, as has been seen,
(1) SW. vol. 12.3  V» 285 (my italics). 
RA.vol.SO.p.472.( daurenj.
iA.  ..1, a  p .2 3 3 .  II. gT IS.
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Schiller gives the name "sinnliche Harmonie". It is 
interesting to note that, in these references to a ''moral" 
or "higher" harmony, the harmonious state of an earlier 
stage is now depreciated and is referred to variously as 
"jene Zustande sinnlichen Friedens" (Ex. 9) or "Ruhe" or 
"Schlaf unserer Geisteskrafte" (both Ex. 10). The "higher" 
harmony is also said to be a reward after battle. (The 
two clauses "die den Kâmpfer belohnt" and "die den Oberwinder 
begluckt" in Ex. 10, of which the latter is a variant of 
the former, illustrate the musicality of Schiller's 
language). "Moralische Harmonie" therefore appears to be 
a state which may only be attained after conflict and in 
comparison with which "sinnliche Harmonie" seems to be a 
state of ease. Furthermore, in his criticism of Rousseau, 
Schiller writes:
"Entweder es ist seine kranke Empfindlichkeit, die 
über ihn herrscht, und sein Gefühl bis zum Peinlichen 
treibt; Oder es ist seine Denkkraft, die seiner Imagination 
Fesseln anlegt, und durch die Strenge des Begriffs die 
AnmutJ^^ des Gemaldes vemichtet. Beide Eigenschaften, deren 
innige Wechselwirkung und Vereinigung den Poeten eigentlich 
ausmacht, finden sich bei diesem Schriftsteller in 
ungewôhnlich hohem Grad, und nichts fehlt, als dass sie
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sich auch wirklich mit einander vereinigt ausserten, dass 
seine Selbsttatigkeit sich mehr in sein Empfinden, dass 
seine Empfanglichkeit sich mehr in sein Denken mischte. 
Daher ist auch in dem Ideale, das er von der Menschheit
aufstellt......................iiberall mehr ein Bedurfnis
nach physischer Ruhe als nach moralischer Ub e re ins t immung 
darin sichtbar. Seine leidenschaftliche Empfindlichkeit 
ist Schuld, dass er die Menschheit, um nur des Streites 
Ex.11. in derselben recht bald los zu werden, lieber zu der
geistlosen Einfôrmigkeit des ersten Standes zurûcêuhrt,
A
als jenen Streit in der geistreichen Harmonie einer
vbllig durchgeführten Bildung geendigt sehen........will". ^
In the first part of this extract Rousseau is criticised 
for failing to achieve a harmony and balance between all 
the forces of his personality. He errs now on the side 
of "Empfindlichkeit" (a criticism v/ith which at least one 
recent writer would a g r e e ) n o w  on the side of "Denkkraft". 
The reciprocal inter-play of both ("deren innige 
Wechselwirkung und Vereinigung") is never achieved.
Rousseau experiences a state of conflict and is said to
(1) SW. vol. M2. pp,254:ff. (**Ube:^ .  " U  ere ins t immung" Schiller's 
italics. Otherwise ray italics). NA.vol.20.pp.451-452 .
(2) cf. R. Hubert. Rousseau et L'Enc.vclopêdiet Essai sur 
la formation des idées politiques de Rousseau (1742- 
1756). Paris. 1933* P* 66. "Toute cette évolution n'est 
point l'effet d'une pure r^êflexion dialectique: elle est 
dominée par des facteurs sentimentaux".
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prefer peace to "moral harmony" ("mehr ein Bedurfnis nach 
physischer Ruhe als nach moralischer Ubereinstimmung").
The next sentence shows another characteristic musical 
variation: "geistlose Einfbrmigkeit" replaces "physische 
Ruhe" and "geistreiche Harmonie" repeats "moralische 
Ubereinstimmung". The word "geistreich" here implies an 
intellectual richness, the full, use of all one's mental 
faculties, while the expression "vbllig durchgeführte 
Bildung" suggests a process in which all the varying 
experiences of life are welcomed and savoured. A second ' 
kind of harmonious relationship between the forces within 
the personality has now been isolated. Whereas the 
relationship which Schiller termed "sinnlich" seems to be 
achieved by certain people, this new relationship, to 
which he applies the adjectives "moralisch", "hbher" or 
"geistreich" seems to correspond more with that ideal of 
humanity, that "innige Ubereinstimmung zwischen seinen 
beiden Naturen" which was discussed under Ex.2. in the 
preceding chapter.
An indication of yet another relationship between the 
forces within the personality is given at the end of the 
essay entitled Uber die notwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch
schbner Formen. where Schiller writes as follows:
(1) Afterwards referred to as NG.
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"So gefâhrlich kann es für die Moralitat des Charakters 
ausschlagen, wenn zwischen den sinnlichen und den sittlichen 
Trieben, die doch nur im Ideale und nie in der Wirklichkeit 
vollkomraen einig se|n kbnnen, eine zu innige Gemeinschaft 
herrscht". The whole context of this statement will be 
examined at a later stage. For the moment it may be noted 
that the word "Gemeinschaft" is used with reference to an 
association between the different forces ("sinnlich" and 
"sittlich") within the personality. A true harmony between 
the forces within the personality is, however, once again 
said to be impossible in the actual world. There may, on 
the other hand, be an association between these forces 
which Schiller describes as "zu innig". (In his translation 
J. Weiss rendered this expression by "too intimate".)
The qualifying "zu" contains a suggestion of falsity: the 
association between the various forces seems harmonious, 
but this harmony is too good to be true. Furthermore, in 
Uber das Erhabene Schiller speaks of the man who takes 
pleasure in living a virtuous life and asks: "Wem wird 
dieser schbne Einklang der natürlichen Triebe mit den 
Vorschriften der Vemunft nicht entzückend se^ n^, und wer
(1) SW. vol. 12. p. 194.
(2) The Philosophical and Aesthetic Letters and Essays of
Schiller. Translated by J. Weiss. London. 1845* p. 196.
The Bohn translation also gives "too intimate" cf. ed.
cit. p. 2Zf6.
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4
sich enthalten kbnnen, einen solchen Menschen zu lieben ?" 
From this sentence there seems to be no doubt that the 
forces within the personality have achieved a harmonious 
relationship with each other, ("dieser schbne Einklang").
Yet the rhetorical question again suggests an element of 
doubt, especially when it is followed by the further one; 
"Aber kbnnen wir uns wohl, bei aller Zuneigung zu 
demselben, versichert halten, dass er wirklich ein
2
Tugendhafter ist, und dass es uberhaupt eine Tugend gibt?" 
However much the forces within the personality may seem 
to be in harmony, there is some doubt in Schiller's mind 
as regards the validity of the claim. Towards the end of 
the same essay the concept of a 'false' harmony is 
explicitly expressed. Here Schiller is talking about the 
purpose in Art of "das Pathetische" and he writes:
"Also hinweg mit der falsch verstandenen Schonung 
und dem schlaffen verzartelten Geschmack, der über das 
emste Angesicht der Notjifwendigkeit einen Schleier wirft, 
und, um sich bei den Sinnen in Gunst zu setzen, eine 
Ex.12. Harmonie zwischen dem Wohlsejn und Wohlverhalten lügt,
(1) SW. vol. 12. p.355. IU.vol.21.p.44.f^A.A{././2.^-iy/.</-4-Y
(2) ibid. UA.V01.21.P.44.V fU'.J. ' *
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1
wovon sich in der wirklichen Welt keine Spuren zeigen".
Here the use of the verb "lugen" shows that the harmony
between "Wohlsejn", which may be taken to refer to that
happy state where the interests of self are satisfied,
and "Wohlverhalten", which may be taken to refer to the
precepts of duty, has only been achieved by concealing
some of the unpleasant truths of actual life. In Schiller's
view as expressed here it is utterly worthless and is to
be rejected. Nevertheless this 'false' harmony may often
beguile us. There is thus a third relationship between
the forces of the personality which seems to be a
harmonious one, but which is not to be confused -------
theoretically at least ------  with a true or ideal harmony.
In translating the passage quoted above J. Y/eiss rendered
2
"lügt" by "counterfeits" and it is proposed to refer to 
this third relationship from now on as that of 'counterfeit 
harmony'.
Three more senses in which Schiller uses the word 
"Harmonie" have now been isolated. Harmony may be 
"sinnlich", "moralisch" or "counterfeit". (The instrument 
of the personality, it is suggested, may be tuned in three
1 ) SVf. vol. 1É. p; 356. \Schiller s italics). *vol.21. 
op. cit. p. 258. pp.51-52.
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different ways). It now remains to investigate these 
three above terms more thoroughly.
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III. Farther consideration of the patterns of hamony 
within the personality
In the attempt to analyse the expressions "sinnliche 
Harmonie", "moralische Harmonie" and " counterfeit harmony'* 
more thoroughly, the essays UAVf and NG will he considered 
in more detail. As Professor Garland has said, "the
• •  A
interest of Uber Anmut und Wurde is primarily ethical", 
for Schiller is here trying to decide what constitutes an 
ethical action, what constitutes a beautiful action, and 
whether an action may be both ethical and beautiful at the 
same time. It has already been shown that, in UAW, Schiller 
considers the action of an animal to be governed entirely 
by the stimuli that it receives through its senses. "Auf 
die Begierde und Verabscheuung erfolgt bei dem Tj&iere" 
he says when explaining the term "Naturnotÿfwendigkeit" ,
"eben so not^wendig Handlung, als Begierde auf Empf indung, 
und Bmpfindung auf den aussern Eindruck erfolgte." An 
animal action could perhaps now be formulated as follows;
(1) H.B. Garland. Schiller. London. 1949. p« 161.
(2) SW. vol. 11. p. 441. KProm this point onwards the 
reader is also referred to Appendix B,v/here the 
references are given in the 'natlonalausgabe ' (iSAK
l A. u.I.il. ' 3 - Lr
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^ ^ ^ ( S i î in e )
a). BegierdeX
^  1
Handliing
The actions of an animal correspond to its natural needs, 
and in its case the needs of the self are nearly always 
the same as the needs of the species. The animal has no 
experience of conflict and can thus have no experience 
of harmony. It could be compared to an instrument that 
is able to sound only one note.
In Man, on the other hand, the decision to act rests 
with the Will. A man may, if he so chooses, disobey the 
urges of natural needs, although he cannot deny the urges 
themselves. (He may choose to starve himself to death, 
but he cannot prevent himself from feeling hungry.) Again 
^ a^n has the freedom to choose between obedience to his own 
selfish desires and obedience to the laws of duty which he 
himself has evolved by conscious thought to legislate for 
the good of the whole. Despite his recognition of this 
freedom of choice, Schiller is nevertheless clear that 
the decision should fall on the side of duty. At another 
point in UAW he writes: "Aber der Vaille soli seine 
Best immung sg run de von der Vernunft empfangen, und nur nach
(1) This section may perhaps be followed more easily if 
use is made of the detachable Appendix A, in which this 
and the following diagrams are reproduced.
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demjenigen, was diese erlaubt Oder vorschreibt, seine 
Entschliessung fassen. Wendet sich nun der Wille wirklich 
an die Vernunft, ehe er das Verlangen des Triebes genehraigt, 
so handelt er sittlich; entscheidet er aber unmittelbar, so
-j
handelt er sinnlich". In Man, therefore, two types of 
action may be distinguished. The first is "sinnlich", thus:
S W(Wille) V( Vemunft)
b) Begierde
handelt unmittelbar
The second is "sittlich":
S W \ V
c) Begierde wendet sich an die
Vemunft
As far as the outcome of the action is concemed, b) is
not to be distinguished from a) above, although even in
this case Schiller is loth to say that Man is a mere
animal. Man would only be reduced to mere animal status
"wo der Mensch dem Triebe nicht bloss freien Lauf liesse;
2
sondern wo der Trieb diesen Lauf selbst nâhme". The above 
actions are all instigated by a sense-stimulus: that is, 
they are courses of action prescribed by an immediate 
response to the world of appearances, the world of space
(1) SW. vol. 11. p. 444. ■^ .A. o.|.
(2) ibid. (Schiller' 8 i t a l i c s ) ^
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and time, which we come to know through our senses. In Man, 
however, there is the possibility of yet a third type of 
action - namely, an action instigated by the awareness of 
duty. ("Vemunft"). This action will also be "sittlich", 
but the Will still has freedom to reject it. Such an action 
may be represented thus:
d)
V 7 w
Pflicht
When an action of type c) is referred to "Vernunft"-------
that is, when we ask ourselves whether our desires are in 
accordance with duty, two possibilities are presented. The 
action may either be approved:
8 ^  ^  _____
Begierde.
e)
V
vy
genehmigt.
or it may be rejected:
S
Begierde.
f)
W
zuruckgewor- 
f en
Similarly an action of type d) may be obeyed by the Will 
because it is in agreement with desire:
V  ) W ------  ^ S
g)
Pflicht
genehmigt
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or it may be found to conflict with desire:
V ----------\ W -\ S ________—
h)  ^  ^ 7
Pflicht zurückgeworfen
When the concept of "sinnliche Harmonie" was discussed 
in the preceding chapter, there was seen to be a complete 
"Ubereinstimmung zwischen ... Empfinden und Denken" (Ex.6). 
It was also said to be a state in which the individual acts 
from an intuitive knowledge of the moral law. Prom the 
above diagrams it will therefore be clear that "sinnliche 
Harmonie" could only be the result of actions of type e).
The desired course of action is, in this case, in tune with 
the precepts of duty. The action is "sinnlich" in that it 
has been commanded by intuition, which may perhaps be 
further defined as a feeling of what is right at any given 
moment, a feeling that itself springs from an immediate 
response to circumstances. The action is also "harmonisch" 
in that the rational side of the personality does not 
disapprove of it. One explanation of how "sinnliche 
Harmonie" might be possible has now been obtained^ It still 
remains to be seen how far this explanation corresponds 
with Schiller's use of the term in the context of UNSD.
Prom the above diagrams it will also be clear that in 
actions of type f) where desires are not in line with the
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course prescribed by duty, a state of conflict arises.
An individual can now defy duty and follow his own desires, 
when his action will, in its outcome, be indistinguishable 
from those of type b). If he chooses to obey duty, however, 
he will encounter the resistance of his own desires, and the 
action will here fall together with that of type h). In 
this situation, he must struggle to suppress his desire and 
follow duty, for, as Schiller says:
"........... kann eine Handlung der Pflicht mit den
Ex.13* Porderungen der Natur nicht in Harmonie gebracht werden,
ohne den Begriff der menschlichen Natur aufzuheben, so ist 
der Wider stand der Neigung notjliwendig". ^
There are circumstances in which harmony between the forces 
within the personality, although desirable, may be 
impossible to attain - circumstances, where self-interest 
must be visibly conquered. V/here such a victory is seen 
to occur, the individual is said to express himself with
"Wurde". As Schiller says: "Wo also die sittliche Pflicht
eine Handlung gebietet, die das Sinnliche notj/wendig
leidend macht.............. da kann also nicht Anmut^, sondern
Wurde der Ausdruck sejn".^ *'VYürde" alone, as Lutz pointed
(1) UAW. SW. vol. 11. p. k.53>(^ A-t>t>l II. p . i l .
(2) ibid. p.454. 2 •itJl '
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1
out, can never be the expression of harmony.
Where duty prescribes a course of action, (type d) 
harmony can only be achieved if desire voluntarily approves, 
(type g). A state resulting from an action of type g) 
might therefore be said to be a state of "moralische 
Harmonie". An action of type g) is "moralisch" in that it 
is in accordance with duty, and "harmonisch"in that all the 
forces within the personality are working co-operatively 
with each other. If there is no conflict here with desire, 
the state of "moralische Harmonie" will only be different 
from that of "sinnliche Harmonie" in that in the former the 
conscious knowledge of duty, in the latter intuition alone, 
prescribes the course of action. The state described above 
(i.e. the state resulting from an action of type g) may be 
said to be the first kind of "moralische Harmonie". However, 
even in actions of type f) and h), where there is conflict, 
Schiller wishes harmony to be brought about. Desire, he 
tells us, is to come into harmony with the moral law (Ex.1) 
and, in the example given above (ex. 13)> the use of 
"gebracht werden" suggests a process of striving towards 
concord. The moment of conflict may find its expression in 
"Wurde", but once impulsive desires have been conquered,
(l) op. cit. pp. 124 ff.
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Schiller wishes self-interest to accept the decision. This
second kind of "moralische Harmonie" will again be
indistinguishable in practice from "sinnliche Harmonie"
and "moralische Harmonie" of the first kind, but it will
be theoretically different in that it has only been attained
after a period of conflict. (If "sinnliche Harmonie" and
the first "moralische Harmonie" are compared to the bottom
note of a scale, this second "moralische Harmonie" might
be said to sound the octave higher.) It will thus be
seen why, in UNSD, Schiller said that "jene Zustande
sinnlichen Friedens" could be a symbol of 'moral' harmony
(Ex. 9) and why 'moral' harmony was itself referred to as
"die hbhere Harmonie" (Ex. 10). It v/iHl also be seen that
in the expression "moralische Harmonie" as it was used in
the first exarr^le from UNSD (Ex. 9) > the word "moralisch"
may have at least three of the connotations isolated by Mrs 
1
Sayce i.e. i) "ethisch-sittlich gut" ii) "geistig, seelisch,
innerlich" (referring to the inner harmony of the
personality) and iii) "zur Idee gehbrig" (referring to an
ideal to be attained).
R. Buchwald, who considered that Schiller came to see
2
all his philosophical studies as "Irrwege", has said that
(1 ) loc. cit. jT,
(2) R. Buchwald Schiller. Leipzig. 1937# p. 238.
k
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Schiller never remained in the realms of abstract theory
-j
for very long. A few concrete exarr^les might perhaps be
2
welcome here, too. In one of the Kalliasbriefe Schiller, 
expanding the parable of the Good Samaritan, tells the 
story of a man who falls among thieves and who then lies by 
the roadside, asking passers-by for help. The first man 
who comes along is willing to help, but cannot bear the 
sight of suffering. "Gut gemeint, sagte der Verwundete, 
aber man muss auch das Leiden sehen konnen, wenn die 
Menschenpflicht es fodert. Der U-riff in Deinen Beutel ist 
nicht halb so viel werth, als eine kleine Gewalt über 
Deine weichlichen Sinne". This action Schiller terras 
"bloss passioniert, gutherzig aus Affect". In this case 
the individual concemed was unable to fulfil his moral 
duty properly, because he was unable to control his feelings, 
His desire is to get away from the scene of suffering as 
soon as possible, although he knows that he should stay 
and do something more positive than merely giving the 
injured man money. He is experiencing the situation 
illustrated by diagram f) above. Furthermore, he is unable.
(l ) op. cit4. P* 247" (He cites the Good Samaritan examples 
from the Kalliasbriefe in proof of this).
( 2 ; "schiTlers" Briefe . Kritisohe Gesamtausgaoe .ürs . vou.F 
J onas • v< 1.5.pp.261-265.1 jCtt ex o x 13 • I’ e oruary . 1795. ;.
( S c h i l l e r i t a l i c s  where quoted.).
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through lack of self-control, to bring desire and duty 
into harmony. Here the failure to achieve harmony springs
1
from what Schiller elsewhere calls "Unvermbgen des Subjekts". 
It must be noted, however, that an impulse that springs 
purely from self-interest is not, in Schiller's thought, 
necessarily a bad one. It may be "gutherzig". The man 
did at least try to do something and did not just pass by 
on the other side. Another traveller, although himself 
weak and ill, is prepared to sacrifice his own horse and 
cloak to the wounded man. "Die Pflicht", he says "gebietet 
mir. Dir zu dienen". This action, Schiller concludes, was 
"rein (aber auch nicht mehr als) moralisch, weil sie gegen 
das Intéressé der Sinne, aus Achtung für's Gesetz unter- 
noramen vairde". This traveller experienced the state 
illustrated by diagram h) and the conflict within the 
personality is shown by the words "und mit sich selbst 
kampfend steht er da". His final decision to offer his 
cloak and horse is a demonstration of "Würde". Finally, 
a traveller approaches who sees the need of the wounded man 
and, of his own accord, asks to help him. All self-interest 
is forgotten. He leaves his own possessions by the roadside
(1) UAW. SW. vol .11. p. 453.
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in order to carry the wounded man on his back to the next 
village. This man, says Schiller in the continuation of 
the letter, acted "als wenn bloss der Instinct aus ihm 
gehandelt hâtte". If the words "als wenn" are studied 
carefully, they will be seen to imply that this man did 
not act from intuition, but from a conscious awareness of 
his duty. Since he obviously wished to help and fulfilled 
his task without any sign of inner conflict, his action 
must have been one of the type illustrated in diagram g). 
i.e. one of moral harmony. In the same letter Schiller 
calls this action a morally beautiful one. Moral beauty 
he considers to be "das Maximum der Charaktervollkommenheit" 
and defines such beauty as a state where "die Pflicht zur 
Natur geworden ist". The distinction between acting from 
intuition and acting as if from intuition is perhaps 
theoretical at this point, but, as will be seen later, it 
is important in other parts of Schiller's theory.
When he says that the desire to obey duty should become 
one's second nature, Schiller implies that some process 
of development must be undergone. As has already been 
stated, desire and duty are to be brought into harmony 
through the mediation of taste, the sense of the beautiful.
(1). Schillers Briefe. Kritische Gesamtausgabe,Hrsg.von 
F oJonas.vol.5.p.264. (Letter of the 10.February.1795.> 
Schiller’s italics where quoted,
9 4
(Ex s . 3 and 4). This idea, the central theme in Schiller's 
thought, is to be heard again at the beginning of the essay 
NG, which, although concerned chiefly with various modes of 
artistic presentation, also contains some shrewd psycholog­
ical insights. Here Schiller writes:
"Die Wirkungen des Geschmacks uberhaupt genommen sind, 
Ex. 14* die sinnlichen und geistigen Krafte des Menschen in Harmonie 
zu bringen, und in einem innigen Bundnis zu vereinigen".
The last clause here "in Harmonie zu bringen und in einem 
innigen Bundnis zu vereinigen" suggests that there has 
previously been a state of conflict, and the word "Harmonie" 
may therefore be understood to refer to the state of 
"moralische Harmonie" discussed above. The layers of meaning 
concealed by the word "Harmonie" are now beginning to be 
revealed. This harmony is now to be brought about by taste 
"dadurch zwar, dass die Begierden sich veredeln und mit den 
Porderungen der Vemunft ubereinstimmender werden". Taste 
has therefore to undertake the development of our impulsive 
desires in such a way that they urge only those courses of 
action which are in line with the precepts of duty. To 
distinguish these 'educated' impulses from true intuitions 
they will be called here 'ennobled desires'.
(1) SW. vol. 12. p. 158. i p
(2) ibid. p. 187. ^ A
9 5
In the essay Uber den moralischen Nutzen âsthetischer 
Sitten, which may be read as a complementary piece to NG, 
Schiller cites the action of Duke Leopold von Braunschweig 
who rowed across a storm-swept river in an effort to save 
some people “die ohne ihn hulflos waren“. This action, says 
Schiller, was clearly prescribed by duty but, in most 
circumstances, it would have then have come into conflict 
with self-interest. “Die Vorstellung der Pflicht ging hier 
vorher, und dann erst regte sich der Erhaltungstrieb, die 
Vorschrift der Vernunft zu bekampfen“. This is clearly the 
situation described by diagram h). If now, Schiller continues, 
the Duke can be supposed to have an exceptionally well- 
developed feeling for beauty which “Allés, was gross und 
vollkommen ist, entzuckt, so wird in demselben Augenblicke, 
als die Vernunft ihren Ausspruch tj^ 'ut, auch die Sinnlichkeit
zu ihr ubertreten, und er [der Herzog] wird das mit Neigung
tÿ(un, was er ohne diese zarte Bmpfindlichkeit fur das ^chone 
g eg en die Neigung h&tte tjfun mussen“. (Another, more trivial; 
example could perhaps also be imagined. Anyone, on a warm 
day, may experience a conflict between the awareness of work 
to be done indoors and a wish to go outside into the sun.
Here a feeling for the beautiful might persuade one of the
(1) SW. vol. 12. For the example of Leopold von Braunschweig 
see pp. 340. ff. (Where quoted, Schiller’s italics)
i)
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value of seeing one’s work properly and tidily finished 
first). “Moralische Harmonie” brought about by the mediation 
of taste may now perhaps be expressed diagramatically thus:
V  ) W _ S
V-------
Pflicht
(Sinne zuerst dagegen)
willigen 
f  jetzt ein.
G(Geschmack) 
vermittelt zwischen 
Vernunft und 8innen.
It must be stressed that this process is instigated by a 
precept of duty. The education of impulse by taste is only 
set in action after the precepts of duty are clear. The 
process shown above might be called the true aesthetic 
education.
In the essay NG, however, Schiller explains how the 
education of impulse by taste may prove extremely dangerous, 
if the precepts of duty are not clearly known. In some 
works of art, he says first of all, it can be detected that 
the content has been sacrificed to the form in order to 
make a pleasing impression on the senses. Here taste has 
exceeded its legitimate function and the result is not 
beauty, but superficiality. “Schriftsteller” , says Schiller 
“welche mehr Witz als Verstand und mehr Geschmack als 
Wissenschaft besitzen, machen sich dieser Betrügerei nur
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allzu oft schuldig”."* If ”Betrügerei” is in itself a 
strong word, Schiller is even more outspoken when he speaks 
of the dangers that may arise when taste takes control of 
the human will. ”Aber eben diese Willkujf^rlichkeit, auf 
Maximen des Willens angewandt, ist etwas Bbses und muss 
unausbleiblich das Herz verderben”. There is no escape 
from the implication of this sentence: Schiller seems to 
have envisaged a false type of aesthetic education which 
may, in certain circumstances, have evil consequences. The 
function of the true aesthetic education is to present 
the precepts of duty in an acceptable form; the false 
aesthetic education tries to deceive us into believing that 
what we want to do is in accordance with duty. In a man of 
taste, Schiller explains, the impulsive desires have been 
’ennobled’ and are not generally in conflict with the 
precepts of duty. This relationship of the forces within 
the personality may be expressed thus:
8 W _ V
3) \  1  ^ ------- '^ genehmigt
This state must be distinguished carefully - in theory, at 
least - from the states o f '“sinnliche Harmonie” and
1) SW. vol. 12. p. 181. SA. /A ^ 4 - ^ 6 .
2) ibid. p. 186. (Schiller's italics). ^  11^ .2.
G. /r.
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”moralische Harmonie”. In ”moralische Harmonie” as 
illustrated by diagram i) an awareness of the moral law 
has been demonstrated. In ”sinnliche Harmonie” as illustrated 
by diagram e) the individual concerned intuitively knows 
what is in accordance with the moral law. In the state 
illustrated above the individual has no real awareness of 
the moral law; his impulses are motivated solely by a desire 
for the beautiful. Now, Schiller continues in NG, ”Je 
bfter nun der Fall sich emeuert, dass das moralische und 
Ësthetische Urt^eil, das Sittengefühl und das Schonheitsge- 
fühl, in demselben Objekt zusammentreffen und in demselben 
Ausspruche sich begegnen, desto mehr wird die Vernunft 
geneigt, einen so sehr vergeistigten Trieb fur einen der 
ihrigen zu halten und ihm zuletzt das Steuer des Willens 
mit uneingeschrSnkter Vollmacht zu übergeben”. • In the 
state expressed by diagram j) the individual concerned 
still referred his desires to his rational nature: that is, 
he asked himself whether what he wanted to do really was in 
accordance with his duty. Now he is sure that what he 
wants to do i£ morally right and no longer hesitates,W" 
t&ÈAk; This new state may be expressed thus :
(1) SW. vol. 12. pp. 188- 189. (Schiller’s italics).
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k) Begierde
jetzt veredelt
vertraut dem . 
Geschmack das 
G \/ Steuer des
Willens
It will be seen that this type of action is not to be 
distinguished in practice from an action of type b). In 
both cases, the will acts of its own accord. Such actions, 
although they may be ”gutherzig” or even ’’pflichtmassig”
(to borrow a Kantian term) are nevertheless morally neutral. 
In Uber den moralischen Nutzen asthetischer Bitten Schiller 
tells the story of a Greek rebel who is presented with an 
opportunity of killing his captor while the latter is asleep. 
The decision to spare his captor’s life will only be moral, 
says Schiller, if it is taken with regard to the law of 
justice that it is wrong to kill. The rebel, however, is 
supposed by Schiller to be a cultivated man who refuses to 
kill ”weil er das Widrige, eine Niedertrachtigkeit begangen 
zu haben, nicht ertragen kann”. Although the outcome of 
this action is indistinguishable from what duty would have 
decreed and the captor’s life is spared, it must be 
remembered that the action itself springs from a feeling 
for the beautiful alone. In nine cases out of ten the 
trust placed in the ’ennobled impulses’ will be perfectly
(1) SW. vol. 12. p. 341. A. lSé>, l l . ' 3 2 ' ^ l tr
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justified, but sooner or later a tenth case will arise when 
the impulse, however noble, will be at variance with the 
moral law. A process of self-deception now begins. Our 
desires have always been perfectly moral before; surely 
they must be so now? Perhaps it is the law itself that is 
wrong? Schiller describes this process in some detail in 
NG when he says; "Die veredelte Neigung, welche sich Achtung 
z'u erschleichen gewusst hat, will also der Vernunft nicht 
mehr untergeordnet, sie will ihr beigeordnet seyn. Sie will 
fur keinen treubrüchigen Untertj/an gelten, der sich gegen 
seinen Oberherrn auflehnt; sie will als eine Majestât 
angesehen sefn und mit der Vernunft als sittliche
>1
Gesetzgeberin, wie Gleich mit Gleichem, handeln”. We now 
argue that the moral law be brought into line with our own 
desires. "Die zufallige Zusammenstimmung der Pflicht mit der 
Neigung wird endlich als notj|(wendige Bedingung festgesetzt 
und so die Sittlichkeit in ihren Suellen vergiftet" writes 
Schiller at another point. The false aesthetic education 
now comes into play and, instead of the moral law appearing 
as our desire, our desire now appears as the moral law. 
Schiller gives, in NG, several examples. The novel Les
1) SW. vol. 12. p. 190. (Schiller’s italics)'^A
2) ibid. p. 187* (Schiller’s italics), t fl l^ l^ù
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Liaisons dangereuses depicts a situation in which the
sacrifice of virtue is excused by the suggestion that it
was in this case an act of magnanimity. If someone we love
is unhappy and this unhappiness can be relieved by an
immoral action, "Sollen wir ihn leiden lassen, um ein
reines Gewissen zu behalten ? ...heisst das lieben,
wenn man bei dem Schmerz des Geliebten noch an sich selbst 
%
denkt ?" In this manner, says Schiller, does love itself
seek to deceive us, and he continues "1st unser Charakter
nicht durch gute Grundsatze fest verwahrt, so werden wir
schandlich handeln bei allem-Schwung einer exaltirten
2
Einbildungskraft". Other examples given by Schiller are 
the telling of a ’white’, lie in order to avoid a breach of 
good manners, and the justification (preached in Schiller’s 
day by the French Revolutionaries, and by how many others 
in our own age ?) of the sacrifice of one generation for 
the sake of the next. These actions, which are the result 
of a compromise on the part of the moral law may be 
expressed as follows;
W
l) Begierde
(diesraal nicht 
sittlich)
V
G
glaubt, dass die 
Begierde sittlich 
ist, und willigt 
ein.
stellt der Vernunft die 
Begierde als sittlich vor.
(1) SW. vol. 12. p. 191 (Schiller’s italics)64.&f<y|
(2) ibid. p. 192. y
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This state, which is "brought about by the false aesthetic 
education, is the state of "counterfeit harmony". Because 
an individual in such a state has deceived himself that 
his desires are in agreement with the precepts of duty, 
there is no sense of conflict, but the harmony is based on 
a compromise, not on a true reconciliation of self-interest 
and moral law.
It must be stated that, although in the examples above, 
taste has deceived us into thinking one of our desires to 
be moral, the deception can also occur where, as Schiller 
says, "die Pflicht zuer^st handelt". Leopold von Braunsch­
weig, for example, could easily have told himself that his 
love for his own family forbade such a foolhardy action.
The possibilities of self-deception are endless. In the 
parable told in the Kalliasbriefe the passer-by whose action 
was "rein moralisch" could also have argued that he had a 
duty not to risk his own life by giving the wounded man his 
cloak and horse. (Again, on a warm day, when our desire is 
to go outside even though our duty is to continue our work 
indoors, we may imagine that our insistence on staying 
indoors is detrimental to our health, which we also have a 
duty to preserve). Indeed, any feeling of harmony between 
the forces within the personality is ambiguous; that is, 
it is impossible to tell in practice whether the individual
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concerned has acted out of accordance with the moral law, 
as in the states of "sinnliche Harmonie" and "moralische 
Harmonie" or whether, as in the states of "counterfeit 
harmony", he has merely deceived himself. When Schiller 
uses the word "Harmonie" without a qualifying adjective 
it may therefore be found that all three relationships 
(i.e. intuitive, moral, and counterfeit) may be implied 
by it.
Perhaps the best example of the ambiguity of the 
harmonious state is afforded by a study of the "schbne 
Seele". Most commentators have seen the "schone Seele" 
as the symbol of Schiller’s ideal for mankind. Berger, 
for instance, sees the "sittliche Schbnheit" which is 
exemplified by the "schone Seele", and the expression of 
which is "Anmut" , as Schiller’s ansv/er to Kant’s insistence 
on the division between morality and feeling. Lutz writes: 
"Die hbchste Vollendung zu der sich der Mensch erheben
2
kann, ist also die Anmut. Er soil eine schbne Seele werden".
(1) K.Berger,Schiller. Munich. 1
(2) op. cit. pp. 12Zf ff.
909, Vol. 2. pp. 183 ff.
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Melitta Gerhard says "In der Ubereinstimmung der sinnlichen 
und geistigen Natur des Menschen, wie sie die schbne Seele 
besitzt, sah Schiller ’das Siegel der vollendeten 
Menschheit’". There can be no doubt that the "schbne
Seele" is one name for Schiller* s ideal of a perfectly- 
integrated harmonious human being, for in UAW he v\^ rites:
"In einer schbnen Seele ist es also, wo Sinnlichkeit 
Ex. 15* und Vernunft, Pflicht und Neigung harmoniren, und Grazie ist
> p
ihr Ausdruck in der Erscheinung".
The use of the verb "harmoniren!* in this sentence suggests
very well the reciprocal inter-play of the forces within the
personality, for the active voice seems to imply the way 
in which the separate notes of desire and duty are mingled 
with each other so perfectly that it is impossible to tell 
which was struck first. Where there is a perfect 
integration of all the forces within the personality, an 
action may be of type e) where the stimulus comes from
intuition, or of type g) where the stimulus comes from a
conscious awareness of duty. To illustrate the reciprocal 
inter-play in such cases, diagrams e) and g) could now 
be enlarged as follows:
1) Melitta Gerhard. Schiller. Bern. 1950. pp. 207.ff.
2) SW. vol.11. pp. 437 ff. // //-/3.
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e)
V
Begierde
Pflicht
Z _______________
genehmigt we il 
auch Pflicht
J  V  \ W    ^ S
g) /
pflicht
vy
\ genehmigt
jetzt Begierde (oder 
^ N e i g u n g )
It will be clear that this reciprocal state, where duty 
is desire and desire is duty, is also attained after the 
process undergone in the true aesthetic education^illustrated 
by diagram i). The verb "harmoniren" in Ex. 15 thus conceals 
three theoretically distinguishable relationships between 
the forces within the personality: that of *‘sinnliche 
Harmonie", where, as in the case of genius, there is an 
intuitive awareness of what is right; that of "moralische 
Harmonie" of the first kind (diagram g) where, like the 
fifth traveller mentioned in the Kalliasbriefe, an 
individual gladly performs what he knows to be his duty;
and that of "moralische Harmonie" of the second kind
(diagram i) which is reached, as perhaps in the case of
the Duke of Braunschweig, after a state of conflict and
 ^ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1 ) cf. p. ^84 preceding.
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• through the mediation of taste, or the sense of the 
beautiful.
The relationship of the "schone Seele" with the outside 
world is necessarily also harmonious. The characteristic 
expression of the "schbn'e Seele" in the outside world is 
grace, and, as Schiller says,
"Zur Anmutj/ muss sowohl der kbrperliche Bau als der 
Charakter beitragen; jener durch seine Biegsamkeit,
Ex#16. Eindrücke anzunehmen und in’s Spiel gesetzt zu werden, 
dieser durch die sittliche Harmonie der Gefühle".^
In this sentence the expression "sittliche Harmonie der 
Gefühle" illustrates by the very balance between "sittlich" 
and "Gefühle" the reciprocal relationship between desire 
and duty. The "schbne Seele" does not have to repress 
feelings and inclinations, because all feelings and 
inclinations are now already moral. All actions of the 
"schone Seele" seem to flow easily and naturally from 
the whole personality; there are no signs of that rigid 
insistence on the moral law which, in Schiller’s view, 
indicates a tense and therefore discordant personality.
The life of a pedantic "Zogling der Sittenregel" is 
compared by Schiller to a drawing in which one can still 
see the first guiding strokes, whereas
(1) SW. vol. 11. pp. 438 ff. 5 A* // p . -2,2^. //.r
Ex. 1 7*
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" in einem schbnen Leben sind, wie in einem Titian-
ischen Gemalde, alle jene schneidenden Grenzlinien verschwun- 
den, und doch tritt die ganze Gestalt nur desto wahrer, 
lebendiger, harmonischer hervor".^
Here also the word "harmonisch" may be said to conceal the 
three relationships isolated above, while the word 
"lebendig" indicates once again that, in Schiller’s thought, 
the true harmonious state always has an active, dynamic 
character. To illustrate the way in which the dynamic 
character of the harmonious personality generates further 
harmonies in the outside world, Schiller enlarges in UAW 
upon his earlier theory of the harmony betv/een body and
soul. Physical beauty, he writes, may be ravaged by a
discordant spirit, whereas
"......... so sieht man auch zuweilen das heitre und in
sich harmonische Gemüt^ der durch Hindernisse gefesselten
• t
Ex. 18. Technik zu Hulfe kommen, die Natur in Preiheit setzen, und
die noch eingewickelte gedrûckte Gestalt mit g'ôttlicher
2
\ Glorie auseinander breiten" , 
and the "schbne Seele" may cast an irresistible grace 
"auch uber eine Bildung, der es an architektonischer
(1) SW. vol. 11. p. 437. ^ ^  ,
(2) SW. vol. 11. p. 404. (Schiller s italics). 5^A
II
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Schônheit mange It". The theory of the harmony between body
and soul now suggests, as Ex.16 also clearly shows, that
actions in the outside world expressed by graceful bodily
actions bear witness to an inner harmony which is now
discovered to be that state where desire and duty have
become synonymous.
Schiller certainly evolved the concept of a "sittliche
Harmonie der Gefühle" as an answer to Kant’s insistence
that the only moral actions are those from which inclination
and self-interest have been excluded as motives. In
Schiller’s view Kant had denied the possibility of both
intuition and ennobled desire; that is, he had seemed to
deny that desires could in themselves be moral. This
position was considered by Schiller to be both dangerous
and ridiculous; dangerous, because it seems to deny the
possibility of harmony and leads to a repression of one
side of the personality; ridiculous, because it may lead
to such absurd situations as the one described in Schiller’s
2
satirical distiches Die Philosophen. Here "Gewissenscrupel" 
complains:
"Gerne diene ich den Freund en, doch t ^ ’ich es leider
mit Neigung,
( , )  3 w .  p .
(2) SW. vol. 1. p. 484. '
The two distiches auoted here may be found in MA.vol i .
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Und so w u m t  es mir oft, dass ich nicht tugendhaft bin" 
and "Entscheidung" replies;
"Da ist kein anderer Ratjzf, du musst suchen, sie zu
verachten
Und mit Àbscheu al s dann tj^ un, wie die Pflicht dir
gebeut".
In UAW, however. Schiller is honest enough to acknowledge 
the counter-argument of the "Rigoristen" who, he says, 
insist that the visible repression of desire is the only 
means of telling whether an action is moral or not. "Um 
also vbllig sicher zu se:fn, dass die Neigung nicht mit 
bestimmte, sieht man sie lieber im Krieg, als im 
Einverstandnis mit dem Vernunftgesetze, weil es gar zu 
leicht sejn kann, dass ihre Fursprache allein ihm seine 
Macht liber den Willen verschaffte". In other words, 
how can we ever be sure, in cases where desire and duty 
seem to co-incide, that our actions are determined by moral 
precepts, and not by the expectation that the outcome would
be to our own advantage ? Perhaps, for instance, we
serve our friends because we think that they may one day 
do a good turn for us? Are we quite sure that we should 
still serve them, if we knew we. were going to receive
(1) SW. vol. 11. p. 430 (Schiller’s italics)
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nothing in return? Is the co-incidence of desire and duty 
a true harmony, or merely a counterfeit one?
In the first part of UAW Schiller defines the "schone 
Seele" as follows^ "Eine schbne Seele nennt man es, wenn 
sich das sittliche Gefûhl aller Empfindungen des Menschen 
endlich bis zu dem Grad versichert hat, dass es dem Affekt 
die Leitung des Willens ohne Scheu uberlassen darf, und nie 
Gefahr lauft, mit den Entscheidungen desselben im
A
Widerspruch zu stehen". If the first part of this sentence 
is considered, it will be found to describe that state of 
affairs illustrated by diagram k) where desires are now of 
such a noble nature that they can,' in nine cases out of 
ten, be trusted. Actions of this type, however, where there 
is no conscious reference to the moral law, are in 
themselves morally neutral. They are also "harmonious" 
in that they do not involve a conflict between desire and 
duty. It may also be permissible to speak of certain 
actions of type b), where there is no awareness of the 
moral law, as "harmonious" in this way, for such actions 
need not necessarily be amoral and Schiller certainly 
allows "Anmut" to uncivilised people and to children.
"Auch dem rohen Menschen fehlt es nicht an einem gewissen
(1) SW. vol.11. pp. 436 f ^  //
Ex. 1 9'
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Grade von AnmutjA, wenn ihn die Liebe Oder ein ahnlicher 
Affekt beseelt, und wo findet man mehr Anmut^ als bei
1
Kindern, die doch ganz unter sinnlicher Leitung stehen ?" 
When Schiller writes therefore:
"Die Anmut]|( namlich zeugt von einem ruhigen, in sich 
harmonischen Gemütÿf und von einem empfindenden Herzen" 
it will be seen that the word "harmonisch" here can refer 
to at least five different relationships between the forces 
within the personality (diagrams e,g,i,k and b). The 
relationships expressed by diagrams k and b can now also be 
included under the meanings of "harmonisch" in Exs. 15,
17 and 18. It would thus seem that the term "schbne Seele" 
could be applied to any individual in any of these five 
states.
A situation must now be imagined where duty and desire 
clearly come into conflict. The situation faced by the 
Duke of Braunschweig is once more a good example, for here 
there is no doubt that self-interest would demand that 
one’s own life be preserved. People with no awareness of 
a higher moral law will here be ruled entirely by self- 
interest: a child, for instance, would seek to escape the
(1) SW. vol. 11. p. 454.— // 2 . / - a 4 .
(2) SW. vol.11. p. 456.-3 $J\.o4.il'r-23L II. 1 0 "  <2.,r
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dangers of the rising waters. In more mature people, who 
may be supposed to have some awareness of moral duties, 
three re-actions are possible. If their lives have been 
guided not so much by moral precepts as by self-interest 
in an ennobled guise, they are now likely to submit them­
selves to the false aesthetic education illustrated by 
diagram 1) and persuade themselves that their moral duty 
is not to attempt to rescue the marooned people but to 
preserve their own lives. Have they not various important 
responsibilities elsewhere? If, on the other hand, their 
lives have been guided by moral precepts, although until 
now these have always co-incided with daty, they may 
decide to attempt a rescue, although they do not wish to 
do so. This action will be "rein moralisch" and will be 
performed with "Würde". Some people, like the Duke of 
Braunschweig, will however even here be able to bring their 
desires into line with duty and will brave the flood-waters 
gladly and willingly. Such people will clearly be seen to 
have achieved "moral harmony" of the higher kind, (diagram 
1). It is now clear why, in the second part of UAW, Schiller 
says: "Die schone Seele muss sich also im Affekt in eine 
erhabene verwandeln, und das ist der untrügliche Probierstein, 
wodurch man sie von dem guten Herzen Oder der Temperament-
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stugend unterscheiden kann". As long as there is no 
clear demonstration of awareness of the moral law and of 
obedience to it, it is impossible to distinguish the 
individual whose actions fortuitously co-incide with the 
moral law ("das gute Herz"), the individual who is moral 
only as long as it is in his interest to be so 
("Temperamentstugend") and who, in time of crisis, easily 
slips into a "counterfeit harmony", and the individual who 
has attained a true synthesis-of desire and duty. The 
term "schbne Seele" is to be applied only to the last of 
these, that is, to the individual who., in times of crisis, 
can show himself capable of attaining "moral harmony" of 
the higher kind. Such an individual will, in states of 
"Anmut", always be aware of the moral law, be it 
intuitively (diagram e) or consciously (diagram g). Although 
both these states may in practice fall together with that 
illustrated by diagram k), where there is no direct 
reference to the moral law because desires are now trusted 
to prescribe moral actions, the authority of the moral law 
over the will can.;in the case of the "schbne Seele" ^ at any 
time be reasserted. Lutz compares the re-assertion of the 
moral law in times of crisis with the burning of a fuse-wire
(1) SW. vol.11. p.447* (Schiller’s italics).
S A . .»(,//. ^ . 0 3 ^
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in an electric circuit: the current of "schbne Sittlichkeit" 
is momentarily broken, because the harmony between duty and 
desire has not yet become adjusted to the new situation.
There is no inconsistency in Schiller’s thought when he 
asserts that "die schbne Seele muss sich... in eine erhabene 
verwandeln"I he is proposing that his ideal harmonious 
individual will, on all occasions, be able to obey the moral 
law willingly, even though such an individual may momentarily 
experience conflict. Although he agrees with Kant and the 
"Rigoristen" that "es beim Sittlichhandeln nicht auf die 
Gesetzmassigkeit der Tj|(aten, sondern einzig nur auf die
p
Pflichtmassigkeit der Gesinnungen ankommt", he insists 
on the possibility of a voluntary acceptance of the moral 
law, which v;ill bear witness to an inner harmony and which 
will manifest itself in the outside world with "Anmut".
The momentary conflict experienced by the "schbne 
Seele" in times of crisis is expressed in the outside 
v/orld by a demonstration of "Würde". As Schiller writes ; 
"Beherrschung der Triebe durch die moralische Kraft ist 
Geistesfreiheit, und Wiirde heisst ihr Ausdruck in der 
Erscheinung". ^  Although at this point in UAY^  "Würde" is
...3) SW. vol. 11. p. 447. (Schiller* é italics). S
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clearly inconsistent v/ith "Anmut", the outward expression 
of harmony, a little later Schiller states "Sind Anmuth 
und Würde •••• in derselben Person vereinigt, so ist der
A
Ausdruck der Menschheit in ihr vollendet". Does he now
envisage a synthesis of "Anmut" and "V/ürde" , or is he
referring here solely to their separate manifestations
on different occasions? Lutz considers that there can be
no synthesis of the two qualities ; in his view Schiller’s
2
language is obscure at this point. Berger attempts very 
little explanation of the problem and is content to 
paraphrase Schiller.^ Melitta Gerhard also paraphrases 
Schiller when she writes that "beides ... zusammen erst das
I
Bild des vollkommenen Menschen verkbrpert", although in 
her opinion, too, "Anmut" and "'Würde" are only to be
' i:
manifested separately on different occasions. One I
explanation of the expression "in derselben Person vereinigt" 
in the sentence quoted above is undoubtedly, as Lutz and 
Melitta Gerhard imply, that it refers to the potential 
ability of the ideal "schbne Seele" to manifest now "Anmut", 
now "Würde" as the situation demands. If, however, diagram
(1) SW. vol. 11. p. 457 (Schiller's italics) .5A-i»o///.n.i25^ ./A2flf
(2) H. Lutz, op. cit. pp. 124 ff. . / >
3) K. Berger. Schiller. Munich. 1909* Vol. 2. pp. 183 ff.
4) M. Gerhard, op.cit. pp. 208 ff. (author’s italics).
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i) is considered again it will be seen that, in the 
attainment of "moralische Harmonie" here, desire first 
of all struggles against the stern precepts of duty and 
"Würde" must be demonstrated, but at the same time the 
process of bringing desire into line with duty through the 
mediati9n of taste is already taking place, and finally a 
state of "Anmut" is again achieved. T^us, although Lutz 
is right in so far as "Anmut" and "V/ürde" can logically 
only appear at separate moments in time, it could perhaps 
be said that, on occasions when "moralische Harmonie" is 
achieved, the two qualities may be seen to merge into each 
other so quickly that a synthesis is suggested.
The question must now be asked: can a true "moral 
harmony" of the type illustrated by diagram i) ever be 
attained in real life? Where a conflict between duty and 
desire occurs, can we ever be sure that, in any resulting 
agreement, we really have brought desire into line with 
duty and not vice-versa ? It must be realised that the 
"counterfeit harmony" illustrated by diagram 1) is never 
recognised as such by the individual concerned. To him 
it is a perfectly valid agreement between duty and desire, 
in other words a "moral harmony". If the state of "Anmut" 
before the conflict is ambiguous, it seems that the new 
state of "Anmut" after the conflict must also be so. There
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is only one instance envisaged by Schiller where such ambiguity
is no longer possible the instance where duty demands the
death of the individual, for here there can be no possible 
advantage to the self. When Schiller’s Maria Stuart sees 
it as her duty to atone for her past sins and submits to 
her execution, when Don Cesar realises that the only way 
to lift the curse over his family is to carry out sentence 
upon himself and die, true "moral harmony" may be said to 
be demonstrated. In all other instances the possibility 
that we have acted out of desire for our own selfish 
advantage will remain. Thus, only in the supreme instances 
mentioned can "Anmut" and "Würde" truly be said to blend 
into each other and the ideal, the completed expression 
of humanity, be attained. In his remarks on UAW and the 
"schone Seele" von Wiese has written "Der voile harmonische 
Einklang von Geist und Sinnlichkeit, die ungetrübte 
Einigkeit des Menschen mit sich selbst, bleibt dabei eine 
regulative Idee im Sinne Kants, wie sie sich im Prozess 
der Erfahrung immer nur in der Annaherung verwirklichen 
lasst. Sie ist nie endgültig gegeben, sondern stets von 
neuem auf gegeben". It could be said that Schiller
(1) V. v/iese op. cit. p. 471.
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envisages not just one scale, but an ever-ascending scale 
of harmonies. As each new "harmony" is reached, it in 
turn becomes the lower note of a new octave, for it too 
must be shattered and a fresh resolution achieved, a higher 
note sounded. One is tempted here to quote once again the 
lines from Schiller’s early poem Melancholie an Laura;
"Ach die kühnste Harmonie 
Wirft das Saitenspiel zu Trummer".
In his youth Schiller had suggested that too great an 
intellectual brilliance could shatter the fragile instrument 
of the physical body. In his mature work he is suggesting 
that, although each conflict between duty and desire must 
be resolved, if life is to have beauty and grace, we must 
always be aware of the ambiguity of the harmonious 
resolution and realise that the highest and purest harmony 
that can be attained is the voluntary acceptance of the 
moral law, where the moral law demands death. Only if we 
are capable of this final acceptance of duty, can we really 
qualify for the name of "schbne Seelen".
(l) cf. also pp. 5|- \^5preceding.
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TV. The significance of the patterns of harmony for 
society.
At the beginning of this section the reciprocal
relationship in Schiller’s theory between the inner world
of the personality and the outer world of the environment
was established. The possible patterns of harmony within
the personality have now been investigated, but the
relationship of these patterns with the outside world remains
to be considered. This relationship between the inner
psychological state of an individual and society as a whole
is important for the understanding of Schiller’s theory of
i
the ’cultural evolution’ of Mankind. In the passages in 
UNSD, for example, where the terms ’’sinnliche Harmonie’’ and 
"moralische Harmonie" are used, Schiller is referring not 
only to inner psychological states but also to separate 
stages in the historical development of Mankind. In the 
assessment of the significance for society of the patterns 
of harmony account must therefore be taken of Schiller’s 
own historical studies, which began in earnest on his 
arrival in Weimar in 1787 and culminated in his professor­
ship at Jena during 1789 and 1790. The writings of this
(1) This term is borrowed from Grossman, of. his article 
entitled ’The Idea of Cultural Evolution in Schiller’s 
Aesthetic Education’. Germanic Review. XXXIV. 1959. PP. 
39 ff.
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period, some of which formed the material for Schiller’s
professorial lectures, throw some interesting light on some
of the ideas found in later essays such as UAEM and UNSD.
For the purposes of the present investigation perhaps the
most important are Was heisst und zu welchem Ende studiert
1
man Universalgeschichte ? (1789), Etwas üher die erste 
Menschengesellschaft nach dem Leitfaden der Mosaischen
2 3
Urkunde (1790) and Die G-esetzgehung des Lykurgus und Solon.
(1790). It should perhaps he noted that the suhject-matter
of the first and second of these was prohahly inspired hy
Kant’8 Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in welthürger-
licher Ahsicht (1784) and his Muthmasslicher Anfang der
Menschengeschichte. (1786).
Schiller as a historian had many detractors. He was
interested neither in discovering new sources nor in
ascertaining the accuracy of existing ones. Thus, although
he always undertook considerable research before writing
his historical essays and plays, he is often not altogether
accurate. For instance, most historians consider his
portrait of Tilly in the major study Die Geschichte des
1) Afterwards referred to as UG.
2) Afterwards referred to as MU.
3 ) Afterwards referred to as LS.
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1
Dreissig.iâhrigen Krieges too one-sided, while Uherweg
points out that in LS Schiller overlooks the fact that
both Lykurgus and Solon based many of their laws on
traditional practices. According to Uberweg, Schiller’s
value as a historian lies in his ability to seize the
meaning of events, to grasp the significance of any one
period for the story of Mankind as a whole. It could
perhaps be suggested that, in his historical studies as
elsewhere, Schiller fits his own description of the
’philosophical spirit’ of whom he writes in UG:
*’.............. .seine edle Ungeduld kann nicht ruhen,
bis alle seine Begriffe zu einem harmonischen Ganzen sich
2
geordnet haben” .
The ’philosophical spirit’ always works with an ideal of 
wholeness and harmony in mind. Just as, in a piece of 
music, one would not judge an individual note without 
reference to the harmony of the whole, so too the 
’philosophical spirit’ will strive to assess the contribution 
made by each particular period of history to the harmonious 
development of the human race. Schiller admits that this 
harmonious development is postulated, for later in the essay
1) op. cit. pp. 104 ff.
2) SW. vol. 10. p. 419. KA.vol.6.p.l86.^A.ui>/. //
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Ex. 20
he writes:
”Sr nimmt also diese Harmonie ans sich selhst heraus, 
und verpflanzt sie ausser sich in die Ordnung der Dinge, 
d.i. er hringt einen vernunftigen Zweck in den Gang der
1
Welt, und ein teleologisches Prinzip in die Weltgeschichte *^. 
This sentence shows very clearly how Schiller extends the 
meaning of the word "Harmonie" to cover three spheres.
First of all, there is the concept of harmony within the 
individual. Then there is the attempt hy the individual 
to order the outside world into a harmonious pattern.
Finally there is the further attempt to see this harmonious 
pattern in the past experience of the whole race. After 
a further study of the historical essays.it will he found, 
too, that the inner psychological state of the individual 
determines not only his own personal relationship to his 
environment hut also the historical expression of whole 
nations and peoples.
In the opening passages of MU Schiller tries to 
imagine the beginnings of human life on earth, (it should 
perhaps be remembered that the three voyages of Cook
Çl) SW. vol.10. p. 438 (Schiller’s italics). KA.vol.6.p. 
200 •
i A .  u-l. 1^ . //. 4 - 1 0 .
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between the years I76Ô and 1779 had stimulated much
popular interest in anthropology.) According to Schiller,
it must be assumed that Man was once little more than an
animal and that the first human society, however primitive
it may now seem, was in fact a great step forward and "eine
i
ausserordentliche Anstrengung". In his pre-social state^ 
as it is envisaged in MU^Man is seen as a solitary creature 
guided at first solely by instinct. "Durch Hunger und Durst", 
writes Schiller, "zeigte sich ihm das Bediirfnis der Nahrung an; 
was er zu Befriedigung desselben brauchte, hatte sie [die 
Natur] in reichlichem Vorratj/ um ihn herum gelegt, und durch
Geruch und Geschmack le it et e sie ihn im Wahl en........... Fur
die Erhaltung seiner Gattung war durch den Geschlechtstrieb 
gesorgt". It will be seen that in this very first stage 
Man is governed entirely by ’natural needs’ and that 
conflict between his own individual good and that of his 
species does not arise.- Soon, however, the rational powers
of Man begin to unfold. "........ seine Vernunft, noch von keiner
Sorge zerstreut, konnte ungestdrt an ihrem Werkzeuge der 
Sprache bauen und das zarte Gedankenspiel stimmen. Mit dem 
Auge des Glücklichen sah er jetzt noch herum in der 8 chop- 
fung; sein frohes Gemüt^ fasste alle Erscheinungen uneigen- 
nützig und rein auf, und legte sie rein und lauter in einem
(1) SW. vol. 10. p.U23.^A, // (bG-)
(2 ) SW. vol. 10. P.1+U3. ' __
V p. au. //.la
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i
regen Gedachtnis^ nieder". These lines hear an unmistakable 
resemblance to the passage in UNSD where the state of 
"reine Natur" and "sinnliche Harmonie" was described.
There, it will be remembered, Schiller writes "Sinne und
Vernunft, en^pfangendes und selbsttatiges Vermogen, haben
■ 2 
sich in ihrem Geschafte noch nicht getrennt". At this
early stage in Man’s history as described in ÎCT "Sinne" 
and "Vernunft" certainly work together: for example, the 
instinct to search for food provides the change of 
surroundings necessary for new experiences, and these new 
experiences in turn stimulate the developing conscious mind. 
However, Man has not yet learnt to turn his acquired know­
ledge against his fellows: for instance, he has not yet 
fenced off one particular food supply for his own private 
use. His life is still untroubled by selfish desire.
("Sein frohes Gemüty fasste alle Erscheinungen uneigennutzig 
und rein auf" In the childhood of Mankind as a race
each individual could be said to enjoy the state of "reine 
Natur" and "sinnliche Harmonie", for, under the guidance 
of instinct alone, each individual knew as yet no conflict
1) ibid. p. 444.
2) SW. vol. 12. p. 232.
3) my italics. if /
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between what he wanted to do and v/hat he felt he ought to 
do. At this point of human history each individual, as 
Schiller says, was indeed "gliicklich".
In IvîU Schiller interprets the Fall of Man as the
falling-away from instinct. ("Abfall von seinem Instinkte").
2
As von Wiese has pointed out, Schiller also accepts the 
Fall of Man in a positive sense. In order to develop at 
all and to fulfil his destiny as a free, rational being,
Man had to outgrow the first happy state described above.
The forbidden fruit Schiller sees as the fruit of the 
"Baum der Erkenntnis" and this can perhaps be interpreted 
by saying that, as more and more experiences present them­
selves to the ordering rational mind, a pQint will sooner 
or later be reached when Man no longer knov/s instinctively 
what to do in face of a new situation. Once this point has 
been reached he must learn to live by the exercise of his 
rational powers. In MU Schiller describes how some 
individuals now learnt to grow crops, others to tame animals. 
However, the Gains soon came into conflict with the Abels, 
for the hard-working farmer began to be jealous of the 
liberty of the nomadic herdsman. Each way of life now
(1) SW. vol. 10 cf. especially pp. 444 - 448.SA.
(2) op. cit. cf. especially pp. 342 - 346. II
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v/ished to assert its superiority. Selfish desires^ which 
urged the individual to secure his own immediate advantage 
without regard to the good of the species as a whole, now 
crept into human life, and the first state of harmony was 
lost. The childhood of Mankind, the state where everyone 
experienced "sinnliche Hamonie", was therefore of limited 
duration.
It might he objected here that two distinct meanings 
now appear to have been attached to the term "sinnliche 
Harmonie". In reference to a supposed first state of 
Mankind (a sense in which it is undoubtedly used in UNSD) 
the term seems to imply a state in which the individual 
is guided solely by instinct. In this first state each new 
experience can be integrated by the ordering mind into a 
harmonious pattern. Can this definition of the term 
"sinnliche Harmonie" be reconciled with the definition
suggested in the preceding chapter ------- that is, a state
where one’s desires are intuitively in agreement with the 
demands of the moral law ? In answering this question the 
previous statement that, in the childhood of Mankind, the 
needs of the species fall together with the needs of the 
self requires further clarification. During the course 
of evolution, one could say, various species have been 
produced, of which each member possesses certain character-
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istics. For instance, a lion has strong teeth and jaws; 
a horse has long legs and muscles designed for flight.
The instinct of a lion is to attack and fight, of a horse 
to avoid danger and run away, and in this way the species 
of both the lion and the horse are preserved. Each 
animal can be said to fulfil its destiny, or "Bestimmung". 
For the animal there is no possibility of further 
development; its destiny is fixed. It never reaches the 
point where its instinct can no longer guide it, and 
thus it never experiences conflict. Man, on the other 
hand, capable of further development, but once he 
ceases to be guided by instinct, he may fall victim to 
the tyranny of selfish desire, and at this point laws 
become necessary to legislate for the preservation of 
his species. The destiny of Man could now be said to 
be that of developing all the potential inside him without 
coming into conflict with these moral laws. It will now 
be seen that, in the childhood of Mankind, where limited 
experience meant limited potential, every individual 
could be said to have fulfilled his destiny and to have 
experienced the state of "sinnliche Harmonie" in the 
sense that he spontaneously obeyed the law of his species. 
At the present time, if an individual spontaneously 
desires to do what is right according to the moral law.
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he can he said to achieve momentarily the fulfilment of 
his destiny and to experience that harmony which his 
ancestors, for a limited period, were able to maintain 
in all walks of life.
In UNSD Schiller attributes the quality of naivety, 
which was earlier stated to be linked with "sinnliche 
Harmonie", to children and unsophisticated people. Such 
people may be said to be still in the first stages of 
cultural evolution. Their experience of the world is as 
yet limited and, like their first primitive ancestors, 
they have not yet encountered situations where they can 
no longer rely on an inborn sense to guide them. In 
UNSD the quality of naivety is also attributed, as has 
already been noted, to genius. In UNSD Schiller is 
writing mostly of genius in one particular field, namely 
literature, but at certain points in the essay and in 
such poems as Per Genius and Das Gluck he seems to 
envisage the possibility that there are also ’geniuses 
in living’. Such a person seems to know instinctively 
the right course of action to take in even the most 
complex situations. He thus never loses the "sinnliche 
Harmonie" once shared by the whole race in its first 
stage and by children and others of limited experience 
nowadays. His relationship with the outside world always
1.29
remains harmonious, and of him it may he said :
"Ein erhahenes Loos, ein gottliches, ist ihm gefallen, 
Schon 'Vor des Kampfes Beginn sind ihm die Schlafe
hekranzt".^
Such a person, who retains "sinnliche Harmonie" under all 
circumstances, may indeed he said to fulfil his destiny 
of developing all his potential and yet remaining 
harmonious. Just as the less gifted may learn style 
from observing the works of the literary genius, so too 
those who do not live harmonious lives may learn from 
observing both the decisions of the intuitively harmonious 
’genius in living’ and the way in which these decisions 
are made. Intuitive harmony within the personality thus 
always means good fortune in the relationship with the 
outside world. In the childhood of every individual and 
of the race as a whole this fortunate state is experienced 
for a limited period. There are, however, people who 
seem able to maintain this fortunate state amid all the 
complexities of life. Such people are not only fortunate 
in themselves but also contribute to the well-being of 
society.
(1) Das Gluck. S;W. vol. 1. p. 434. 11. 5-6 
HA.vol.1.p.409.
s/\. u.l. I. lai. ff.
130
Once intuitive harmony in either the individual or 
the race has been lost, the correct course of action must 
be ascertained by conscious thought. However, because 
the situations.that now arise are so complex, conscious 
thought may not at first be able to provide a solution 
and Man is at the mercy of his impulses. In the conflict 
between the first Cain and Abel the rational course would 
have been to fix the territorial boundaries of both nomads 
and farmers, but at first neither side could see this 
solution and both, acting from impulse, tried to secure 
the advantage. This stage of Man’s development, where 
selfish desires have the upper hand, is variously designated 
by Schiller as "rohe Natur" or "blosse Natur" or "wirkliche 
Natur". Unchecked, the assertion of selfish desire by 
each individual would quickly bring such anarchy and chaos 
that the race of Mankind would be in danger of extinction, 
and in MU Schiller shows how one man, the first King, 
became strong enough to impose his will over his neighbours 
and to form, in this way, a community based on some kind 
of law. Historically speaking, therefore, after the 
Fall of Man, a social state emerges to which Schiller 
gives the name "Naturstaat". This state is not to be 
confused with Rousseau’s "état de nature". As Grossman 
says: "The expression "state of nature" [in Schiller’s
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sense] is used here to describe a state built upon
hazard, necessity and force rather than upon reason ---
a viewpoint quite the converse of Rousseau’s more widely
accepted glorification of a form of life previous to the
1
bondage of society". Schiller’s "Naturstaat" is the
product of a haphazard collection of laws evolved over 
the ages to keep the selfish desires of individuals under 
control. If it should, be prematurely dissolved, as 
Schiller came to believe had happened in France during 
the Revolution, the tendency to anarchy and chaos, always 
latent in the individual, will again become manifest.
As Schiller writes in UAEM: "In den niedern und zahlreichen 
Klassen stellen sich uns rohe gesetzlose Triebe dar, die 
sich nach aufgelostem Band der burgerlichen Ordnung 
entfesseln, und mit unlenksanner Wut^ zu ihrer tjî^ ier- 
ischen Befriedigung e i l e n " . T h e  individual who is 
ruled by selfish desire is at the mercy of his every 
impulse. He can thus achieve no purposeful, harmonious 
relationship with the outside world, for the stimuli 
.he receives from it urge him first one way and then 
another. If such individuals form the majority in any 
society or race, as was the case immediately after the
(1 ) op. cit. p. 41. .
(2) SW. vol. 12.
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Fall of Man, anarchy and chaos will he the result.
Once the first King had welded his fellows into the 
first community, it was recognised that obedience to 
authority brought at least some order and purpose into 
life. In some communities it gradually happened that 
those whose duty it was to formulate the law now tried 
to regulate every aspect of human life and thus build an 
ordered and perfectly predictable society unshaken by 
individual passions. Lykurgus was one such law-giver, 
and in LS Schiller draws a detailed picture of life in 
Sparta during his regime. Lykurgus’ aim was to create 
a strong, militaristic state, a self-sufficient body in 
which the individual was to feel himself a cell. ("Glieder 
desselben Staatskorpers" writes Schiller.) Accordingly 
nothing was allowed which might encourage the individual 
to entertain ideas of his own importance. Schiller 
describes, for instance, how
"Ein anderes Gesetz verordnete, dass kein Haus ein 
anderes Dach haben durfte, als welches mit der Axt 
Ex. 21. verf ertigt worden und keine andere T^iir, als die bloss 
mit Hülfe einer Sage gemacht worden se.-J. In ein so 
schlechtes Haus konnte sich Niemand einfalien lassen.
(1) SW. vol. 10. pp. 501 - 522. S A - è ' S .
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kosfbare Mobel zu 8chaffen. Ailes rausste sich harmonisch
1
zu dem Ganzen stimmen."
Lykurgus’ Sparta, it could be said, achieved a certain
measure of political harmony in that all possible causes
of conflict between citizens were eliminated and in
that everything was ordained to contribute to the good
of the whole. Later, however, Schiller makes it clear
that he considers this to have been a mistaken ideal of
political harmony, and thus the word "harmonisch" in the
above quotation might almost be said to have an ironic
flavour. Schiller certainly recognised the need for
some code of authority and for some division of labour
within the community, but he deplored the tendency of
the state to repress the individual. Thus in UAEM he
writes of the individual in such a community:
"Ewig nur an ein einzelnes kleines Bpuchstuck des
Ganzen gefesselt, bildet sich der Mensch selbst als
Ex.22. Bruchstuck aus; ewig nur das eintonige Gerausch des
Rades, das er umtreibt, im Ohre, entwickelt er nie die
2
Harmonie seines Wesens...."
In this sentence the word "Harmonie" obviously refers to
1) SW, vol. 10. p. 507. IV / / 4 - lO.
2) SW. vol. 12. p. 23.^uAÊrtt). i A u W .  iU)-SLQ.
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the harmonious development of all the potential within 
each individual, and the state that allows no room for 
such development is to he condemned. In LS Schiller 
declares emphatically "Hindert eine Staatsverfassung, dass 
alle Krafte, die im Menschen liegen, sich entwickeln; 
hindert sie die Portschreitung des Geistes; so ist sie 
verwerflich und schadlich". It has rightly been said that 
on no account would Schiller countenance the modern 
totalitarian state, for, however perfectly it may seem to 
function, it represents, as has been seen, a false ideal.
(it might perhaps be mentioned that these very historical 
studies, where Schiller so explicitly limits the authority 
of the state, are often conveniently ignored by his Marxist
interpreters ) The repression of the individual by
the totalitarian state is paralleled in the development 
of the individual himself by a too rigid adherence to the 
letter of the law —  a state in which all feelings and 
inclinations are held to be bad. Both the individual 
who represses the irrational side of his nature and the 
state that represses the individual have advanced a 
little on the path of cultural evolution, in so far as 
they have learnt to tame the tyranny of mere selfish desire.
1) SW. vol. 10. pp. U-fS-/y.
2) cf. for example A. Gisselbrecht, Schiller et la • 
Nation Allemande. Paris, 1956. cf. footnote on p.117. 
"Bt 1* intermède des etudes historiques (1787-1795) 
dont on a vu plus haut 1 ’importance’’.
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but they have not yet reached the goal.
At one point in UAEM, where he is explaining the 
causes of the lack of harmony within the individual 
personality, Schiller writes:
"Liegt namlich seine Vollkommenheit in der uberein- 
stimmenden Energie seiner sinnlichen und geistigen 
Krafte, so kann er diese V ollkommenhe it nur entweder 
durch einen Mangel an Ubereinstimmung oder durch einen 
Mangel an Energie verfehlen. Ehe wir also noch die Zeug- 
nisse der Erfahrung daruber abgehort haben, sind wir 
schon im Voraus durch blosse Vernunft gewiss, dass wir 
den wirklichen, folglich beschrankten Menschen entweder 
Ex.23. in einem Zustande der Anspannung oder in einem Zustand 
der Abspannung finden werden, je nachdem die einseitige 
T^atigkeit einzelner Krafte die Harmonie seines Wesens 
stdrt, Oder die Einheit der Natur sich auf die gleichformige 
Erschlaffung seiner sinnlichen und geistigen Krafte 
grundet". ^
If this passage is studied carefully it will be seen that 
the expression "Mangel .an Ubereinstimmung", the inability 
to bring both sides of the personality into concord, may 
be equated with a state of tension. ("Anspannung"). In
(1 ) SW. vol. 12. pp. 83-84. (my italics).
SA. c^l. l a . -  p.(,S /.C^
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this state there can he no harmony, because one side of 
the personality is pitched too high ("je nachdem...stort)
  that is, the individual concerned is either ruled by
selfish desire, or he is ruled by a too rigid insistence 
on the laws of duty. The political expression of the 
former has been found to be anarchy, of the latter 
totalitarianism. How then is the expression "Mangel an 
Energie" to be interpreted ? The individual who lacks 
energy is said to be in a state of relaxation, ("Abspannung") 
The strings of this instrument, one might say, are so 
slack that no true harmony may be drawn from them. The 
expression "gleichformige Erschlaffung seiner sinnlichen 
und geistigen Krafte"may perhaps be read as a description 
of that state of counterfeit harmony examined in the two 
preceding chapters, especially if it is linked with such 
passages as the following from Uber das Erhabene: "Ohne 
das Erhabene wûrde uns die Schonheit unserer Wurde 
vergessen machen. In der Erschlaffung eines ununter- 
brochenen Genusses würden wir die Rustigkeit des Charakters 
e inbus sen und, an diese zufallige Form des Dase:tns 
unauflosbar gefesselt, unsere unveranderliche Bestimmung
i
und unser wahres Vaterland aus den Augen verlieren".
(1) SW, vol. 12. p. 368, ("Erschlaffung" my italics -
otherwise Schiller’s italics.)
SA. oci I X  p . ' x u  II \a-
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Here the insistence on beauty at all costs, instilled 
into us IJ? a refined taste, is said to lead us into a 
state of "Erschlaffung". If it is accepted that the 
individual in a state of counterfeit harmony always seeks 
to avoid challenge and conflict, preferring the easy and 
most pleasant course, it will be seen that he fails to 
develop his character to the utmost, that he lacks energy 
to make sufficient effort. Because such an individual 
does not rise to the challenge of life, but rather strives 
to avoid or neutralise it, he cannot be said to be in 
control of his environment. Instead of trying to impose 
some pattern upon the outside world, he deliberately 
avoids any involvement with ,it that would upset his own 
comfortable existence. Counterfeit harmony within the 
individual thus brings about a complacent attitude to the 
outside world, and this state of complacency, it must 
be added, is not a creative one, for here the individual 
is content to let the world take its course, however 
misguided he knows this course sometimes to be. Perhaps 
no better description of the way in which counterfeit 
harmony within the individual manifests itself politically 
in society is to be found in Schiller’s work than in this 
further passage from UAEM: "Auf der andern Seite geben
uns die civilisirten Klassen den noch widrigern Anbllck 
der Schlaffheit und einer Depravation des Charakters, die
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desto emhr emport, v/eil die Kultur selbst ihre Quelle
ist Wir verlaugnen die Natur auf ihrem rechtmassigen
Pelde, um auf dem moralischen ihre Tyrannei zu erfahren, 
und indem wir ihren Eindrucken widerstreben, nehmen wir 
unsere Grundsatze von ihr an. Die affektirte Dezenz 
unserer Bitten verweigert ihr die verzeihliche erste 
Stimme, um ihr, in unserer materialistischen Sittenlehre, 
die entscheidende letzte einzuraumen. Mitten im Schoosse 
der raffinirtesten Geselligkeit hat der Egoism sein System
gegrundet............... Stolze Selbstgenugsamkeit .zieht das
Herz des Weltmanns zusammen, das in dem rohen Naturmenschen
noch oft sympathetisch schlagt, und wie aus einer brenn-
enden Stadt sucht jeder nur sein elendes Eigenti^um aus
der Verwustung zu fluchten......Die Kultur, weit entfernt,
uns in Preiheit zu setzen, entwickelt mit jeder Kraft, 
die sie uns ausbildet, nur ein neues Bedurfnis; die Bande 
des physischen schnüren sich immer beangstigender zu, so 
dass die Purcht zu verlieren selbst den feurigen Trieb
-j
nach Verbesserung erstickt". In the first sentence
of the above passage the more civilised classes within 
society are chastised by Schiller for being in a state 
of "Schlaffheit". They are also said to be demoralised, 
and here one may perhaps recall the passage in NG where
(i) SW. vol. 12. pp. 17-19 (Schiller’s italics).
(uAEti s} IX ç is. //.a.ff.
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Schiller writes of "Betrugerei" and "etwas Boses" with 
reference to a false use of taste. If the next sentences 
are studied closely it will he seen that Schiller describes 
here that process analysed in full in NG and formulated 
in this thesis as diagram 1 ). The individual v/ithin the 
more refined classes of society has indeed learn^to control 
his more passionate impulsive desires; he has conventions 
of decency and good taste which he dare not violate. His 
actions are still, however, motivated by self-interest 
without any regard for the general good of the community. 
V/hen he acts, he acts solely to procure his own advantage,
I
and where he cannot procure it, he turns complacently away. 
The above passage makes - it quite clear that Schiller 
considered most of the civilised class within his ov/n 
society to be in a permanent state of "counterfeit harmony". 
The state of "counterfeit harmony", as has already been 
seen, is not a dynamic one, and thus the civilised classes 
may be expected to reject all developments which would 
upset their own comforts. This situation Schiller deplores, 
because it hinders Mankind in his cultural evolution.
The goal of the cultural evolution for the individual 
as well as for society is the attainment of true moral
(1) cf. pp. 96 and 99 preceding.
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harmony. The attainment of moral harmony hy Society as a 
whole will he discussed later. For the moment it must 
he noted that Schiller intended the term "Naturstaat" to 
apply to the whole of the transitional stage between the 
intuitive harmony of Mankind before the Pall and the 
attainment of moral harmony in Elysium, one of Schiller’s 
names for the perfected society. It may, however, prove 
exceedingly difficult to outgrow this transitional stage. 
The haphazardly evolved code of laws within the "Natur- 
staat" itself may suddenly be found no longer strong enough 
to hold in check the latent tendency towards anarchy —  
that is, towards a state in which each individual does ' 
exactly as he wishes without any regard for the community. 
As a consequence^a much stricter code may be evolved and 
a totalitarian state which again hinders all further 
development come into being. Thirdly, development may be 
hindered by the complacency of the more civilised classes 
within the "Naturstaat" who, in a state of counterfeit 
harmony themselves, believe themselves to be already in 
the best of all possible worlds. Indeed, the complacency 
of this class may itself be the cause of the general 
decline in the prestige and effectiveness of the laws, 
and in this way a vicious circle —  chaos, total restraint, 
complacency —  is formed. (it should be noted that this
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same vicious circle can also be observed in the development 
of the individual,) Schiller also envisages yet another 
obstacle to the further development of society. He writes 
in UNSD:
"Der Geisteszustand der mehrsten Menschen ist auf 
einer Seite anspannende und erschdpfende Arbeit, auf der 
andern erschiaffender Genuss. Jene aber, wissen wir, macht 
das sinnliche Bedurfnis nach Geistesruhe und nach einem 
Stillstand des Wirkens ungleich dringender als das 
Ex.24.moralische Bedurnis nach Harmonie und nach einer absoluten
Preiheit des Wirkens........     dieser bindet und lahmt die
moralischen ^riebe selbst, welche jene Porderung aufwerfen 
mussten".
Here, where harmony is said to be a "moral need" and where 
the word itself is associated v/ith an unlimited "Preiheit 
des Wirkens" it may be said that Schiller has the state of 
true moral harmony in mind. The attainment of this state 
is now said to be hindered on the one hand by exhaustion 
caused by too much work (a term which includes both the 
mental strain of living in society, of having to make 
decisions at every moment of the day, and the effort of 
sheer physical work so necessary for the maintenance of
(1) SW. vol. 12. pp. 307-308. (Schiller's italics).
SA- vol. iX p. //.
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the community) and on the other hy the stultification of 
the moral drive, a stultification caused hy slackness and 
complacency. This example is proof of Schiller’s great 
psychological insight into the workings of the individual 
and of society. In the individual too much work or 
tension creates a desire for ease, hut too much ease 
generates complacency. Thus a second vicious circle, 
again inimical to the further development of society, 
is set up. To break both the vicious circles discussed 
here[and to open the door to further progress and to the 
attainment of moral harmony by both the individual and 
society^is the task of the true aesthetic education.
Before the ways in which Schiller proposes to carry 
out this task are discussed, the state of moral harmony 
must itself be explored a little further. When debating 
at the beginning of UAEM the way in v/hich true moral 
harmony is to be obtained Schiller writes "Es kame also 
darauf an, von dem physischen Charakter die Willkuÿr
und von dem moralischen die Preiheit abzusondern --- es
kame darauf an, den erstern mit Gesetzen ubereinstimmend, 
den letztern von Eindrucken abhangig zu machen". The 
concept of moral harmony is here given a new dimension.
(1) SW. vol. 12. p. 10.
(u/\en 3). „ //.SgffT
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In the above sentence both the inner state of the 
personality and the relationship of this personality 
with the outside world are examined. The "moral" part 
of Man’s character, his ability to think and his freedom 
to take his own decisions, is not to lose touch with the ‘ 
outside world.but is to rely for knowledge of this world 
on the "physical" side of human nature, that is on the 
impressions received through the senses. The ideal 
morally harmonious person does not shrink from new 
experiences of the world, but the new impulses and desires 
which may be generated by these experiences can always 
be broug'ht into harmony with the concepts of duty.
("miti G-esetzen ubereinstimmend"). Through these new 
experiences the morally harmonious person will become 
more hnd more aware of an ever-increasing complexity and 
potentiality in life. Such a person could be said to 
control his environment in that he can order every new 
experience into the general pattern of his life; he is 
also open to his environment in that he welcomes 
challenge, change and new experience. As in the state 
of intuitive harmony, the relationship between inner and 
outer worlds is here truly reciprocal. The attainment 
of moral harmony would therefore bring with it an 
awareness of the unlimited potential of life and a desire
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and ability to experience this to the full; it would, 
in other words, be a state of infinite possibility. In 
striving to attain this state, the individual is in fact 
striving towards the Divine, for God is said by Schiller 
to be absolute unity and harmony of being ("absolute 
Einheit des Erscheinens") and at the same time unlimited 
potential, ("absolute Verkundigung des Vermogens").
Just as God may be seen as the ideal for each 
individual, the "Staat der Preiheit" described in UAEM 
may be taken as thë ideal for society as a whole. It 
could indeed be said to be the political expression of 
the attainment of moral harmony by each individual. The 
morally harmonious individual voluntarily accepts the 
duties imposed on him by the moral law; in the ideal 
society everyone would accept restrictions on his own 
freedom in the interests of
freedom for every other member of the community to develop 
his own particular gifts. There would thus be an equality 
of opportunity for everyone to expand and explore the 
possibilities within him, and the society itself would 
not be a complex piece of machinery, set in motion at some 
time in the past to ensure a working order, but a living 
and developing organism. In UAEM Schiller tries to show us
(1) UAEM (Brief 11). SW. vol. 12. p. 52.
Sf\- **cl. iX .  p. 1^ .1. H .L.Çf
1U5
how we can attain some degree of approximation to this 
ideal. In the 8th letter particularly he calls upon us 
to have the courage not only to fight those physical 
conditions which make it impossible for the majority of 
human beings to develop at all but also to cast aside our 
own complacency and shallowness: ”Erkuhne dich, weise zu 
s e > n . ^
In the opening letters of UASM it sometimes seems 
as if Schiller is proposing the society of classical Greece 
as an ideal on which modern society might mould itself.
For instance, he writes: "Die Griechen beschamen uns nicht 
bloss durch eine Simplicitat, die unserem Zeitalter fremd 
ist; sie sind zugleich unsere Nebenbuhler, ja oft unsere 
Muster in den namlichen Vorzugen, mit denen wir uns uber 
die Naturwidrigkeit unserer Bitten zu trosten pflegen. 
Zugleich voll Form und voll Fulle, zugleich philosophirend 
und bildend, zugleich zart und energisch sehen wir sie 
die Jugend der Phantasie mit der Mannlichkeit der Vernunft 
in einer herrlichen Menschheit vereinigen". Here the
1 ) SW
2) SW
. vol. 12. p . 3 5 .
. vol. 12. p. 20. (my italics). »
^ u A E ri u). èPi. u ,|. I X  I>. ij- I. S-Ilf,
1i|6
harmonious nature of Greek society is illustrated hy the
three complementary pairs of words in the last sentence.
("Form und Fülle" ; "philosophirend und hildendj' "zart und
energisch") In that it could manifest all these qualities
at the same time, Greek society is certainly seen hy
Schiller as one of the finest achievements of humanity to
date. Yet if his other remarks on Greece and the cultural
evolution of Mankind are taken into consideration, another
layer of his thought is revealed.
Schiller’s first detailed treatment of a Greek theme
—  inspired, it has been suggested, by his envy of the
1
success of Goethe’s Iphigenie auf Tauris - is to be found
in the poem Die Gotter Griechenlands. It is a lament not
so much for the grandeur that was Greece but for the
beauty that has now fled from the world. In UAW a Greek
myth is used to illustrate the concept of "Anmut" and in
the following discussion Schiller speaks of "das zarte
Gefühl der Griechen" and of the combination of "Natur und
Sinnlichkeit, Materie und Geist" to be found in Greek
2
works of art. In both the poem and the essay it is the 
Greek desire for harmony and beauty that is praised. In
Schiller’s next major essay UAEM the Greeks themselves are
(1) cf. E.M.Butier: The Tyranny of Greece over Germany. 
Cambridge. 1935- pp. lëU-173. %
(2) SW. vol. 11. pp. 584-388.f  A.
II
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described as harmonious beings living in a harmonious 
society. Schiller nov; writes: "Damais, bei jenem schonen 
Erwachen der Geisteskrafte, hatten die Sinne und der 
Geist noch kein streng geschiedenes Eigent^um; denn noch 
hatte kein Zwiespalt sie gereizt, mit einander feindselig 
abzutjleilen, und ihre Markung zu bestimmen. Die Poesie 
hatte noch nicht mit dem Witze gebuhlt, und die Spekulation 
sich noch nicht durch Spitzfindigkeit geschandet. Beide 
konnten im Not^fall ihre Verrichtungen tauschen, weil 
jedes, nur auf seine eigene Weise, die Wahrheit ehrte.
So hoch die Vernunft auch stieg, so zog sie doch immer 
die Materie liebend nach, und so fein und scharf sie 
auch trennte, so verstummelte sie doch nie." In Greek 
society, Schiller continues, each individual was a 
harmonious whole, whereas in modern times the individual 
is but a fragment, a person who can develop only one 
specialised part of his potential ability. The question 
now arises: were the Greeks living in a state of 
"intuitive" harmony or does Schiller mean us to think that 
they achieved, for a short time at least, the "moral" 
harmony, the perfection of both individual and society 
described earlier in this chapter ?
(1) SW. vol. ,12. p. 20. //.
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The passage quoted above ("Damais....... verstummelte
sie doch nie") bears at first sight a strong resemblance
to the description of "sinnliche Harmonie" in UNSD, ("So
lange der Mensch....... als nach Binheit strebend sich
aussern"). In both passages "Sinne" and "Geist" (UAEM)
or "Vernunft" (UNSD) are said to work together: in UAEM
they have "kein streng geschiedenes Eigentj/um" and in
UNSD are said to be "noch nicht getrennt". In UNSD, too,
Schiller definitely places the Greeks in the category
of a "naive" people. Commenting on the different
attitudes of Greek and modern poets, Schiller here comes
to the conclusion that the Greeks led a simple life,
close to Nature. "Sehr viel anders war es mit den alten
Griechen" he writes. "Bei diesen artete die Kultur nicht
so weit aus, dass die Natur daruber verlassen wurde. Der
ganze Bau ihres gesellschaftlichen Lebens war auf
Empfindungen, nicht auf einem Machwerk der Kunst
errichtet; ihre Gotterlehre selbst war die Eingebung
1/ 2
eines naiven Gefuhls. However, if Greek society is 
allowed to represent "sinnliche Harmonie" in the history 
of the human race, what is now to be said of the passage 
previously quoted from MJ ("....seine Vernunft...... in
1) of. pp. 67-60 preceding.
2) SW. vol. 12. P.223. /U-U.
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einem regen Gedachtnis^ nieder") ? This passage, it
will he remembered, referred to the happy state of Man 
v/hen he was as yet little more than an animal and could 
still rely on his instinct to prescribe the right course 
of action for him in all situations. Had Schiller 
forgotten about this earlier passage when he wrote about 
the Greeks in UNSD, or can a more favourable explanation 
for this apparent discrepancy be found ?
If UAEM is consulted again, it will be found that 
Schiller did not envisage that the harmony of Greek society 
would last for ever. It is quite clear that he saw that, 
at a certain point, this harmony would have to be 
sacrificed, if the human race were to progress. He 
writes:
"Sobald auf der einen Seite die erweiterte Erfahrung 
und das bestiramtere Denken eine scharfere Scheidung der 
Wissenschaften, auf der andern das verwickeltere Uhrwerk 
der Staaten eine strengere Absonderung der Stande und 
Geschafte not|twendig machte, so zerriss auch der innere
Ex.25. Bund der menschlichen Natur, und ein verderblicher Streit
2
entzweite ihre harmonischen Krafte."
This same process i.e. the process of growing out of one 
state of harmony in order to acquire new experience,
1 ) cf. ppj2?-|iÿpreceding.
2) SW. vli. 12. p.22. 6).
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has already been mentioned with reference to MU. In 
this latter essay Man was seen to reach a stage where 
he could no longer rely on instinct as an infallible 
guide; in UAEM the Greeks are seen to live in harmony 
until their political institutions proved unable to meet 
the demands of the increasing complexities of life. It 
could be suggested, therefore, that Schiller sees both 
the development of the individual and the "cultural 
evolution" of Mankind in terms of a scale of harmonies; 
as soon as one harmonious chord is struck, a higher one 
still to be heard is postulated. Indeed, Schiller 
himself speaks in UAEM of "steps" or "degrees" of 
harmonious development. Greek society, for instance, 
is now referred to as "ein Maximum, das auf dieser Stufe wed 
er verharren noch hoher steigen konnte." It could not 
remain on this step, Schiller continues, because, in order 
to control the increasing complexity of experience, the 
intellectual faculties in Man had to be more sharply 
defined. Nor could it ascend higher "weil nur ein bestimm- 
ter Grad von Klarheit mit einer bestimmten Pulle und 
VVarme zusammen bestehen kann. Die Griechen hatten 
diesen Grad erreicht, und wenn sie zu einer hohern
(1) 8W. vol.12. p.27. (My italics)
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Ausbildung fortschreiten v/ollten, so mussten sie, wie 
wir, die Totalitat ihres Wesens aufgehen, und die Wahrheit
4
auf getrennten Bahnen verfolgen". The childhood of
Mankind, as described in MU, may perhaps thus be seen as
the first harmony in the scale. When it is broken, a
period of anarchy, conflict, and discord follows until,
finally, the next harmony, the Greek state, emerges. It
will now be seen that,to the man in the first throes of
discord after the Fall,the idea of the Greek city-state,
had he been able to conceive it, would have appeared as
the ideal "moral harmony". To us, at a stage of evolution
beyond that of the Greeks, the city-state appears as the
lost Golden Age, as a time when each individual v/as still
a harmonious whole, as a lost state of "sinnliche Harmonie".
Each new harmony that is heard in the scale of evolution may
thus be said to be "moralisch" in relation to the harmony
that has preceded it, but "sinnlich" in relation to the
2
higher harmony that is now postulated. The word 
"harmonisch" in Ex. 25 may thus be said to have a double 
reference both forwards and backwards.
(1) ###; SW.vol.l2.p.27, SA.uo/./2- n.22.
(2 ) Lutz. op.cit. pp. 175. .  also pnints out the 
relativity of all states of harmony. He speaks of a 
"Totalitat erster (niederer) Ordnung" and of a 
"wiederhergestelite Totalitat zweiter (hoherer) 
Ordnung". The former may be a symbol of the latter, 
as he believes is true of the references to Greece 
in UNSD.
1.52
Throughout this chapter an attempt has been made to 
trace the correspondence in Schiller’s thought between 
the development of the individual and the development of 
Mankind as a whole. In the concluding section of the 
last chapter it was shown how the harmonious individual, 
the "schone Seele", must continually be exposed to conflict 
and challenge if he is not to slip back into the morally 
ambiguous state of counterfeit harmony. In the concluding 
section of this chapter an examination of Schiller’s views 
of the Greek state has revealed that he applies the same 
reasoning to the processes of history. If development is 
to continue, if complacency is to be avoided, then harmony 
must be shattered and the search for a new harmony begin.
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V. Schiller’s theory of the creation of harmony.
In the last chapter it was shown how the process of 
world history has, for Schiller, the character of a 
development towards ever higher forms of harmony. It was 
also seen that the new harmony to which, according to 
Schiller, modern society is now striving is that of the 
"Staat der Freiheit" outlined in UAEM. This ideal state 
is only to he attained in so far as each individual member 
of the community can be brought into a state of ’moral’ 
harmony. The creation of such a harmony within the 
individual —  or, at least, of a state approximating to 
it —  is thus of the utmost importance for the development 
of Mankind as a vi/hole. It must now be asked how Schiller 
envisaged that such a task could be accomplished.
The first answer is that harmony is to be created 
through the examples of those individuals v/ho are themselves 
already harmonious. In his early writings Schiller had 
developed the idea of "Seelenharmonie" and the co-operation 
between two harmonious souls was thought to draw other 
people into friendship and. brotherhood. Several passages
(l) cf. pp. 34-37 preceding.
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have already been quoted to show that, in his mature work, 
true harmony again has an active and creative force. The 
’genius’, for instance, who is still guided by intuition, 
may be able to solve problems that have baffled others, 
and in this way he can be said to further harmony and 
progress in the outside world. The female sex, it seems, 
must also be mentioned here. In the much-maligned poem 
Wurde der Frauen Schiller says that women are "treue 
Tochter der frommen Natur" and in Das weibliche Ideal he 
calls Amanda truly free, because
"............................   ewig notlj^wendig
Weisst du von keiner Wahl, keiner Not^wendigkeit mehr.
Ex.26. Was du auch gibst, stets gibst du dich ganz; du bist
ewig nur Eines,
II 2
Auch dein zartester Laut ist dein harmonisches Selbst".
■ Women, too, it may be said, have been able to retain the 
state of intuitive harmony. They do not have to choose 
between duty and desire, for they can rely on their 
natural feelings to provide an infallible guide. They 
thus know no conflict, and to the observer always appear 
to act from the whole of their being, ("ewig nur Eines").
It is interesting to note that Ananda is here compared to
(1) cf. A.W.Schlegel’s parody of it; given in H.H. Borcherdts’ 
Schiller und die Bornantiker. Stuttgart. 1948. p.412.
(2) SW. vol.1. p.473.11.7-10. NA.vol.l.p.287.
J A . u 0i 2 .yy,.
155
a piece of music: each action is related to her personality 
in the same way as each note is related to the central 
theme of a musical work. She never acts out of character, 
despite the complexities of life, and her harmonious influ­
ence thus has a soothing effect on the lives of others.
The same theme may he heard again in Wurde der Frauen:
"Aher mit sanft uberredender Bitte 
Fuhren die Frauen den Scepter der Sitte,
Loschen die Zwietracht. die tohend entgluht,
Lehren die Krafte, die Feindlich sich hassen,
Sich in der liehlichen Form zu umfassen.
Und vereinen. was ewig sich flieht". ^
Here the italicised expressions all indicate a process of 
reconciliation and harmonization. To the person seeking 
harmony, feminine grace and calm appear as qualities to he 
admired and, if possible, imitated. In this way the 
harmonious individual has power to heal the discords within 
other people and thus within society as a whole.
Although the harmonious individual may serve as a 
guide, each person should ultimately find his ideal inside 
himself. As Schiller writes in UAEM: "Jeder individuelle
(l) SW. vol. 1. p. 410.11. 57-62 (my italics). For the 
reference to "treue Tochter der frommen Natur" cf. 1. 20.
Wurde der Frauen may be found in NA.vol.l.pp.240-243^
5 A .  00/.A
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Mensch..tragt, der Anlage und Bestimmung nach, einen reinen 
idealischen Menschen in sich, mit dessen unveranderlicher 
Einheit in alien seinen Ahwechslungen ubereinzustimmen die 
grosse Aufgabe seines Dasetns ist". For each individual 
the ideal will be the same, yet different: the harmonious 
integration of all the qualities that he alone possesses 
and of all the experiences that he alone encounters. Each 
one of us, it could be said, must be led through life by 
our own personal vision of harmony.
It has already been shown how the appreciation of 
the beautiful may bring about, in the individual, the 
desired reconciliation between the in^ulsive and rational 
sides of Man’s nature. Because this process has such 
important political and cultural implications (as Schiller 
says
"Der Geschmack allein bringt Harmonie in die Gesell-
K 2
Ex. 27. schaft weil er Harmonie in dem Individ^um stiftet")
it must now be considered in a little more detail, even at
(1 ) SW. vol. 12. p.12. 5A. «W./2. ^  If).
(2) UAEM: Brief 27. SW. vol.12. ^.154.
ç. n t  U.CL-3,
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the risk of repeating much of the work that has already
been done on this subject. In his review of Burger’s
, poetry Schiller defines the task of the artist (the
creator of beautiful objects) as;
”..... die in mehrern Gegenstanden zerstreuten
Ex. 28. Strahlen von Vollkommenheit in einem einzigen zu sammeln,
einzelne, das Ebenmass storende Zuge der Harmonie des
Ganzen zu unterwerfen, das Individuelle und Lokale zum
2
Allgemeinen zu erheben."
The work of art, in this case the completed poem, is seen 
here as an integrated whole, in which all the various 
parts stand in a balanced relationship to each other. No 
one part is allowed to dominate and upset the balance.
The purely individual emotions experienced by the poet
(1) In addition to the works already mentioned I should 
like to add here the following, as I have found them 
particularly helpful.
H.A.Korff. Geist der Goethezeit. Leipzig. 1930. esp. 
Teil.II. Edassik. pp. hyS ff.
H.Meng. "Schillers Abhandlung uber Naive und senti­
mental is che Dichtung. Prolegomena zu einer Typologie 
des Dichterischen". Wege zur Dichtunp:. Zurcher 
Schriften zur Literaturwissenschaft. Vol. XXIII. 1936. 
The «^Introduction and Notes of W.F. Mainland’s edition 
of uber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung. Blackwell’s 
German Texts. Oxford. 1951.
(2) SW. vol.12. pp. W 6-407. NA.vol.2£.p.255.
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("das Individuelle und Lokale") have to fit into the 
harmony of the whole. It is this inner equilibrium between 
the parts that endows the poem with a symbolic and universal 
significance. This inner equilibrium is, however, difficult 
to create. In the same review Schiller lists:
"........ ein unedles, die Schonheit des Gedankens
entstellendes Bild, ein in’s Platte fallender Ausdruck,
Ex.29. ein unnützer Worterprunk, ein...unachter Reim oder barter
Vers, was die harmonische Wirkung des Ganzen stdrte "
By drawing attention to themselves such features detract 
from the totality of a work, and the general impression 
is not one of harmonious integration, but of a disjointed 
succession of isolated words and thoughts. From these 
sentences it is clear that Schiller considers the 
harmonious effect of a work of art to depend on the 
ability of the artist to create an impression of an inte­
grated whole, in which there is balance and reciprocal 
inter-play between the parts. The work of art may thus 
stand as a symbol of the harmonious personality, for it 
demonstrates within itself those principles on which the 
harmony of the personality must be based. The work of 
art, for Schiller, is furthermore never merely a symbol of
(1) SW, vol. 12. pp. 406-407. NA.vol.2£.p.251.
JAv.i. /6. p. a33. 1.3S^ Ç. 0.3If. I I.
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the harmonious personality: it is also an agent that 
produces, for a short time at least, the state of harmony 
in the beholder. In NG Schiller says that a truly beautiful 
work of art
wird dem Verstand vollkommen Genuge tÿ^n,
sobald es studirt wird, aber eben weil es wahrhaft ist,
so dringt es seine Gesetzmassigkeit nicht auf, so wendet
Ex.30. es sich nicht an den Verstand insbesondere. sondern
spricht als reine Einheit zu dem harmonirenden Ganzen des
•]
Menschen, als Natur zur Natur".
The appeal of the truly beautiful work of art is not
limited to the intellect alone, although the study of the 
details of its composition (the way in which the colours 
are arranged in a painting, for instance) would perhaps 
reveal rational principles. Its appeal is to both sides 
of the personality at once: to the rational, because it 
contains within itself a demonstration of the subjugation 
of the part to the whole; to the impulsive (sinnlich), 
because it can only be apprehended through the senses.
The appreciation of such a work thus brings into play all 
the forces within the personality, as the active force
(1) SW. vol.12. p.174. (Schiller’s italics)
3A  vol. IX p. 13a  II. lS-2.lt..
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of the word "harmonirend" in the above sentence indicates. 
Momentarily, therefore, the beholder experiences the 
harmony of both sides of his personality and becomes aware 
of his true nature. Thus the work of art, as a symbol of * 
this true nature, and the beholder may be said to stand 
in the relationship "Natur zur Natur".
Prior to the experience of the state of harmony in
front of the work of art the beholder 7/111 be in a state
of either "Anspannung" (tension) or "Erschlaffung", which
may be equated with ’counterfeit* harmony. One of the
previous examples of the word "Harmonie" showed how
Schiller compared the individual in a state of tension to
an instrument that had been pitched too high. In this
case, harmony will only be possible when the taut strings
are loosened. Similarly an individual in a state of
complacency has been said to resemble an instrument that
2
has not been pitched high enough. Here the loose strings 
must obviously be tightened. Schiller is thus led to 
postulate two distinct kinds of aesthetic effect to redress 
the balance in either case. To these he gives the naræs
cf. Ex. k pp. 58-59 preceding, 
cf. pp. 135 - 136 preceding.
1.61
of "schmelzende" and "energische Schonheit".^ In UAEM
Schiller v/rites of the former:
"Pur den Menschen unter dem Zv/ange entweder der
Materie oder der Pormen ist also die schmelzende Schonheit
Ex.31. Bedurfnis, denn von Grosse und Kraft ist er 1angst geruhrt,
ehe er fur Harmonie und Grazie anfangt empfindlich zu 
2
werden. "
Prom the context it is reasonably clear that the above 
sentence contains one of Schiller’s favourite figures of 
speech, that of chiasmus. ^  "Materie" can be related to 
"Kraft" and "Pormen’' to "Grosse". The individual who is 
dominated by impulses that come to him from the outside, 
material world is at the mercy of the most forceful 
impression occurring at any given moment. The individual 
who is a slave to the concepts of reason ("Pormen") may 
have been seduced by the moral "greatness" of following 
duty at the expense of denying the other parts of his 
nature. In neither case will there be any feeling for 
true harmony and grace. The task of "auflosende" or 
"schmelzende Schonheit" is therefore twofold: it must 
tame the wild impulses in the one case and bring about a
( 1 ) The same theme is repeated in UNSD, v/here the two 
types of aesthetic effect appear under the names of 
"Erholung" and "Veredlung".  ^ . \
2) SW. vol.12. p.81. 5 A  u#(. //• H ' X  ( U-4£/7/é>y.
3 ) cf. also Professor Wilkinson's remarks on this figure 
of speech, op.cit. passim.
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recognition of impulse and feeling in the other. In UAEM 
Schiller further explains how this task is to he accomplished, 
"Die schmelzende Schonheit" he writes "um dieser doppelten 
Auf g ah e ein Genuge zu ty(in, wird sich also unter zwei 
verschiedenen Gestalten zeigen. Sie wird erstlich. als 
ruhige Form, das wilde Dehen hesanftigen, und von Empfin­
dungen zu Gedanken den Ubergang bahnen; sie wird zweitens 
als lebendes Bild die abgezogene Form mit sinnlicher Kraft 
ausrüsten, den Begriff zur Anschauung und das Gesetz zum 
Gefühl zurückfûhren. " It is from this starting-point that 
the concept of the play-impulse is finally developed. The 
artist not only creates an integrated whole; he also creates 
an illusion or semblance. ("Schein"). By entering into the 
illusion, by ’playing’ (that is, by taking part for the 
sake of taking part) the individual finds his tensions 
released. Later in UAEM Schiller writes:
"Der gesetzlose Sprung der Freude wird zum Tanz, die 
Ex.32. ungestalte-f Geste zu einer anmut^igen harmonischen Geberden- 
sprache.
The leap of joy and the clumsy gesture are purely impulsive 
re-actions. They follow immediately from an external 
stimulus and the individual has no control over them. In
 ^ JA U-I.IXy, 46- u. 13-^ 0. iH). ' '
1) SW. vol. 72. pp. 85-86. (Schiller s italics).
SW. vol. 12. p. 151.
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the art—forms of the dance and the mime, however, he can 
leap and gesticulate without experiencing any external 
stimuli at all. Either hy performing himself or hy 
watching others he can find an outlet, in ’play’, for 
his urges. He is thus no longer dominated hy them and 
is free to think about his impressions and to develop the 
rational side of his nature. On the other hand, the 
individual "unter dem Zwang der Pormen" may, on watching 
a dance or mime, be ’ carried away’ or ’enlivened* by the 
action. His repressed impulsive nature finds a momentary 
satisfaction, again in ’play’, and he remembers how to 
feel. Of "anspannende" or "energische Schonheit" Schiller 
writes : "Pur den Menschen unter der Indulgenz des Geschmacks 
ist die energische Schonheit Bedurfnis, denn nur allzugern 
verscherzt er im Stand der Verfeinerung eine Kraft, die er 
aus dem Stand der Wildheit heruberbrachte. " The 
individual who has been seduced by taste into a state of
’counterfeit’ harmony has lost any driving urge to action
he may once have possessed. For him challenge is necessary. 
The movements of the dance or mime must awaken in him the 
urge to act and exert himself in the outside world. In 
this way the harmonious work of art may generate harmony
(1) UAEM. Brief. 16. SW. vol. 12. p.81.
vJ. I X  p. 43- //. la- ILr
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in three very different types of individual, and both 
barriers (i.e. tension and complacency) to Man’s further 
development may be lifted. Schiller summarises this in 
UAEM by saying:
"Beide entgegengesetzte Schranken werden durch
Ex. 33.die Schonheit gehoben, die in dem angespannten Menschen
1
die Harmonie, in dem abgespannten die Energie wieder herstellt".
Ideally, Schiller says, both effects should be 
generated by one and the same work of art. In practice, 
however, this will rarely be found, as the artist himself 
is subject to the limitations of the world and is not 
necessarily a harmonious being. In UNSD Schiller distinguishes 
the different modes of feeling that may impel an artist to 
create. In other words, he is now concerned not with the 
effect of the work of art as such but with the creative 
process itself. The ’naive’ poet, it could be said, is 
one who has been able to retain the state of ’intuitive’ 
harmony and thus finds no conflict between himself and the 
outside world. His aim, Schiller writes, is to present
2
"die moglichst vollstandige Nachahmung des Wirklichen".
As examples of ’naive’ poets Schiller cites among others
fi) sv/. vol. 12. p.84. f A  (3 M //. /yl.
(2) SW. vol. 12. //. a t - a y .
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Shakespeare (whose objectivity had at first alienated him), 
Homer and Molière. The creations of the ’naive’ poet may 
have both ’relaxing’ (auflosend) and ’strengthening’ 
(anspannend) effects. The objective presentation of reality, 
whereby the ’naive’ poet is exposed to the danger of 
falling into the vulgar or trivial, may not prove palatable 
to everyone and may thus disturb and arouse the complacent 
individual. At the same time the ’naive ’ poet portrays
V
life as a whole, and this portrayal of wholeness, of a 
harmony in which all elements of life, both tragic and 
comic, find their own particular place, may enable the 
release of tension in the ways described above. The 
’reflective’ poet, on the other hand, may be said to be 
one who no longer stands under the guidance of intuition.
He is not at one either with himself or with his environment 
but is striving to attain ’moral’ harmony. Of his work 
Schiller says;
"Entweder ist es der Widerspruch des wirklichen 
Zustandes, oder es ist die Ubereinstimmung desselben mit 
dem Ideal, welche vorzugsweise das Gemutj;^  beschaftigt;
Oder dieses ist zwischen beiden getj^eilt. In dem ersten 
Palle wird es durch die Kraft des innern Streits, durch 
Ex.34. die energische Bewegung. in dem andern wird es durch die
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Harmonie des innern LeHens, durch die energische Suhe 
hefriedigt; in dem dritten wechselt Streit mit Harmonie,
4
wechselt Ruhe mit Bewegung".
In the first case mentioned here there is an awareness of 
the discrepancy between the actual state of affairs and 
the ideal which, it might now be said, is the state of 
’moral* harmony. Such a feeling, which criticises the 
actual world, finds its expression in the satirical mode. 
In the second case there is a vision of ’moral* harmony
f#
("Ubereinstimmung. .mit dem Ideal") and this finds its 
expression in the idyllic mode. In the third case there 
may be both the presentation of the ideal and the lament 
that this ideal is nowhere realised. This mixed feeling 
is expressed by the elegiac mode. The satirical mode is 
said to satisfy "durch die Kraft des innern Streits, durch 
die energische Ruhe". By its forceful challenge to 
existing conditions, by its vivid and sometimes bitter 
portrayal of the conflict between the ideal and the real, 
it may be said to exert a ’strengthening’ influence on 
those in a state of. complacency. The idyllic mode^ which 
presents a vision of the successfully integrated life and 
of the energy that flows from it ("die Harmonie des innern
(l) SW. vol. 12. p. 276. footnote, (^chiller's Italics) -
SA. oci. (X p XX/. k  30-
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Lebens... die energische Ruhe" will encourage a ’tense’
person to work for the reconciliation of the opposing
forces, Vihere criticism of the actual world is mixed with
the presentation of the ideal ’moral ’ harmony, as in the
elegiac mode, both ’strengthening’ and ’relaxing’ effects
may be expected. The former will be awakened by the
portrayal of "Streit" and "Bewegung" and the latter by
"Harmonie" and "Ruhe".
If Ui^M deals primarily with the effect of a work of
art and UNSD with the different kinds of creative impulse
in the artist himself, Schiller elsewhere tackles in
more detail the question of the subject-matter of the work
of art as such. His categories of the beautiful and the
sublime may perhaps be considered under this heading. In
his Zerstreute Betrachtungen uber verschiedene asthetische
Gegenstande Schiller gives us a description of a beautiful
landscape and examines its effect upon us:
"Wir Sind aufgelost in susse Empfindungen von Ruhe,
und indem unsere Sinne von der Harmonie der Parben, der
Ex.35. Gestalten und Tone auf das Angenehmste geruhrt werden,
ergdtzt sich das Gemûtl^ an einem leichten und geistreichen
1
Ideengang und das Herz an einem Strom von Gefuhlen."
Although this passage refers to the beauty of natural objects.
(1) SW. vol. 11. p. 570.
S A .  ...I-//•
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those works of art which portray such objects may be said 
to have a beautiful subject-matter. Such works please by 
their depiction or evocation of harmony, achieved perhaps by 
the harmony of line and colour in painting, of sound in 
music, or of sound and image in poetry. Prom what has been 
said above it will be clear that such works have, first and 
foremost, a ’relaxing’ influence and help to bring about 
harmony in the beholder in the way already described. 
Schiller’s analysis of the sublime follows very closely 
that worked out by Kant in the Critique of Judgment. The 
feeling of sublimity is evoked when the individual becomes 
aware of his rational nature. This may happen firstly when, 
in the face of great physical danger or great physical 
magnitude, the individual feels within himself something 
that enables him to challenge such manifestations, and 
secondly when, in the conflict between duty and desire, he 
is able to subjugate his selfish impulses to the general 
good and thus prove that he is more than an animal. In such 
cases the conflict between the rational and impulsive sides 
of human nature is often clearly seen. In Uber das 
Pathetische. as in UAW, Schiller refers to the statue of 
the ’Laokoon’ group for an example of a sublime facial 
expression at variance with the suffering shown elsewhere 
in the body. He writes:
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"An dieser Disharmonie nun zwischen denjenigen ZOgen, 
die der animalischen Natur nach dem Gesetz der Not)(wendigkeit 
eingepragt werden, und zwischen denen, die der selhstt^atige 
Geist hestimmt, erkennt man die Gegenwart eines uhersinnlichen 
Ex.56.Prinzips i^Menschen, welches den Wirkungen der Natur eine
4
Grenze setzen kann,,,,..."
Works of art which portray such situations may he said to
have a sublime subject-matter. By their portrayal of
disharmony they disturb complacency and throw out a challenge
to greater effort. The portrayal of the sublime is the
task of tragedy, although it may also be portrayed by other
genres. As a tragedian himself Schiller v/as naturally most
interested in this dramatic form and he examined it in
detail in many of his minor essays e.g. Uber den Or und des
Vergnügens an tragischen Gegenstanden (1792) and ^ e r  die
tragische Kunst (1792) as well as Uber das Pathetische (1793).
Schiller’s concept of tragedy has already been very fully
discussed by many interpreters and only those aspects which
2
seem relevant to the present thesis will be mentioned here.
In Uber das Pathetische. for instance, Schiller tells us 
"Das erste Gesetz der tragischen Kunst war Darstellung der
H i  SW. vol. 11. p. kô3.SAi^»Hl- l - p.^S6. I. If.
(2) Perhaps special reference shquld be made hire to the
^?]^&aa^r^"Schicksalsbegriff und Tragik bei Schiller und 
Kleist". Germanische Studien. Heft 228. Berlin 1940.
F, Prader. "Schiller und Sophokles". Zurj^cher Be it rage 
zur deutschen Literatur - und Geistesgescnichte. No.7. 
Zurich. 1954.
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leidenden Natur. Das zweite ist Darstellung des moralisclien
Widerstandes gegen das Leiden”. Tragedy must portray Loth
the conflict between the impulsive and rational sides of the
personality (we must see that the protagonist suffers such
a conflict) and the triumph of the higher, rational
principle. This is the more important way in which the
tragedies of Shakespeare (and of other dramatists, he they
* naive’ or ’reflective’) exert their ’strengthening’ effects.
In Uher die tragische Kunst Schiller says explicitly that
tragedy is perhaps the best medium for presenting such
effects, for, unlike the novel or the epic, it shows the
action unfolding in the present before our eyes. ”Eine Reihe
mehreref zusammenhangender Vorfalle wird erfordert” says
2
Schiller, as he gives advice to the would-be tragedian,
’’einen Wechsel der G-emütysbewegungen in uns zu erregen, der 
die Aufmerksamkeit suannt. der jedes Vermogen unseres 
Geistes aufbietet, den ermattenden Tj^atigskeitstrieb 
ermuntert, und durch die verzogerte Befriedigung ihn nur 
desto heftiger entflammt”. At the same time, however, great 
tragedy may also be ’relaxing’ as it portrays ultimately, 
according to Schiller, the harmony of the universal order. 
The individual’s sacrifice to a higher duty contributes to
(1) SW. vol. 11.
(2) SW. vol. 11. p. 558. (my italics)/
p  u.is-ao.
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the harmony of the Universe as a v/hole. Just as one discord 
may mingle in the overall harmony of a symphony. It is 
interesting to note the use of this very metaphor in Uher 
die tragische Kunst;
*'Dann gesellt sich zu unserem Vergnugen an moralischer 
Uhereinstimmung die erquickende Vorstellung der vollkommen- 
sten Zweckmassigkeit im grossen Ganzen der Natur, und die
Ex.37. 8cheinhare Verletzung derselhen wird hloss ein Stachel
fur unsere Vernunft, in allgemeinen Gesetzen eine Recht- 
fertigung dieses hesonderen Fallés aufzusuchen, und den
2
einzelnen Misslaut in der grossen Harmonie aufzulosen. ”
From this examination of Schiller’s theories of the 
nature and effects of art and artistic creation, it is clear 
that the true aesthetic education as represented hy diagram
i) has a two-fold task. This task may perhaps he summarised 
as "Where there is harmony, conflict; where there is 
conflict, harmony” if it is h o m e  in mind that ’harmony’ 
in the first half of this suggested maxim refers to the 
'’counterfeit’ state, whereas in the second half it refers to 
the ’moral’ one. The aim of the true aesthetic education is 
always the establishment of true ’moral’ harmony as shown by 
diagram i) but, as it is almost impossible to distinguish
(1) The expression ’’moralische Uhereinstimmung” does not, I 
believe, refer here to "moral harmony” but merely to an 
agreement with the moral law.
(2) SW. vol. 11. p.545.
i*A u.i, I. i/.ai-ay.
&    --------
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to the pseudo from the real harmony because of
our infinite capacity to deceive ourselves, ’strengthening’
effects will always be necessary to disturb complacency. On
the other hand, the aesthetic education must always seek,
through the effects of ’relaxing’ art, to generate in each
individual a vision of the possible higher ’moral’ harmony
still to be attained. Ideally, therefore. Art should ensure
that Mankind as a whole continues to progress towards ever
higher and more complex forms of harmonious integration.
Schiller nevertheless recognises that, in practice, there
are several v/ays in which Art may either serve the false
aesthetic education shown in diagram 1 ) or even fail
altogether. In the first instance ’relaxing’ art may
%
"suffocate” as Schiller writes in UAEM , both the emotional
and the moral drives, ”........... daher”, he continues "wird
man in den sogenannten verfeinerten V/eltaltern Y/eichheit 
nicht selten in ^eichiichkeit, Flache in Flachheit, Korrekt- 
heit in Leerheit, Liberal it at in Willk^^lichkeit, Leichtig- 
keit in Frivolitat, Suhe in Apathie ausarten..... sehen". The 
second noun in each of the above pairs might perhaps be 
regarded as an attribute of the state of ’counterfeit’ 
harmony e.g. "We i chii chke it” (a state of being ruled by
(1) For the use of "erstic^en” and for the following 
q.uotation here cf. SW. vol. 12. p. 81.
5 A. i»o|. i d  p. ^LiA £
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feelings), "Flachheit" (lack of emotional or intellectual 
depth), "Leerheit" (the absence of any real guiding 
principle), "Y/illku^rlichkeit" (the arbitrary following 
of one's own desires), "Frivolitat" (the refusal to take 
the world seriously) and "Apathie" (the refusal to face 
challenge and change). Secondly, 'strengthening' art may 
generate too much energy with the result that, once again, 
the wilder passions and impulses take control." daher",
-j
Schiller says, "findet man in den Zeitaltern der Kraft 
und der Pulle das wahrhaft Grosse der Vorstellung mit dem 
Gigantesken und Ahenteuerlichen, und das Erhahene der 
Gesinnung mit den schauderhaftesten Aushruchen der Leiden-
r
schaft gepaart”. In this sentence the expressions "das 
wahrhaft GrTsse der Vorstellung" and "das Erhahene der 
Gesinnung" may be said to represent what ’ strengthening’ 
art should achieve, while "gigantic" or "fantastic" ideas 
and "gruesome outbreaks of passion" bear witness to its 
dangers. Yet again, as Schiller admits, Art may fail in 
furthering the aesthetic education, because there will 
always unfortunately be the individual
"...... der ohne Sinn fur jene Harmonie immer nur auf
(1) S W . -i ivol. 12. p. 81. Ç A ' 1 %  E H  /é).
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das Einzelne dringt, der in der Peterskirche selbst nur die 
Ex.38.Pfeiler suchen wurde, welche dieses künstliche Firmament unter-
// 'I ' ■
stutzen....... "
The power of the harmonious work of art,to generate harmony 
in the beholder is here completely neutralised. Such an 
individual^ it must be assumed, is beyond help and is con­
demned to spend all his life as a fragment, never gaining
awareness of his full -human potential..............
Despite the difficulties outlined above. Art is perhaps 
the sole force which, in Schiller’s view, can guide Man 
towards his true destiny. As he writes in the review of 
Burger’s poetry:
"Bei der Vereinzelung und getrennten Wirksamkeit 
unserer Geisteskrafte, die der erweiterte Kreis des Wissens 
und die Absonderung der Berufsgeschafte notwendig macht, ist 
es die Dichtkunst beinahe allein, welche die getrennten 
Krafte der Seele wieder in Vereinigung bringt, welche Kopf 
und Herz, Scharfsinn und Witz, Vernunft und Einbildungskraft
Ex.39. in harmonischem Bunde beschaftigt, welche gleichsam den
2
ganzen Menschen in uns herstellt".
The totality of the individual, in which state there is 
harmonious activity and an awareness of unlimited potential.
1) NG. SW. vol. 12. p. 175. SA. i>oi 1^ - y'-
2) SW. vol. 12. p. 398.
II.
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îTiay be restored after either a state of complacency or a 
state of conflict by the experience of Art. The ’moral* 
harmony experienced in such moments, if only for a short 
time, allows each individual to postulate for himself an 
ideal being, or "schdne Seele"^ in whom this harmonious state 
would be constantly maintained. In this way each individual 
may indeed gliispse his own vision of harmoiiy^which he can 
then take as the guiding principle of his life.
In the poem Die Führer des Lebens Schiller gives a
warning against one-sided commitment of any kind. "Nimmer
widne dich Sinem allein" he says, "Never try to play on
one theme, and one theme alone, throughout your life". A
2
similar principle is recommended in Licht und War me where 
the reader is exhorted to combine the warmth and earnestness 
of enthusiasm with the shrewd, practical gaze of the man of 
the world. In Die Johanniter^ he saw the Christian religion 
as a subtle balance of strength and humility. The
(1) SW. vol. 1. p. 449. 1. 9. KA.vol.l.p.272./A.i«>/././'r-'2tO-3ti
(2) SW. vol. 1. p. 447. NA.vol. 1.p.383, »»/./. L( 2./I,
(3 ) SW. vol. 1. p. 416. NA.vol.1,p.233.i A - L .
In NA the earlier titles are given; thus Die führer des Le r,en a 
appears as Schdn und Erhaben,and Die Johanniter as Die Kitter 
des Spitals zu Jerusalem .
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difficulties of obtaining any such balance between opposing
forces are indicated in Die schv/ere Verbindung. where the
energy of genius and the discipline of taste fight shy of 
■]
each other. In Das Ideal und das Leben the ideal of 
harmony is again presented as unattainable in this life.
Even Hercules has to wait for death before he can hear the
P
Olympian music....... These random examples show Schiller’s
constant pre-occupation with the concept of harmony and his 
attempt to find in it a criterion for all action and 
behaviour.
This pre-occupation is again reflected in Schiller’s 
style and speculative method. Again and again in the 
philosophical essays opposing forces are weighed against 
each other; each side is scrupulously examined until a 
higher concept that unites both is discovered. This process 
is, moreover, by no means confined to the essays. In Das 
Lied von der Glocke. for instance, the smelting of the 
metals is described in similar terms; first a hard metal, 
and then a soft one is taken, and from their combination 
comes the harmonious sound..
uo1.1, p * I ———— — —
(1 ) One of the Votivtafeln. cf, SW. vol. |1. p. 465. NA.vol.l.p.
(2) SW. vol; 1. pp. 365-371. i ' A - u o l . z u l .
The first version of Das Ideal und gas Leben will be found in 
La .vol.1.pp.247-251 under the title of DA5 Keich der Schatten
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"Prüft mir das Gémisch,
Oh das Sprdde mit dem Weichen 
Sich vereint zum guten Zeichen.
Denn, wo das Strenge mit dem Zarten,
Wo starkes sich und Mildes paarten,
1Da gibt es einen guten Klang".
Indeed, the concept of harmony, for Schiller, could
be said to be a ’religious’ one in the widest sense of
this word. In his youth, in Die Theosonhie des Julius.
2
he had written "Das Universum ist ein Gedanke Gottes" and 
the whole created world, in all its variety and vastness, 
had been seen as a work of art conceived and executed by 
God. Every manifestation of harmony, in nature or in art, 
was regarded as a reflection of God, the supreme artist.
"Harmonie, Wahrheit, Ordnung, Schonheit, Vortrefflich- 
keit," Schiller says here, "geben mir Preude, weil sie mich 
in den tÿ/âtigen Zustand ihres Srfinders, ihres Besitzers 
Ex. 4-0. versetzen, we il sie mir-die Gegenwart eines vernunft ig
empfindenden Wesens verraten und meine Verwandtschaft mit 
diesem Wesen mich ahnen lassen".^
When Schiller writes "meine Verwandtschaft mit diesem Wesen
1) SW. vol. 1. p. 393. 11. 85-90. KA.vol.l.p.248.5A.o*/./.
2) SW. vol. 1C. p. 324. SA. «.LII i l<f I
3) SW. vol. 10. p. 325
--.LI . p. 117. I-N,
oJ.ll. |l.|(g. ti i - l 3 .
178
mich ahnen lassen" he implies that, in the Divine work of 
art, Man must occupy a special place. As has been seen, 
there is a clear distinction in all Schiller’s thought 
between the world of Nature, in which Man, like the animals, 
would be guided solely by instinct, and the world of freedom, 
in v/hich Man shares by his ability to make his own decisions 
and to determine his own acts. With this distinction in 
mind, the divine work of art as envisaged by Schiller might 
perhaps be compared to a drama or musical composition, both 
of which are dependent for their effect on the competence 
of the performers. The text or score may be said to 
correspond to the plan ordained for the world by God, while 
Man resembles an actor who fails to bring out the full 
meaning of his text^or a musician who fails to play his 
instrument in tune. When Karl Moor, for example, asks:
"Es ist doch eine so gdttliche Harmonie in der seelen- 
Ex.41. losen Natur, warum sollte dieser Missklang in der vernunft- 
igen se;|u ? "
he implies not only that the whole Universe should be a 
piece of harmonious music, but also that Man, unlike the 
world of Nature which has remained in tune, is failing to 
carry out his proper task in the great orchestra. By the
(1) Act,,. CO. 5. SW. vol. 2. p.
SA. 0.1 3. p-
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wrong use of his freedom ("unsere schlecht gehrauchte 
moralische Freiheit", as Schiller calls it in UNSD^), ‘by- 
choosing to follow his own selfish desire, hy allowing 
himself to he deceived into a state of ’counterfeit’ 
harmony, Man fails to attain the true nature ordained for 
him hy God. It is almost as if the musician were to reject 
the composer’s score and insist on playing different notes
altogether...........
The hope expressed hy Schiller in his philosophical 
writings is that Man, if made aware of his true nature, 
might once again try to live in harmony with it and thus 
contribute to the harmony not only of his ov/n immediate 
society but also of the Universe as a whole. The regenerative 
process, Schiller clearly states, must start within the
o
individual personality, (cf. Ex. 27) . Here the various 
inner forces are to be integrated into a balanced whole and 
a harmonious relationship with the outside world is thus 
to be obtained. The experience of such an integrated state 
of ’moral* harmonyjwhere there is no conflict between the 
course urged by duty and that urged by desire, may be 
inspired either through those individuals who are themselves 
’intuitively’ harmonious or through Art. At the same time
SW. vol. 12. p. 217.^^- 'Yy l|,
cf. p. 156 preceding. f
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receptive to the feelings of others and yet always in 
control of his impulses, such an integrated individual 
would he able, ideally, to bring harmony into the limited 
social sphere in which he lives. As his own experience 
and sympathy increase, his love for his fellow-beings also 
grows and he is able to see in each something of value 
which may be developed and welded into the whole. Finally, 
the chain-reaction set in motion by the integrated individual 
should result in a political harmony, an ideal society in 
which freedom of the individual is combined with respect 
for the laws necessary for the life of the community. It 
is now perhaps easier to see the reconciliation of those
two ideas --- harmony of the personality and harmony as a
creative force flowing throughout the Universe --- which
%
were noted in the discussion of Schiller’s "Jugendschriften".
In practice, as has been seen, the integrated state of 
’moral’ harmony can never be maintained for more than a 
short time; at most points in our lives v/e shall only 
attain degrees of approximation to it. There is in 
Schiller’s realization of Man’s capacity for self-deception 
a concept very similar to the Christian doctrine of original
(l) cf. Chapter II. pp. 23-48 preceding.
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sin. For the Christian, however, the inherent sinfulness 
of Man’s fallen nature could only he redeemed hy the divine 
intervention of Christ. For Schiller, the curse may perhaps 
he lifted if the ambiguity of human motives is recognised. 
His great tragic characters —  Maria Stuart, Johanna, Don 
Cesar —  realise the moral ambiguity of their past actions, 
although these actions had at one time seemed right to them, 
and make atonement through their voluntary sacrifices. In 
the everyday world of ordinary life^however^ the awareness 
that we may at every point deceive ourselves into 
’counterfeit’ harmony, and that there is always a more 
complex harmony to be attained, will suffice. It is here 
that the peculiar structure of Schiller’s thought is most 
clearly seen, for it is as if v/e were hearing a piece of 
music, in which a bright, optimistic theme is accompanied 
all the time by a darker, more sombre one.
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G. CONCLUSION.
In the Introduction to this thesis an attempt was 
made to trace the general development of the figurative 
senses of the word "Harmonie" from the purely musical ones. 
It was shown that, for Schiller, harmony in the musical 
sense implied both a combination of two or more notes into 
a new chord and an ordered, rhythmic movement through time. 
The connotations of combination and movement were then 
found to be present when he used the word figuratively. For 
instance, in the two early essays Philosophie der 
Physiologie and Uber den Zusammenhang der tierischen Natur 
des Menschen mit seiner geistigen Schiller develops a 
concept of physiological harmony which bears both the 
above characteristics. The living organism is an example 
of the combination of various parts into a whole and, in 
health, of an active co-operation between them. It can thus 
be said that, from his very first writings onwards, Schiller 
works out the musical allegory implicit in the word 
"Harmonie" in a detailed and original way.
The second type of harmony to be found in these early 
essays is the harmony between body and soul or, as we might 
say today, between physiological condition and psychological 
state, Schiller investigated this relationship with
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remarkable insight and showed that physiological disharmony 
could produce psychological disturbances, and vice-versa. 
Musical metaphors are again used as illustrations. Body 
and soul are compared to two stringed instruments placed 
side by side in such a way that a note struck on one 
causes a reverberation on the other. One of the sources 
of Schiller’s later theory of the harmonious personality 
is undoubtedly to be found here, and from now onwards 
Schiller begins to think of the human soul, or personality, 
in musical terms.
Elsewhere in Schiller’s early writings the word 
"Harmonie" (sometimes "Seelenharmonie") is used to mean a 
harmony between friends or lovers. Such people are some­
times said to be tuned in the same key; thus, here again, 
a musical metaphor is present. Love and friendship are 
seen by Schiller as two creative forces which flow 
throughout the world and which will, eventually, unite 
the world into one harmonious whole. Linked with this 
idea of world-harmonv is the idea of a. much greater 
cosmic harmony. In the poem Per Tanz. for example,
Schiller envisages the Universe as a constantly changing, 
yet unified whole. In other places in his work there 
are echoes of the ancient Pythagorean concept of the 
harmony of the spheres, and it is implied that the planet
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Earth may not he able to contribute to this cosmic 
symphony because of the sin of her inhabitants. If itI
is borne in mind that obedience to the moral laws of 
society on the part of everybody would bring about a state 
of world-harmony and thus enable the Earth to play her 
full part in the cosmic symphony, then Moral Law, as it 
might now be called, may perhaps be likened to that strong 
fundamental rhythm which, in Der Tanz. Schiller regarded 
as the unifying concept in the incessant whirl of activity. 
As Karl. Moor recognises at the end of Die Rauber. when 
Man disobeys the Moral Law, he commits a crime not only 
against himself and other human beings but also against the 
whole Universe. When one recalls this aspect of Schiller’s 
work, it is not difficult to see why Kant’s concept of a 
’categorical imperative’ legislating for the universal 
good made such an impression upon him. In the philosophical 
essays, it is true, Schiller does not write about crimes 
against "die Harmonie der Welt" as he had done in Die 
Rauber. but the rejection of a course prescribed by duty 
is an eequally serious matter.
In Section B Schiller’s use of the word "Harmonie" 
within his philosophical essays was investigated. It was 
found that one of the figurative senses in which Schiller 
usea the word here was that of a vague general agreement
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between desire and duty, where desire and duty are seen as 
different forces within the human personality. (Ex. 1).
It was further found that Schiller envisaged three different 
types of agreement between desire and duty. The first 
type, in which the course of action urged by desire is in 
tune with the precepts of the moral law, was represented 
by diagram e) and it was contended that this was the agree­
ment understood by Schiller when he used the term "sinnliche
%
Harmonie" (Ex.6). "Sinnliche Harmonie", or, as it was 
translated, intuitive harmony, was seen to be the state 
experienced by those people to whom Schiller attributes 
the adjective ’naiv*. The second type of agreement between 
duty and desire was found to be that in which duty 
prescribes a course of action which desire then accepts.
To this agreement was given the name of moral harmony.
The acceptance by desire can be immediate, in which case 
this harmony only differs from "sinnliche Harmonie" in 
that here the conscious knowledge of duty prescribes the 
course of action, (diagram g). On the other hand, desire 
may at first reject the precepts of duty and only come to 
accept them after a prolonged period of conflict. Such a
(1 ).cf.p.56. p r e c e d i n g .Oder die Triebe des letztern setzen 
sich mit den Gesetzen des ersten in Harmonie".j.
(2).cf.pp.67-68.preceding.("1st der mensch in den btanfi der 
Kultur getreten....so ist jene sinnliche Harmonie in -ihm auf 
gehoben").
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conflict, in Schiller’s view, may he brought to a harmonious 
resolution through the mediation of taste, a process 
represented here by diagram i), Hov/ever, even if such a 
resolution takes place, the harmony achieved cannot be 
maintained for long; indeed, it has to be broken and a 
"higher" harmony postulated, if, as shown elsewhere, 
complacency is not to gain the upper hand. It will be seen 
that a distinction must be made here between a limited moral 
harmony, represented here by both diagrams i) and g), which 
is attained every time we carry out our responsibilities 
willingly, and an absolute moral harmony, which must 
constantly be re-postulated. It must be admitted that, 
although this distinction is present in Schiller’s thought, 
he himself never makes it very clearly. Indeed, a typically 
Schillerian thought structure is revealed, if it is realised 
that both the limited and absolute states may be understood 
simultaneously, whenever Schiller uses the word "Harmonie" 
of this type of agreement. (Ex. 3). *
The above agreements between desire and duty, whether 
of the intuitive or moral variety, may be regarded as true 
harmonies. In both there is a delicate balance between 
the various forces within the personality. No one force 
is allowed to become dominant, but each plays its part in 
determining and executing the course of action. Such a
(1).of.p.58 preceding.( ” das G-aiize unserer sinnlichen 
und geistigen KrMfte in mëgliehster Harmonie auszubilden"j
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personality manifests to the outside world an integrated, 
harmonious whole and may perhaps he compared to the single 
chord formed hy the combination of two notes in music.
In the third type of agreement envisaged hy Schiller 
"harmony" between the forces within the personality was 
found to be achieved only as a result of a compromise on 
the part of duty. It was a state in which the individual 
deceived himself into believing that what he wanted to do 
was, in fact, in accordance with the moral law. (diagram l) 
This relationship, however, cannot be considered a true 
harmony. Schiller himself uses the verb "lügen" with 
reference to it (Ex. 12)*and in this thesis the term 
applied to it is counterfeit harmony. The revelation of 
this layer of Schiller’s thought is, in my opinion, most 
important. First of all, it is impossible to distinguish 
in practice this counterfeit agreement from the limited 
kind of moral harmony outlined above. In both cases there 
is no awareness of conflict within the personality. We 
have, however, no means of ascertaining, as long as the 
harmonious state is maintained, whether we are really 
carrying out the demands of duty or whether we are mereJy 
deceiving ourselves into thinking v/e are doing so. It is 
now perhaps clearer why an absolute moral harmony, which 
must always remain an ideal, must constantly be postulated.
(1). cf .p.80.prececLing.( "eine Harmonie zv/ischen dem Wohlsein
und Y/ohlverhalten lilgt " ).
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It is also perhaps easier to understand why, in UAW,
Schiller has to find an infallible "Probierstein" to test 
the morality of the "schone Seele" and why, in NG, he has 
to point out the dangers of an education through taste, 
if it is undergone before moral principles have been 
established sufficiently firmly.
A second general sense in which Schiller was found to 
use the word "Harmonie" in the philosophical essays was 
that of concordance between the -personality and its 
expression in the outside world. (Ex. 5). The harmonious 
individual is able not only to integrate each new experience 
into himself but also to impose his own thoughts and ideals 
on the outside world. It is suggested in this thesis that 
the reciprocal relationship between personality and 
environment can be compared to the movement through time 
of a musical work. In the same way that a work of music 
moves through time and yet retains an essential unity, so 
too the harmonious reciprocal relationship between a 
constantly changing environment and a constantly changing 
personality should, ideally, never be lost. If the inter­
action between the individual and the outside world is 
borne in mind, it is easy to see how Schiller’s theory of 
harmony can be extended to cover social, political and 
historical spheres.
On the purely personal level it may be said that the
T n  .cf.p.60 preceding”.! "Harmonie in die Versehiedenheit 
seines Erscheinens zu bringen").
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intuitively harmonious individual never experiences
conflict with his environment and thus spends his life in
a state of good fortune and happiness (Ex. 7). ^ The
individual who achieves a limited kind of moral harmony
also achieves (at least momentarily) complete harmony with
his environment. His confidence in himself is restored
and he is able to meet all situations of life with calm
and equanamity. This state may be called one of awareness
of infinite potential (Ex. 24)^(Obviously if one were
able to achieve absolute moral harmony this awareness of
infinite potential would never be lost. Such is the state
attributed by Schiller to God.) In the states of good
fortune and infinite awareness there is furthermore true
reciprocity between the personality and the environment.
The individual is not dominated by the outside world, nor
does he lose contact with it altogether. On the contrary
he is able to exert an influence on it and in this way
he contributes to the general movement of life. In the
state of counterfeit harmony, on the other hand, the
relationship between the personality and the environment
is not truly reciprocal, for the individual is governed
entirely by desires arising from stimuli received from
the outside world. Such an individual thus experiences
no conflict with the outside world, but he cannot in any
(Ij.cf.p.GB preceding. ( "wo der iviensch noch. .als harmoniscne 
Einheit wirkt").
( 2 ) .cf .p .141. preceding, (."das moralische Be dur f ni s nach liar- 
monie und nach elner ahsoluten Prelhelt dea ^'^rkens").
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sense be said to influence it. His state is one of 
complacent acceptance (Ex. 23).  ^Although it is thus 
possible to say that limited moral harmony is a dynamic 
and active state, whereas counterfeit harmony is a passive 
one, it must always be remembered that, in practice, it 
is impossible to make this distinction.
On the political-historical level the state of good 
fortune is seen by Schiller to correspond to the childhood 
of Mankind, that is to a time at the beginning of history 
when everybody was intuitively harmonious (Ex. 10). The 
state of absolute moral harmony may be said to correspond 
to a time at the end of history, to an ideal society or 
'(Elysium", to which we must constantly strive and in which 
we should all be unambiguously morally harmonious (Ex. 10).^ 
Between these two extremes each society will be the 
outward expression of the inner state of the majority of 
its inhabitants. States of inner conflict will manifest 
themselves in anarchy or totalitarianism, while complacency 
within the individual will soon lead to political 
complacency and decadence. '
In Schiller's thought the evolution both of the 
individual and of Mankind as a whole follows a dialectical 
pattern. After the first state of intuitive harmony is
(1). cf. p. 125 preceding.( "aie Einheit der Natui' sich auf déê 
gleichfdrmige Erschlaffung seiner sinnlichen und geistigen 
Krâfte grthidet";.It is true that tne word "Einheit" is used 
here,but what is described is an absence of conflict,an 
apparent harmony•
TSj .cf .p.75 preceding. (
   ______________________
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lost, a time of conflict or discord is experienced until, 
in some way, a new harmony may bfe brought about. This 
new harmony may be a true moral harmony; on the other hand, 
it may be a counterfeit one. When a test-situâtion occurs, 
counterfeit harmony v/ill reveal itself in a complacent 
attitude, and here no further development may be expected.
A truly moral individual or nation, however, will not 
shrink from entering a fresh period of conflict, and here
the whole process --- harmony, conflict, harmony—  begins
again. As each new harmony that is attained will be open 
to the charge of ambiguity, the dialectical process must 
be imagined as an infinite one. The comparison of this 
process to a musical scale is perhaps not helpful at all 
points, but it does help to illustrate two particular ones. 
The first is that each new harmony is said to be "higher" 
than the one that preceded it. (Ex. 10). The second is 
that each harmonious state comes to be regarded, after it 
in turn has been shattered, as a lost Golden Age or lost 
state of intuitive harmony. The top note of each octave, 
immediately becomes the bottom note of the next. Schiller’s 
use of the word "Harmonie" may often be found, therefore, 
to have a double reference forwards and backwards (Ex. 25).
(1) Mankind as a race has lost this state of intuitive 
harmony, and most individuals lose it in childhood.
Some individuals, however, are fortunate enough to 
maintain it for longer.
I 2 ; .of .p.149 preceding.( "und ein verderblicher Streit «rntïj. 
zweite ihre harmonisehen kr^Tte". "sinnlich" to us today, 
"moralisch"in comparison with what had gone before.^.
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For the dialectical process to he maintained it is 
necessary firstly that, in states of harmony, complacency 
must he shattered and secondly that, in states of conflict, 
a new harmony must he brought about. It now becomes clear 
why, in expounding his theories of the "aesthetic education" 
of Mankind, Schiller distinguishes two kinds of beauty.
One ("die energische Schonheit") disturbs and challenges, 
while the other ("die schmelzende Schonheit") reconciles 
tensions into a new balance and synthesis. Theoretically 
it should be possible for the same aesthetic object to 
carry out both tasks. The harmony of a work of art (Ex.
28),^Schiller believes, or the natural intuitive harmony 
of the 'genius' or other 'naive' individuals, can not only 
bring about harmony in those individuals in a state of 
conflict by presenting moral precepts in an acceptable 
form, but can also challenge and inspire those in a state 
of complacency to greater efforts. In practice, however, 
most works of art will be found to err on the side of 
either 'relaxing' or 'strengthening' beauty. There is 
a danger here, specifically pointed out in NG, that some 
people will be led by purely 'relaxing' art to value the 
absence of tension above all else and thus the possibility 
of a 'false* aesthetic education, which leads not to moral, 
but to counterfeit harmony, arises. Since Schiller realises
ITj.cf.p.l5? preceding.(Sdas Ebenmass storende Zuge der
Harmonie des Ganzen zu unterwerfen".)
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that it would he ridiculous to legislate for this situation 
(hy saying, for example, that certain works of art must 
only he experienced hy certain people) this danger will 
always remain and can only he countered hy firm instruction 
in moral principles. Hence the aesthetic education alone 
cannot perhaps he considered entirely sufficient to 
maintain Mankind's "cultural evolution". It is, however, 
an indispensable complement to a purely moral education 
which could never, of itself, bring about harmony.
It must be admitted that, in the philosophical 
writings, Schiller's concept of harmony is nowhere stated 
in so consistent a fashion as that outlined above. Never­
theless it can be argued that this consistency is present, 
if sufficient attention is paid both to the use of 
language and to the range of the essays as a whole. It 
might be objected that some of the distinctions made in 
this thesis complicate, rather than simplify, matters.
Would it not be easier, for instance, to see "sinnliche 
Harmonie" as a simple first state, in which there is no 
awareness of conflict and in which the individual feels 
himself at one with the world, and "moralische Harmonie" 
as a higher complex state achieved after the conflicts 
generated by experience have been solved and integrated 
into the personality ? Is it really necessary to see
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either state in terms of an agreement between desire and 
duty ? It could be argued that Schiller himself is here 
confusing a psychological with a philosophical issue. The 
ability to know what to do in every situation in life, 
which might be taken as one definition of "intuition", means 
that one can integrate each new experience into oneself. 
'Naive' people are able to remain harmonious throughout 
their lives either because their experience remains limited 
or because they are blessed with the gift of always knowing 
how to tackle each situation as it occurs. They may serve 
as a psychological ideal of integration towards which the 
rest of us should strive. The insistence that desire 
coincide with duty could be seen as a philosophical idea 
formulated by Schiller when under the influence of Kant.
It would seem, however, that Schiller can be defended 
against this charge if it is realised that 'integration' 
for most modern psychologists involves some degree of 
adjustment to social norms, or acceptance of social duties. 
Seen in this light, Schiller's theories of the various 
agreements possible between desire and duty can still have 
meaning, and one can perhaps see why, in the philosophical 
essays, so much emphasis is placed on harmony that springs 
from a voluntary acceptance of the moral law. Furthermore 
it is through the analysis of the various agreements possible
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between desire and duty that the existence of counterfeit 
harmony is most clearly revealed.
If the reader will now check the italicised 
expressions in the preceding paragraphs it will he found 
that 21 senses in which Schiller uses the word "Harmonie" 
may he distinguished. When he uses it with reference to 
the personality or to the relationship of the personality 
with the outside world, the musical connotations of 
combination and ordered movement are still to he borne 
in mind. For example, in Ex. 17 ("und doch tritt die
ganze G-estalt nur desto........ harmonischer hervor" ) each
action of the "schone Seele" is said to blend into the 
pattern of the whole, just as, in a symphony, each note 
is related to a central theme. Furthermore, the revelation 
of counterfeit harmony means that whenever the word is used 
a slightly ironic flavour must also be noted. In this 
respect the possibility that what we think is true harmony 
may prove to be counterfeit can perhaps be compared —  to 
take an analogy from piano-playing —  to a sombre note 
sounded by one hand while the other is still playing
(i) :;b^.lawâx are included some examples from the
dramas, where the word "Harmonie" is used with obvious 
ironic connotations.cf.Kabale und Lieoe .Ac/t V.sc.7.
( .dass E-:el und Scham eine Harmonie veranstalten, die der 
zartlichen Lie be unmoglich gev/esen ist" ) .cf.also Don Carlos. 
Act 3. sc , Ihr solltet/^v^it dieser beispiellosen Harmonie
tJetzt in derselben Meinung euch begegnen ? .
*** j ' S/\ lf»lL II. ^*3'’
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vivaciously. A  good example of this may he seen in Ex.17
(quoted above) because, as the "Würde" section of UAW makes
clear, there is no way of telling, as long as the state of
harmony is maintained, whether the "beautiful" life is a
truly moral one. Finally it would seem that, because of
the reciprocal relationship between Man and Society and
because the idea of an ideally harmonious Universe never
entirely disappears from Schiller's thought, the
psychological, political and metaphysical connotations
must always be borne in mind whenever the word "Harmonie"
occurs in Schiller's work. Sometimes, as in Ex.27. ("Der
Geschmack allein bringt Harmonie in die Gesellschaft, weil
u
er Harmonie in dem Individ/um stiftet") the word is used 
at two different levels, the first "Harmonie" here 
implying an ideal political society and the second referring 
to the psychological state of the individual. Sometimes,
as in Ex.11 ("...... als jenen Streit in der geistreichen
Harmonie einer vollig durchgefuhrten Bildung geendigt 
sehen") both levels may be understood simultaneously.
Hence the claim made in the introduction that "Harmonie" 
may be seen as another Schillerian concept-n;yth will, it 
is hoped, appear justified. The v/ord "Harmonie" may be 
said to serve as a code-word for all the thoughts and 
ideas formulated by Schiller as regards his Ideal: or, to
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put the matter differently, the whole range of his thought 
exhibits a musical structure, in which one word or idea 
can only be understood fully with reference to those other 
ideas at work in the writer's mind, just as one note within 
a symphony is meant to be heard in conjunction with all the 
other notes and themes within the framework of the whole.
The 18th century has been called the Age of
A
Revolution. The political upheavals that occurred in 
France and America, for example, are but the most 
spectacular manifestations of the changes taking place 
in human thought. Throughout the Western world, one 
might say, the individuality of each human being was 
asserted. In politics, the concept of democracy emerged. 
In religion, the individual was encouraged to think for 
himself and, if he so desired, to reject God altogether 
and form his own "religion naturelle". In philosophy the 
problems of individual human experience (sense perception.
(1) cf. R.R.Palmer The Age of Democratic Revolution. Vol.I. 
The Challenge. Princeton University Press. 1959.
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the aesthetic experience) began to be explored and 
eventually a new science, that of psychology, came into 
being. The movements known broadly as "Aufklarung" and 
"Empfindsamkeit" may perhaps be seen as two different 
facets of this process. In the former the progress of 
Mankind is to be achieved by following certain laws 
discoverable by human reason and all concepts and 
institutions that impede such enlightenment are to be 
rejected. In the latter the individual is exhorted to 
explore his own inner self and listen to the voice of 
feeling.
With these new thoughts came new problems. How could 
one live morally if God were rejected, if the ancient 
authority of Church and King were denied ? How could 
democracy achieve its aims of liberty, equality and 
fraternity without degenerating into anarchy ? These 
problems found a variety of answers, and that given by 
Schiller is by no means a facile one. He has moved a 
long way away from the popular doctrines of Leibniz with 
their affirmation that this is the best of all possible 
worlds, and yet he wishes to preserve the harmonious 
structure of the Universe, for otherwise even the urge in 
Man towards harmony might be called into question. The 
Universe is for Schiller still a harmonious purposeful
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whole governed hy certain laws, just as a piece of music 
is governed hy laws of rhythm, hut Man can choose whether 
or not to obey these laws, Schiller also champions 
Shaftesbury *s ideal of the ’virtuoso', the man who 
naturally obeys the moral law, while at the same time he 
realises the capacity for self-deception to which Man is 
heir. This important point of divergence from Shaftesbury 
and his disciples forces Schiller to admit the necessity for 
some absolute moral law such as that proposed by Kant. In 
his own work this necessity may be seen reflected in the 
necessity for Man to postulate an ever-higher ideal, in the 
necessity for constant questioning and self-examination.
If Schiller’s thought here and there appears confused, if 
his distinctions are not subtle enough, if the language of 
his time seems to tie him down in inconsistencies, he 
should at least be given credit for tackling a task of 
overwhelming magnitude: that of providing Mankind with a 
blueprint for its own future. The goal is a harmonious 
world, in which each individual will have his unique 
contribution to make, just as each note contributes to a 
great symphony. Schiller does not pretend that this goal 
can ever entirely be realised. He recognised too clearly 
those streaks in Man’s nature that will make the individual 
put his own selfish interests first and that will render
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most human actions ambiguous. In Schiller’s dramatic 
works the ambiguity of human action leads to tragedy, and 
the lot of Mankind would indeed be tragic if this ambiguity 
could not in any way be balanced by a more hopeful stand­
point. In his philosophical works Schiller provides this 
balance by postulating an Ideal of absolute moral harmony 
towards which we can constantly strive and against which we 
can measure all our actions. Furthermore, to preserve 
Mankind from falling into absolute despair, he offers us, 
in the aesthetic experience, the possibility of experiencing 
this harmony, if only for a few moments. It is this 
experience which is to give us courage and inspiration to 
live our everyday lives. In his own time Schiller provided
inspiration to many ---  perhaps the most fitting example
to mention here is that of Beethoven, whose Choral 
Symphony may perhaps be said to capture the dynamic movement
of Schiller’s thought --- but his message is just as
relevant for us today and also, one would hope, for all 
future ages.
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